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This thesis is an analysis of the public service int gration, a New Public Management 
initiative, in a transitional context such as Kazakhstan. This thesis focuses on three 
main perspectives – the impact of the service integra ion policy on those who was 
involved in the implementation process; the problematic aspects of service 
integration in a transitional context; and the use of “organisational learning” and 
“communities of practice” in analysing service integration. By combining New 
Public Management theory (in particular, the ideas on decentralising management 
and customer-orientation), service integration theory and organisational learning 
theories, and rich empirical data, this thesis found that public service integration was 
implemented in the Kazakhstani context to a limited extent. Through the use of 
triangulation of methods which incorporated case study, interviews, participant 
observation, virtual ethnography and documentary analysis, this thesis captured 
complex, non-linear and diverse power dimensions and relationships between the 
new single-window centres, traditional service providers and customers. The 
development of the “communities of practice” among the front-line personnel was 
analysed within service integration policy context.   
 
Promoting service integration is seen as beneficial for both service providers and 
customers in Kazakhstan, but there are both conceptual and practical challenges. 
Although significant progress in public service improvement was achieved and noted 
in the research, this thesis found that the One Stop hops inherited relations-based, 
patronage system and corruption from the traditional bureaucracy. It found that the 
new technologies, while improving access to the public services, were used to extend 
centralised control across the regions. This thesis also found that organisational 
learning did take place, however, in the underdeveloped form of adaptive learning, 
with the lack of critical reflection on the existing ways of working. This thesis 
concluded that the institutional framework and culture prevailing in the Kazakhstani 
traditional bureaucracy constrained implementation of the service integration policy 
to a full extent. 
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In the past few years, academics, political scientists and international organisations 
have focused their attention on managerial reforms in post-communist countries. 
Within the region of Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), New Public Management (NPM) reforms became on  f the priorities because 
these reforms were expected to improve the quality of governance, and that, in turn, 
should have led to the entrenchment of new democratic political systems and market 
economies. In promoting NPM ideas, many internationl organisations encouraged 
recipient countries to reform their public administration systems. Regardless of the 
claims made by the advocates or opponents of the managerial reforms, the NPM 
concept still remains a top priority on the agenda of many governments in the post-
communist region. 
 
This thesis contributes to the debate on the applicabi ty and appropriateness of 
managerial reforms in transitional countries by examining implementation of the 
‘One Stop Shop’ policy (OSS) in the post-Soviet Central Asian state of Kazakhstan.1 
The public administration reform in Kazakhstan has introduced a new public sector 
organization – OSS – as an innovative approach to citizen-centred service delivery. 
The term “OSS” is defined as the provision of services and information of different 
government bodies through one location (Hagen and Kubicek, 2000). The OSS 
policy is aiming to bring together a wide range of public services from across central 
government departments and local municipalities (akimats) to provide citizens with 
high quality, integrated and easy-to-access service.2 Kazakhstan is considered to be a 
front-runner in the NPM reforms compared to other Central Asian states. By 
comparison, the neighbouring countries either have not been able to reform their 
respective civil services consistently, due to political instability (for example, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), or the reform measures they ave enacted have been largely 
conservative in nature (for example, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; Duvanova, 2008; 
Knox, 2008; Perlman and Gleason, 2007). The case of Kazakhstan is peculiar. 
                                                
1 “One Stop Shops” are referred to in the legislation as “Public Service Centres”. In this thesis the 
term “One Stop Shop” is used along with the term “single-window”.     
2 The Kazakh term “akimat” is used to define a “local municipality”.   
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During the early years of independence, under the influence of various Western 
institutions, it has been enthusiastically introducing modern aspects of public 
administration within the context of rapid economic liberalisation. Kazakhstan is 
regarded as a new model for the developing world (Perlman and Gleason, 2007), 
moving “forward in its evolution toward a democratic country” (Knox, 2008: 486), 
as evidenced since 2010 by the country’s confirmation o the rotating chair of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  
 
Although this thesis is mainly drawn from the experience of Kazakhstan and focuses 
on post-communist bureaucratic challenges, it has potentially far-reaching 
implications, because it draws attention to the impact of political regimes on state 
capacity and the culture of traditional bureaucracy. These issues are relevant in a 
variety of regional and political settings. Through the analysis of consecutive stages 
of the OSS policy development (marked by the adoption of important documents in 
2005, 2007, and 2009), this research evaluates the extent to which Kazakhstan’s 
legislative changes promoted “better quality for less costs”, customer-orientation, 
transparency and accountability in the public service provision. The photo below 
(Figure 1) illustrates the customer service environme t and design of the single-
window centre, which helps a reader to visualize a typical Kazakhstani OSS as we 
enter into the discussion on the OSS policy implementation.    
 














The single-window centre represents a counter servic  in a modern and well-
designed space, which is available for citizens, and tries, in a more business-like 
atmosphere, to process customers’ requests for official documents, the payment of 
registration fees and similar services. During the period of data collection for this 
research project, from December 2006 to December 2008, the OSS provided access 
to 25 services of three key stakeholders: the Ministry of Justice (MJ) of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan (RK), a coordinator of reform (legal services, for example, issuing a 
passport, business registration, property registraton); Agency for Land Resource 
Management (ALRM) (land services), and Ministry of Defence (MD) (registration of 
military servants in reserve).3 The full list of services delivered through the single-
window arrangements is provided in Chapter 5. This research does not cover the 32 
new services, which have been added to the scope of the OSS services since January 
2009 after this fieldwork was finished, however, Chapter 9 provides a brief 
discussion of the selected new services based on the secondary data.    
 
This thesis analyses OSS policy implementation with a particular focus on service 
integration processes drawing on the experiences of the OSS managers, front-office 
employees and service users.4 It uses a qualitative approach to understanding and 
examining the transformation of public service deliv ry processes as it is 
contextually driven and requires a high degree of interpretative work. This 
introduction sets out the research questions of the thesis; provides the background for 
service integration policy in Kazakhstan in order to contextualise the research; 
indicates the key research problems and the findings i  relation to these, and outlines 
the structure of the thesis by providing a brief summary of each chapter.   
 
 
                                                
3 “Stakeholders” are used to define government bodies which work in cooperation with the Ministry 
of Justice to deliver joined-up services through OSS.        
4 The terms “front-office” or “front-line” are used to define staff at the front line of customer service. 
The term “back-office” is used to define government officials from stakeholder departments who 
review applications and make decisions “at the back stage” of service delivery process. The terms 
“service user”, “customer” and “client” are used interchangeably in this thesis to define users of the 
public services.  
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1.1 THE AIMS OF THE THESIS   
 
The aim of the research was to examine the processes of public service integration in 
Kazakhstan, using the different experiences of those involved in policy 
implementation: the managers of the single-window centres and coordinating 
authority, front-line employees and customers. Further to this the research aimed to 
analyse the conceptual and practical difficulties as ociated with the transfer of the 
managerial idea of service integration to the post-c mmunist context such as 
Kazakhstan. Bardach (1998) and Bloom et al. (2008) highlight that service 
integration is a learning process. “Organisational learning” entails individuals 
questioning and challenging the organisation, leading to a deeper level of 
understanding and reassessment of values and assumptions (Argyris and Schon, 
1978a). Public service integration has challenged the traditional bureaucracy by 
stimulating knowledge exchange across professional a d organisational boundaries. 
Learning based on everyday practice in the workplace and other social settings takes 
place within “communities of practice”, which are single, localised, and relatively 
small communities (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Thus, thi  research aimed to test the 
appropriateness of the use of the concepts “organisational learning” and 
“communities of practice” in analysing service integration processes. These aims 
were operationalised through three research questions he development of which is 
discussed further in Chapters 2-4. The following research questions give structure to 
this thesis and significance to its findings (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Research Questions  
 
 Research Questions 
1.  What are the experiences of those involved in the implementation of public 
service integration through single-window arrangements in Kazakhstan? 
2.  In what ways is service integration a problematic concept in a transitional 
context such as Kazakhstan? 
3.  Are concepts such as “organisational learning” and “communities of 
practice” useful tools in analysing public service integration?  
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These research questions are significant given the importance of effective and cost-
efficient public services to Kazakhstan’s ability to modernise its society and 
economy. These questions recognise that service, quality and learning are contextual; 
for this reason I explored these concepts in particular contexts of the case study 
organisations. Questions 1-2 helped to prepare a basis for answering research 
question 3. Each of these research questions requires a multi-layered answer. These 
answers involve reviewing appropriate literature, refe encing empirical data, and the 
construction of conceptual instruments to enable a full analysis. In each case, the 
answers cross-reference, each contributing towards a holistic vision of public service 
integration in Kazakhstan. 
 
A number of influences shaped my interest in this research and the methodological 
approach undertaken. As set out in Section 1.2 below, public service integration 
through a single-window arrangement is a highly topical and politically sensitive 
area. Public service integration policy was launched quite recently in Kazakhstan, in 
February 2005, by the Presidential initiative to improve the quality of public services 
and orientate the government towards customer needs (Nazarbayev, 2005a). Given 
the high disparity of the population over a large terri ory of the country, with nearly 
half of the citizens living in rural areas, low level of computer literacy and limited 
Internet access, face-to-face interaction between th  government and clients through 
the single-window centres still remains the most significant access point to public 
services. Within five years of policy implementation the spectrum of OSS services 
has been increased from 25 to 57 services, and the number of the single-window 
centres has expanded from four pilots to over 300 physical offices across the country. 
Therefore, understanding the operation and impact of the system is of great 
importance. The responses to service quality improvement by using the single-
window arrangement are indicative of the broader trnds of how the Kazakhstani 
government responds to the needs of its citizens’ ad pressure from the international 
community, which it is very keen to become part of.   
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I am interested in public service integration area because I worked in the Civil 
Service Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Agency) for six years prior to my 
doctoral study and witnessed radical changes in the Kazakhstani public sector. In 
addition, my personal interest in this research was shaped by studying NPM literature 
and discussions with practitioners who participated in my training sessions at the 
Eurasian Civil Service Training Centre and shared their concerns on the 
implementation of Western ideas in the post-communist context. My knowledge of 
the local political system characterised by hierarchical, “monolithic” and corrupt 
bureaucracy also contributed to my desire to understand how a new managerial 
policy such as service integration would be implemented in Kazakhstan, how the 
policy would affect those who would be implementing it, how the policy would 
challenge the existing structure and culture, and fi ally to be able to carry out 
research that will contribute to the policy development. Therefore, in other words, 
this research combines my professional interests, knowledge of the local context and 
academic interests.  
 
Whilst the overall outcomes of the public service integration policy, such as quality 
improvement, cost-effectiveness and fighting corruption, are clearly articulated in the 
official documents, the links between them and the guidelines for implementation are 
vague, implicit and in some cases contradictory. The development of the legislation 
is summarised below and discussed further in Chapter 5. In order to analyse factors 
affecting patterns of public service integration in Kazakhstan, my interest was to 
explore different areas (political, cultural, organisational and technological), in which 
strategic decisions on policy design, selection of the specific types of technologies 
and services were influenced by the international trends in managerial reforms and a 
dynamic interplay of internal and external factors. This thesis may not reflect the full 
complexity of the relationships between key variables, which require re-
contextualisation and significant learning on a variety of local circumstances. 
However, this research project aims to provide a useful basis for understanding and 
explaining the impact of the political regime on state capacity, the culture of 
traditional bureaucracy and the implementation of public service integration in a 
transitional context. 
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Further to this, these interests affect who my intended audiences are. Aside from my 
supervisors and examiners, I am interested in addressing an audience of academics. 
This work aims to make a valuable contribution to the heoretical interpretation of 
service integration in the context of managerial reforms in transitional countries, 
which in the academic discourse still remains unexplored. I also address Kazakhstani 
policymakers who may find the results and conclusion  f this research project useful 
for the improvement of policy implementation. While the situation in the 
Kazakhstani public sector in many respects is similar to the situation in other post-
communist states, academics and governments from the neighbouring countries may 
find the results and conclusions of this research project applicable to their countries 
as well. Thus, this research combines an interest arising from my experience in the 
civil service with academic interests developed during teaching practice, and 
practical strategic decisions. 
 
Based on the research questions above, a number of choices were made regarding 
appropriate research strategies. The importance of context in understanding and 
analysing the service integration process was clear both from the literature and the 
policy itself: “implementation is not just about choosing and implementing a 
programme of change that reflects ‘best practice’ but understanding political 
contingencies that may affect the successful implementation of a change programme” 
(Osborne and Brown, 2005: 67).  
 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, this research uses a qualitative rather than 
quantitative approach, as the service integration process is contextually driven and 
requires a high degree of interpretative work. Combining participant observation, 
interviews, policy documents, case studies and virtual ethnography provided data 
from different angles on the implementation process, and on the different responses 
that have emerged. Two case studies of the OSS were examined in Astana, the new 
capital of Kazakhstan, which provided rich empirical d ta for analysis and formed an 
important context for gaining a detailed, in-depth understanding of the service 
integration process. The case organisations were launched as pilot projects in 
November 2005. By the start of data collection which took place from December 
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2006 to December 2008, the case organisations have accumulated the most 
experience in design and delivery of joined-up servic s compared to other single-
window centres which were established one-two years later. New service procedures, 
technologies and innovations were piloted first at the case organisations, which 
transferred their experiences to the regions at a later stage. Hence, selected cases 
were able to provide rich empirical data on the issue  of learning new work practices 
and service arrangements. 
 
Participant observation of the daily work practices within the case organisations 
provided first-hand insight into the challenges, tensions and contradictions of the 
front-line customer service. It is important to emphasise that the research was not 
limited to the selected sites in Astana. In addition t  the examination of the work 
practices in the case organisations, interviews with 11 managers of the single-
window centres from different regions, 5 senior managers from the coordinating 
authority, and 25 front-line employees were conducted and analysed. The rich 
empirical data combined with the analysis of web-discussions among service users 
and extensive secondary data in the form of policy documents, survey reports and 
mass media publications, provided an opportunity to grasp a broad overview of the 
policy implementation from the views of those who have introduced legislative 
changes, those who implemented policies in practice and those who have 
experienced customer service at the new public organisations. 
 
The thesis structure is outlined below, indicating the ways in which these themes are 
addressed throughout it. The study begins by developing a framework for the 
analysis (Chapters 2-3). This combines a review of NPM, service integration, 
concepts of “organisational learning” and “communities of practice”, each of which 
are contested domains. The ways in which this reseach project is put into practice 
and the challenges it poses are outlined in the discussion of the research design and 
practice (Chapter 4). The study then moves on to analyse different dimensions of 
public service integration within the single-window centres across regions adopting a 
macro-perspective (Chapters 5-6). Chapter 5 reviews the key stages of policy 
implementation and analyses the underlying reasons f r hifting from the original 
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“single-access model” towards a country-specific “alternative-access model”. 
Chapter 6 analyses power dimensions and the developm nt of relationships between 
the key stakeholders, as well as examining the use of control mechanisms over the 
performance of the OSS managers and front-line staff. Against this background and 
by way of illustration, the research then turns to a micro level case study of the 
personnel policies within the single-window centres by examining selection, 
recruitment and training policies as well as gendere  divisions (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 
explores experiences and perceptions of the front-line employees from the case 
organisations in the process of learning and adopting new working practices and 
service arrangements. Chapter 9 provides a discussion of the corrupt culture of the 
public service in Kazakhstan in relation to the single-window centres, and explores 
customers’ perceptions of the new service organisations compared to the traditional 
government bodies. In the final chapter the answers to the research questions, the 
implications of the study for the analysis of managerial reforms in the transitional 
context, the appropriateness of the concepts such as “organisational learning” and 
“communities of practice” in the context of Kazakhstan are discussed (Chapter 10).                    
 
Overall, this thesis presents a qualitative case study of the service integration 
processes in the public sector of Kazakhstan. It draws on research with the service 
providers (OSS managers and front-line employees) to analyse the impact of the 
political system on the extent and progress of policy implementation. It also takes 
into account the voices of the services users who experienced customer service 
through single-window arrangements. The findings are focused around the key 
analytic themes relating to the impact of the political system on the policy 
implementation, defining and promoting service integration, and challenges 
constraining policy implementation. It is argued that, within a difficult policy context 
of this transitional country, many positive achievements as well as strategic failures 
have been made in Kazakhstan in relation to the improvement in quality of public 
services, and fighting corruption. The background for public service integration and 
the context for this research are discussed in the following section. Whilst the focus 
of this research is on the service integration policy, with case studies located in 
Astana, this has to be understood within the broader context of the managerial 
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reforms in Kazakhstan. Key trends are summarised in this section, prior to an in-
depth critical analysis of the literature in Chapters 2-3 and the policy analysis in 
Chapters 5-10. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT       
   
It is largely accepted as a fact that national cultures affect the structures and 
performance of public administration. As Lachman, Nedd and Hinings (1994: 52) 
state, “Imported practices may fail, or be ineffectively implemented, if they are 
inconsistent with the core values of local settings”. Explanation of the relations 
between contextual factors and a new policy will hep me to lead a discussion on why 
service integration policy has taken a country-specific form in Kazakhstan, what 
impact the political system has had on the culture of the customer-oriented 
bureaucracy, the nature of service integration processes, and what challenges have 
constrained policy implementation.     
 
There are a number of features about Kazakhstan that make it both an interesting and 
important location for the research. Kazakhstan is emerging as the most dynamic 
economic and political actor in Central Asia (Dave, 2007). It is the second largest 
country of the former Soviet Union, after the Russian Federation, and has rich natural 
resources, particularly oil and gas reserves, which are being exploited through 
massive foreign investment. Despite remarkable economic transformation under the 
leadership of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in 2008 the overall poverty rate was 
estimated to be 15 percent of the population, exceeding 60 percent in some oil-rich 
rural regions (World Bank, 2008). Kazakhstan has the lowest social indicators in the 
regions of Europe and Central Asia (for example, in terms of access to safe drinking 
water, incidence of tuberculosis and AIDS), which illustrate the poor quality of 
socially significant public services, such as health and social care. One of the 
significant challenges for Kazakhstan in improving public service quality at lower 
cost is its small population size (15.4 million peole) spread over a vast territory 
which is equal in size to the Western Europe (1 million square miles), with nearly 
half of the citizens, 43 percent, living in the rural areas.  
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The political system of the country raises serious concerns among the academic 
community and is criticized for monopolizing political power, clanism and nepotism 
(Cummings, 2005; Duvanova, 2008; Emrich-Bakenova, 2009; Perlman and Gleason, 
2007; Schatz, 2004). General public dissatisfaction with the poor quality of public 
services delivered by the government bodies and public sector organisations 
(hospitals, schools, traffic police, tax bodies etc.) has resulted in the formulation of a 
negative image of the government (Jandosova, 2003; Jandosova, 2007).  
 
The political leadership of Kazakhstan wants the country to become one of the 
world’s top oil producers and to enter the top 50 competitive economies. Kazakhstan 
is under growing pressure by the international community to engage in political 
reforms which include a modernisation agenda to improve quality of public services 
(Knox, 2008). Since January 2010 this is particularly significant in light of the 
present chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the OSCE, although serious concerns were 
raised that Kazakhstan could undermine integrity of the OSCE’s human-rights 
principles (Kucera, 2009; Lillis, 2009). Many regional experts continue to assert that 
Kazakhstan does not adequately represent the OSCE’s democratic values, and, 
therefore, does not deserve to chair the organisation. In response to the critique of the 
international community President Nazarbayev said that Western-style democracy 
cannot be quickly implemented in Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan has achieved 
certain results in developing democratic legislation, the Kazakhstani government 
endorsed a number of non-democratic legislative acts. These include the adoption of 
the law that restricts freedom of expression via the Internet, and passing a draft law 
that restricts disclosure of information about the personal lives of the public figures 
and allows for the criminal prosecution of journalists (Marat, 2009). These examples 
present a snapshot of the authoritarian political system in Kazakhstan which is 
important to understand in order to allow for follow analysis of the managerial 





An overview of the findings of the international survey report is presented below to 
contextualise the political, socio-economic and technological environment of the 
country, and to examine Kazakhstan from a comparative perspective with other post-
communist countries. Discussion of the country’s background enables a reader to 
understand the interplay of complex internal and external factors that have shaped 
the service integration policy in a country-specific form in the process of transferring 
the managerial ideas from developed democracies to the transitional context.       
 
According to the survey on Worldwide Governance Indicators which captures six 
key dimensions of governance in 212 countries over more than a decade 1996-2008, 
Kazakhstan is pictured in an unfavourable position compared to some post-
communist states, such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see Table 2) (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009). Voice and Accountability measures the extent to which 
a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, freedom of 
expression and a free media. Political Stability measures the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Regulatory Quality 
measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of Law 
measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, 































Singapore  35 96 100 99.5 94 99.5 
Estonia  83 67 84 92 85 79 
Latvia 73 59 70 83 71 65 
Lithuania  72 72 72 85 68 63 
Russia  22 24 45 31 20 16 
Kazakhstan  19 64 39 40 24 16 
Kyrgyzstan  26 22 26 42 8 13 
Uzbekistan  2 18 27 6 10 11 
Tajikistan  10 21 17 16 12 15 
Turkmenistan  1 53 11 2 7 5 
 
Adopted from Kaufmann, D., Kraay A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2009) Governance Matters VIII: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996 - 2008, Washington: World Bank, 
http://www.govindicators.org              
 
Table 2 shows the survey results of 10 countries in terms of aggregate and individual 
governance indicators from 1996-2008 in order to compare Kazakhstan with other 
post-communist states. The aggregate indicators combine the views of a large 
number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and 
developing countries. The individual data underlying the aggregate indicators are 
drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-government 
organisations, and international organisations. Singapore was included in this table as 
an exemplary model for Kazakhstan chosen by the political leadership: a country 
with “eastern mentality” which successfully eliminated corruption.   
 
The indicators “government effectiveness” and “contr l of corruption” are also 
considered here: Government effectiveness measures the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to such policies. In terms of government 
effectiveness Kazakhstan (score of 39) is behind Russia (45), but remains the highest 
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in the Central Asia region (Uzbekistan – 27; Kyrgyzstan – 26; Tajikistan – 17; and 
Turkmenistan – 11), which testifies to the ongoing progress of the public sector 
modernisation agenda. However, Kazakhstan is lagging far behind other post-
communist countries, such as Estonia (84), Lithuania (72), and Latvia (70).  
 
The next indicator - “control of corruption” - measures the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including petty and high forms of corruption, as 
well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The control of corruption 
in Kazakhstan (16) is much lower than in Baltic states (Estonia – 79, Latvia – 65, 
Lithuania – 63). The situation with the control of c rruption in Kazakhstan is similar 
to the situation in Russia (16) and other Central Asian states (Tajikistan – 15, 
Kyrgyzstan – 13, and Uzbekistan – 11). While Kazakhstan is leading in Central Asia 
region in terms of “government effectiveness”, the “control of corruption” in the 
country is still very weak and similar to the situation in Russia and neighbouring 
Central Asian states. Kazakhstan is lagging far behind Baltic countries, which 
illustrate bright examples of successful transformation from Soviet centralized 
bureaucratic systems to democratic market economies, thus justifying that good 
governance is not the sole preserve of rich, industriali ed countries, but can be found 
around the world. It is worth highlighting at this stage that the political management 
of Kazakhstan tends to avoid comparisons with the Baltic states. By contrast, it 
actively uses effect of positive, stable economic and political situation in Kazakhstan 
compared to the “colour revolutions” in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia.   
 
Singapore, a model for Kazakhstan in driving public management reform, has one of 
the best world rankings in terms of government effectiv ness (100) and control of 
corruption (99.5). However, Singapore ranks in the middle on voice and 
accountability (35), far below poorer post-communist states (for example, Baltic 
countries). The Singapore public service is regarded as almost entirely free from 
corruption, a fact that in a large part reflects the strong emphasis the national 
leadership placed on probity and dedication to natio l values with the lack of 
democratic mechanisms.  
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The high level of corruption in Kazakhstan is also confirmed by the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) report published by Transparency International. The CPI 
survey report by Transparency International relates to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by the business people and country a alysts among 180 countries, 
and ranges from 10, as highly clean, and 0, as highly corrupt. According to the CPI 
survey report Kazakhstan is ranked 120th among the most corrupt countries in the 
world (Transparency International, 2009).  
 





















Adopted from Transparency International report “Corruption Perception Index 2009”, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009   
 
The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the 
abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI ask 
questions relating to the misuse of public power for private benefit. These include, 
for example: bribery of public officials, misuse ofpublic funds and questions that 
probe the strength and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts, thereby encompassing 
both the administrative and political aspects of corruption. Table 3 shows that the 
CPI score of Kazakhstan in 2009 is 2.7, which is far below Estonia (6.6), Lithuania 
(4.9), and Latvia (4.5). In terms of the CPI score, Kazakhstan is better when 
compared to Russia (2.2) and other Central Asia states: Tajikistan (2.0), Kyrgyzstan 
(1.9), Turkmenistan (1.8) and Uzbekistan (1.7). Singapore has one of the highest CPI 
Country rank Country 2009 CPI score 
3 Singapore  9.2 
27 Estonia 6.6 
52 Lithuania  4.9 
56 Latvia  4.5 
120 Kazakhstan 2.7 
146 Russia 2.2 
158 Tajikistan  2.0 
162 Kyrgyzstan 1.9 
168 Turkmenistan 1.8 
174 Uzbekistan 1.7 
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scores (9.2) reflecting political stability, long-established conflict of interest 
regulations, and solid, functioning public institutions. Realising that corruption 
presents fundamental challenges to build-up a transparent and democratic 
government, the political leadership has placed high expectations on the public 
service integration policy as a panacea from corruption and public service failures. 
The corrupt culture of the public sector in Kazakhstan is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 9, which examines the impact of the traditional bureaucracy on the new 
public service organisations by illustrating examples of the illegal practices within 
single-window centres.   
 
It is important to examine the technological infrast ucture of the country given the 
significant role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in improving 
the activities of public sector organisations and their agents (Heeks, 2003). The 
expected outcome of service integration is building joined-up government, which 
enables information to be gathered and shared across departments, and public 
services to be re-organised and joined together in an integrative manner. Thus, the 
technological infrastructure in the country can enable or constrain service integration 
as a means to overcome distance and assist vulnerable groups in remote locations to 
get access to the public services.   
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) publishes e-readiness rankings through a 
weighted index comprising of about 100 quantitative and qualitative criteria. 
According to the EIU rating Kazakhstan is positioned in 66th place among 70 
countries with a score of 3.89 out of maximum 10, which is far below Estonia (7.10), 
Latvia and Lithuania (6.03), and Russia (4.42). Kazakhstan is the only country in the 
Central Asia region covered by the EIU, and the repo t lacks any explanation of the 
reasons for the missing data on the other Central Asian countries. Table 4 shows the 
overall benchmarking of Kazakhstan’s e-readiness as well as its ranking in specific 
categories such as the connectivity and technological infrastructure; the business 
environment; the social and cultural environment; the legal environment; government 
policy and vision, and finally consumer and business adoption. Connectivity and 
technological infrastructure measures the extent to which individuals and busines es 
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can access mobile networks and the Internet, and their ability to access digital 
services through means such as digital identity cards.  The business environment 
covers such factors as the strength of the economy, political stability, taxation, 
competition policy, the labour market, and openness to trade and investment. The 
social and cultural environment measures the population’s literacy and basic 
education as well as “e-literacy”, i.e. experience using the Internet and its receptivity 
to it. The legal environment reflects those legal frameworks that have a direct mpact 
on the use of digital technology to inform, communicate and transact business. 
Government policy and vision assesses the activities of governments in leading 
citizens to a future government, which is digital and has a clear roadmap for the 
adoption of technology. Finally, consumer and business adoption looks at the 
amount that businesses and consumers spend on accessing ICT services and their 
adoption levels of e-commerce, as well as availabilty of digital channels for 
accessing government services.  
 












infrastructure   
 




15% 5.66 8.65 (Denmark) 4.40 (Iran) 
 
Social and cultural 
environment  
 
15% 3.80 9.13 (Australia) 3.20 (Azerbaijan) 
Legal environment  10% 3.70 9.80 (Hong Kong) 2.20 (Iran) 
 
Government policy 
and vision   
 
15% 2.85 9.85 (Denmark) 2.50 (Iran) 
Consumer and 
business adoption   
 
25% 4.05 9.70 (Singapore) 2.25 (Iran) 
 
Adopted from “The 2008 E-readiness Rankings – a White Paper from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit”, http://www.eiu.com   
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As is apparent from Table 4, the present state of e-readiness in Kazakhstan is 
considered to be very close to the lowest score in most of the categories. Only five 
countries, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran and Vietnam were ranked below 
Kazakhstan. The combination of factors such as lack of clarity in government policy 
and vision, an inadequate legal environment, low connectivity and technological 
infrastructure, as well as the social and cultural environment, have posed significant 
constraints to successful public service integration in the country.    
 
Some international reports are more positive in their evaluation of Kazakhstan’s 
progress in developing a technological infrastructure. According to the United 
Nations “E-Government Survey 2008: from E-Government to Connected Governance 
2008”, Kazakhstan is continuously showing strong progress in improving the overall 
e-environment. The report ranks 192 countries on their readiness for e-government 
services based on the composite of Web Measure, Telecom Infrastructure and 
Human Capital indices. The Web Measure index is primarily the measure of the 
presence/absence of specific electronic facilities/s rvices available on the official 
website and/or some sectoral sites, e.g. health, education, social welfare.   
 
The ranking for Kazakhstan in 2008 was 16 ranks higher than that achieved in 2005 
which itself was 18 ranks higher than that achieved in 2003. This report particularly 
emphasises the improvements made in the government site 
(http://www.government.kz) and the president’s site(http://www.akorda.kz). Despite 
this rapid improvement in rankings and the fact thaK zakhstan received very high 
scores on the Human Capital Index, the level exceeding Singapore and other 
developed countries, Kazakhstan is ranked 81st out of 192 countries in terms of 
overall e-government readiness, lagging behind Estonia (13), Lithuania (28), Latvia 
(36), and Russia (60). In the Central Asia region Kazakhstan is followed by 






The overall conclusion of the international survey r ports by the EIU and United 
Nations is that despite positive signs of ICT infrast ucture development,                   
e-government readiness of the country remains very low. The significant challenge 
for Kazakhstan is the continuing and widening digital divide defined by Fink and 
Kenny (2003: 2) as a gap in access to ICT, the ability to use ICT, actual use and the 
impact of use. According to the National Programme of Building-Up E-government 
in Kazakhstan in 2005-2007, the percentage of the population who were computer 
literate was 4.5%, which included 2.3 percent of Inter et users. However, the ICT 
infrastructure and use of Internet has developed dynamically in Kazakhstan. The 
number of households with access to computers has tripled within the last five years 
up to 15 percent including 5 percent of active Inter et users. While only 22 percent 
of citizens have access to land-line telephone communication, 100 percent of the 
population is covered by mobile phone technologies.  
 
Kazakhstan, being a large geographical country, is facing much more diverse socio-
economic and technological conditions than many successful e-government countries 
with relatively small territorial entities (for example, the Baltic states and Singapore). 
There are significant variations in Internet availability, usage, affordability and 
reliability between large cities and rural areas. Given the disparity of the population 
across the country, low level of computer literacy and limited Internet access, 
customer service through face-to-face rather than virtual communication still remains 
a vitally important access point to the public services for Kazakhstanians, 
particularly in the case of vulnerable groups and rural inhabitants.  
 
Thus, the managerial idea of public service integration has been introduced into the 
transitional context of a post-communist Central Asian country which is 
characterised by the authoritarian political regime, high level of corruption, lack of 
public accountability and low level of e-government readiness. At the same time 
Kazakhstan has high human capital illustrated by the dynamic growth of the 
computer literacy and spread of Internet usage, which is promising with regards to 
the technological side of the policy implementation. One of the main targets of the 
Kazakhstani administrative reform during the last 10 years has been to improve the 
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quality of public services and reduce the level of c rruption (Janenova, 2008a; 
Kaparov, 2006; Knox, 2008). Kazakhstani public administration has not been 
immune to the international trend of NPM, which presents a fundamental challenge 
to the traditional inertial bureaucracy. The main priorities for the current 
administrative reforms were defined as follows: 
• to improve the quality of public administration processes, procedures and 
public service provision; 
• to improve professional skills, efficiency and co-ordination of the state 
apparatus; and 
• to reduce risks of corruption (Presidential Decree No. 274, 13 January 2007).  
 
The single-window centres as innovative, customer-oriented organisations, have 
proved to be highly popular with citizens more used to being shunted from one 
public body to another by poorly motivated civil servants lacking in customer 
orientation (Knox, 2008: 489). Table 5 indicates the development of public service 


















Table 5: OSS Policy Legislation – Key Points   
 




Government Resolution on the 
“Establishment of Public 
Service Centres on a pilot basis 
by the Ministry of Justice, Tax 
Committee and Agency for 
Land Resource Management”  
  
4 pilot OSS were launched: two in Astana 
and two in Almaty. 
 
Civil servants from stakeholder 





Presidential Decree entitled 
“State Ant-Corruption 
Programme for 2006-2010” 
 
OSS were defined as one of the key tools 




“Development of E-government 
in Kazakhstan during 2008-
2010”  
E-services were piloted in the OSS. 
Target was set that by 2010 most public 
services would be provided through OSS 





Government Resolution on 
“Establishment of State Entities 
“Public Service Centres of the 
Ministry of Justice of RK”   
30 OSS were established.   
Main function of OSS “to accept 
application and return processed 
documents” was stipulated. Tax 
Committee withdrew the project. New 
partner, the Ministry of Defence, joined.   
List of 25 services was adopted.  
 
2007-2008 Orders of the Minister of 
Justice on “Establishment of 
Public Service Centres at the 
regional and village level” 
 




Order of the Minister of Justice 
on “Introducing call-centres in 
the OSS in Astana on a pilot 
basis” 
 
Call-centre and mobile technology were 





Government Resolution on 
“Public Services Delivery 
through Public Service Centres 
of the Ministry of Justice of 
RK”   
New stakeholders (Ministry of Labour 
and Social Protection, Ministry of 
Transport and Communication, Ministry 
of Environment Management, local 
municipalities, etc.) joined OSS with 32 
new services. The number of OSS was 




Amendment to the Law on 
Local Government and Self-
Government in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan  
The local municipalities were delegated 
coordination authorities over OSS from 
the Ministry of Justice.   
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As apparent from Table 5, the public service integration policy is characterised by 
complex continuous negotiations between the traditional government bodies and the 
coordinating authority of the OSS policy over the re-distribution of functions, staff, 
financial resources, design and delivery of joined-up services. All of these issues are 
analysed throughout the thesis. In particular, Chapter 5 contains a detailed discussion 
on the progress of the development of the legal framework for the OSS policy and 
the shaping of a country-specific model of service delivery through single-window 
arrangements.  
 
A hierarchical political system characterised by the patronage and clientele system 
prevailing in the Kazakhstani public sector (Cummings, 2005; Duvanova, 2008; 
Janenova, 2009b; Schatz, 2004), and “eastern” cultural values (Perlman and Gleason, 
2007) raise serious concerns over the successful implementation of the Western 
managerial policy in the transitional context. Therefo e, it is important to understand 
the impact of the political system on the experiences of those who were involved in 
service integration process by learning and adopting new working practices, re-
negotiating professional identities and facing contradictory quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions of public service quality. The key factor in the increasing 
significance of the OSS policy is the rising number of public services delivered 
through single-window approach, and the government’s intention to delegate 
provision of most public services to the OSS with the expectation that “reducing 
personal points of contact lessens opportunities for corrupt practices” (Knox, 2008: 
489).   
 
This brief summary of the country and policy background has indicated the key 
problems reflected in the research questions posed in this thesis relating to the 
potential impact of the political system on the policy implementation and the 
complexity of the service integration process in the transitional context.  What 
follows now is an outline of the significance of this research for social policy and 




1.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION  
 
The theoretical significance of this research 
 
This research contributes to the debate on the applic bility and appropriateness of 
managerial reforms in transitional countries by examining the implementation of the 
single-window policy in the post-communist Central Asian state of Kazakhstan. The 
thesis maps the public service integration process in Kazakhstan, identifying the 
main challenges and constraints upon policy implementation, which are typical for 
many transitional countries. In particular the research analyses how the NPM idea of 
customer-orientation has been transferred and re-contextualised in the transitional 
context, using the case of the single-window centres. In contributing to the debate 
about forces shaping public services and particular ch racteristic features of public 
services, I have attempted to bring together a range of academic insights and 
theoretical perspectives to examine the service intgra ion process. Drawing on the 
works of Hood (1998), Lynn (2006), Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), Argyris and 
Schon (1978a), Bardach (1998), Lave and Wenger (1991), and new empirical data, 
this research aims to make an important theoretical contribution to the academic 
debate on the applicability of Western managerial reforms in transitional countries 
and the appropriateness of the NPM theory, as well as concepts such as 
“organisational learning” and “communities of practice” in the analysis of the OSS 
policy implementation.  
 
Firstly, the research poses fundamental questions about the political context in which 
NPM reforms can take place. Can significant improvements in service quality be 
achieved as a result of Western managerial reforms in the context of hierarchical, 
corrupt and inertial public sectors? Secondly, the research explores if organisational 
learning takes places in the OSS as service integration is a learning process, and 
learning is a necessarily situated and non-linear subject (Bloom et al., 2008). Thirdly, 
is the concept of the “communities of practice” appropriate for use in the top-down, 
planned change environment? This thesis argues that service integration is best 
conceptualised not in structural or organisational terms, but that rather, integration is 
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more richly textured, encompassing accountability, the particular types of services 
integrated, sets of people, and the strategic framework.  
 
Conclusions from this thesis should be of particular relevance to the growing 
literature on managerial reforms in the transitional context. Over the past decade, 
many post-communist countries have established a good record of creating effective 
administrative institutions (for example, the Baltic states), while others have failed 
dramatically (as illustrated earlier in this chapter). Unfortunately, current research 
mostly concentrates on the analysis of successful re ormers, neglecting countries that 
carry out reforms but fail to improve bureaucratic quality. Focusing on the failing 
reforms, however, is as important as considering the c ampions of NPM reforms, 
because this may reveal faulty strategies, targets, and criteria and hence, practices to 
avoid. This thesis argues that Kazakhstan’s OSS policy is aimed to improve 
bureaucratic effectiveness, efficiency, and professionalism - the primary ingredients 
of NPM - but also to strengthen the executive grip on power. It is suggested that 
when analysing NPM reform programs, it is important to examine the political 
interests that promote these projects as well as the pre-existing capacity and efficacy 
of administrative institutions.  
 
The empirical significance of this research 
 
This research generated rich empirical data based on examination of the work 
practices of the managers and front-line employees, views of the government 
officials from the coordinating authority and service users, as well as extensive 
secondary data in the form of policy documents, survey reports and mass media 

















• Transcripts of semi-structured interviews 
with 11 OSS managers, 5 senior 
managers from the MJ. 
 
• Notes from four week observations in 
two case organisations. 
 
• Notes of unstructured interviews with 25 
front-line employees. 
 
• Notes of web-discussions by the OSS 
service users.    
 
• Notes of views by 15 local municipality 
managers on their evaluation of OSS 
policy implementation in the regions. 
 
• Notes from two official meetings with 
the managers from the OSS and MJ. 
 
• Policy documents (legislation, 
policy reports, service standards 
and regulations). 
 
• Survey of literature on NPM, 
service integration and 
organisational learning. 
 
• Mass media publications. 
 
The first significant area of this empirical study is the nature of service integration 
processes, which are non-linear, problematic and highly contextual. Notwithstanding 
the fast growth of Internet-based e-government arrangements, physical customer 
service centres remain a very important means to reduce administrative burdens for 
citizens and businesses. This is partly because physical OSS possess qualities, such 
as providing opportunities for personal advice and guidance, and high level of 
accountability through personal involvement of staff, that Web-based single-window 
arrangements cannot offer. This thesis represents the first empirical research on 
public service integration in the Kazakhstani context, which remains unexplored for 
the academic and policy-making communities. Secondly, using the case of the OSS, 
this research analyses the process of adaptation of NPM reforms in the transitional 
context. In particular, the research project explores implementation of the NPM 
principles, such as decentralizing management and customer-orientation. In doing so 
this research is able to critically assess why and how the implementation of the NPM 
ideas has been constrained in Kazakhstan. The third important area of this empirical 
study is the analysis of the appropriateness of concepts such as “organisational 
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learning” and “communities of practice” in the Kazakhstani context of public service 
integration. Here empirical data helps to explore th  values, perceptions and 
experiences of the OSS managers and front-line staff. Overall, this thesis aims to 
offer a significant empirical contribution to the academic and policy debate on public 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK     
 
Chapters 2 and 3 aim to develop a conceptual framework for the analysis of public 
service integration. A transformation of public services towards more market-based 
and customer-oriented models forms a set of challenges to the hierarchical structure 
and inertial top-down culture of the traditional bureaucracy. The literature review 
illustrates that the public service integration process is a complex concept contesting 
old working practices, accountabilities, spans of cntrol, identities and roles. It 
involves multidimensional issues related to decentralizing management by “letting 
the managers manage” and building “flatter relations”, changing the focus of the 
government towards customer needs, ability of managers to encourage and 
experience critical thinking on the traditional ways of working and renegotiation of 
professional identities.     
 
Hence, given complexity of service integration processes this research requires a 
multidisciplinary approach involving social policy, public policy and organisational 
studies. Firstly, this thesis examines NPM theories (Hood, 1991; Lan and 
Rosenbloom, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) to 
improve the understanding of the context within which service integration policy has 
been implemented. Secondly, the research explores th  appropriateness of the 
concepts of “organisational learning” (Argyris and Schon, 1978a), “situated 
learning” within “communities of practice” (Lave and Wenger, 1991) and 
“communities of coping” (Korczynski, 2002a). Togethr, three bodies of literature, 
social policy, public management and organisational studies, provide the conceptual 





Table 7: Conceptual Framework of the Research 
Focus  Discipline Relevant theory 
Service quality agenda  
Decentralising management  
Customer-orientation  
Cultural change  
 
Social policy  
Public policy   
Service integration theory  
New Public Management 
 
    
Learning    
Challenges of customer service  




Single and double loop learning  
Situated learning  
Communities of practice  
Communities of coping   
 
 
Derived in parts from the literature review and synthesis of the key concepts, which 
are discussed in the chapters 2 and 3, this conceptual framework helps to guide the 
analysis of implementation of service integration policy in the transitional context 
and organise the research findings. Hence, this thesis analyses contextual factors that 
influence and shape service modernisation reform in Kazakhstan by exploring 
institutional, administrative and technical capacities, as well as cultural patterns in 
the public sector. In particular, the research examines policy implementation by 
identifying key actors, understanding their motivations, behaviour and role in 
shaping service design, power dimensions, and exploring the parallel tracks of 
attempts to democratise Kazakhstan by reducing corruption and improving service 
quality. This work also examines the service integration process by exploring 
structure, strategy, methods of performance control and personnel policies of the 
single-window centres and their appropriateness for integration goals. The particular 
emphasis is put on the development of the relationships between the traditional 
bureaucracy and customer-oriented bureaucracy, which involved challenging existing 
work practices, norms and professional identities. This research aims to explore if, 
and what type of learning has taken place within the single-window centres; how the 
front-line staff learnt new working practices and service arrangements, and 
renegotiated their professional identities towards cu tomer-oriented bureaucracy.  
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This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on NPM theories (section 2.1) and 
aims at improving understanding of the context in which this research takes place 
with particular emphasis on the key elements of NPM, such as decentralising 
management and customer-orientation (section 2.2). The findings of previous 
research enable me to construct explanations of the challenges faced by Kazakhstan 
in implementing managerial reforms as a transitional country (section 2.3). The final 
section 2.4 summarises the key issues learnt from the review of the NPM literature, 
which are helpful to understand the concept of manageri l reforms and constraints 
faced by the transitional countries. In the next chapter (Chapter 3), literature on 
service integration and organisational learning is analysed, the arguments of the 
literature review from Chapters 2 and 3 are drawn together, and the basis for building 
a conceptual framework for the analysis of public service integration in the 
transitional context is determined.  
 
2.1 THEORIES OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
 
Over the last two decades, many developed countries have implemented the NPM 
model. Following the paths of developed countries and under pressure imposed by 
the international donor agencies, many developing countries have been trying to 
reshape their administrative systems along the logic f NPM. Kazakhstan has not 
been immune to the international trends of NPM and has adopted a managerial 
agenda as a key priority in their current administrative reform. While the adoption of 
NPM practices seems to have been beneficial in some cas s, the previous research 
shows that there are both potential for and real limitations to applying such elements 
in transitional countries. The limited experience of NPM in such states suggests that 
there are institutional and cultural problems, whose persistence constrains 
implementation. This section explores the concept of NPM and the question of 
whether and to what extent NPM theory can contribute to the understanding of 
managerial reforms in the transitional context of Kazakhstan. It is argued that 
country-specific contexts influence the dynamics of NPM reforms as policy 
implementation is firmly embedded in the societal, political and economic 
circumstances of a particular point in time. The proponents of NPM see managerial 
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reforms as providing a future for smaller, fast-moving service delivery organizations 
that would be kept lean by the pressures of competition and that would need to be 
user-responsive and outcome-oriented in order to survive. By contrast, the critics of 
NPM note concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of NPM, particularly for 
transitional countries, such as increasing social inequality, corruption and 
unmanageable change processes that could damage public service provision.   
 
This section begins by analysing how NPM theories can ontribute to understanding 
the impact of managerial reforms on government performance and service 
improvement. It reviews the findings of previous reearch both from developed and 
developing countries. Furthermore, it is emphasised that the analysis of managerial 
reforms can be broadened by considering the service integration process within the 
institutional context of customer service organizations in which learning is 
embedded. This suggests adopting a multi-level approach, combining an analysis of 
NPM, service integration and organisational learning theories. This approach may 
offer a fresh look, and as such it may feed back into the theoretical debate.        
 
The large and growing literature on public sector management reforms in Western 
countries (for example, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) 
has emphasised that changes in the economic, social, political, technological and 
administrative environments combined to prompt and drive radical changes in public 
administration and management systems (Lane, 1997; Lynn, 2006). The central 
objective of change was improvement in the ways in which government is managed 
and services delivered, with emphasis on efficiency, e onomy and effectiveness.  
 
Since the 1970s, the old administrative model has come under severe criticisms for 
various reasons. The first set of criticisms focused on major economic problems: 
• governments were too large, consuming too many scarce resources; 
• governments were involved in too many activities, whereas alternative means 
of provision existed for many of these; and growing i flation, excessive costs 
and excessive bureaucracies resulted from state intervention (Minogue, 1998; 
Hughes, 1998). 
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The second aspect of criticism relates to the pattern of administration. The traditional 
model of administration is rejected as being inefficient, costly, rigid, corrupt, 
unaccountable, and unsuitable to an age seeking more dynamic models of social and 
economic development (Hughes, 1998). Thus, these two criticisms have led the way 
for the emergence of a new model, with different titles, such as “new public 
management” (Hood, 1991), “market-based public administration” (Lan and 
Rosenbloom, 1992), “managerialism” (Pollitt, 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), 
“reinventing government” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and a “post-bureaucratic” 
model (Barzelay, 1992). Whatever the title is, they all provide a similar premise, 
although there are significant country-specific variations and NPM’s overall 
suitability for different regimes still remains uncertain (OECD, 1995).  
The literature on public management reforms also points to the development and 
availability of ICT as providing the necessary tools and structures to make workable 
managerial reforms in the public sector (Greer, 1994). For example, refined 
information systems are pivotal to the principle of management decentralization 
through the creation of executive agencies. In order to decentralize and have greater 
accountability, it is important to have confidence in reported performance 
information (Greer, 1994). NPM reforms have also been “globalized” by change 
agents. These include large international management consultants and international 
financial institutions, all of which have been instrumental in the increasing 
“importation” of new management techniques from the private into the public sector. 
They have played an important role in packaging, selling and implementing NPM 
techniques (Greer, 1994).  
 
From the above review of the literature we can draw a lesson that a combination of 
factors coincided to produce an irresistible pressure for management reforms in the 
public services in developed market economies. Changes in the political context and 
the search for efficiency and effectiveness in public services were key driving forces 
for change toward more market-oriented policies. From the late 1970s this shift in 
the Western countries was imposed on developing regions, particularly in countries 
that embarked on International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank-supported 
structural adjustment programmes.  
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A review of the literature suggests that NPM is nota homogenous whole but rather 
has several, sometimes overlapping elements, representing trends in public 
management reforms in different countries. Its compnents and features have been 
identified by a number of writers, including Hood (1991, 1998), Ferlie (1996), Flynn 
(1993), Lynn (2006), Pollitt (1993), and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004). For example, it 
is worth noting that Hood’s original conception of NPM did not explicitly feature the 
issue of customer-orientation. The Citizen’s Charter brought the issue of consumers 
to prominence and has since become a key feature of most NPM discussions. 
Osborne and Gaebler’s approach also contains some important differences in 
emphasis from the general NPM approach. Unlike the ideologically driven NPM 
underpinned by the “public bad – private good” ethos in the United Kingdom 
(Talbot, 1994: 11), Osborne and Gaebler assert their belief in government. They also 
assert that privatisation is not the only, or often he most appropriate, solution, and 
that in some cases, bureaucracies work better (for example, in social security). 
Beyond these differences, there is much in common with the different views on 
NPM.  
 
As highlighted above, the proponents of NPM see the traditional bureaucratic model 
as rigid, rule-bound, slow moving bureaucracies that are costly, inefficient and 
unresponsive to their users. Public services were provider-dominated, especially in 
the case of professionalised provision (for example, education and health care) where 
powerful, autonomous professions defended vested inrests and could not be held to 
account (Pollitt, 1993). In contrast, NPM was presented as providing a future for 
smaller, fast-moving service delivery organisations that would be kept lean by the 
pressures of competition and that would need to be user-responsive and outcome-
oriented in order to survive. These organisations would be expected to develop flatter 
internal structures and devolve operational authoriy to front-line managers. With a 
downsized staff, many of whom are on performance-related contracts, many services 
would now have to be contracted out. Professional dominance would be minimized 
to allow for the substitution of more cost-effective mixes of staff. Leading on from 
this the following section explores two of the key NPM principles on decentralising 
management and customer-orientation which may be particul rly relevant for public 
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service integration policies aimed at delegating operational service delivery functions 
from the central to the local level, and building customer-oriented government.         
 
2.2 DECENTRALISING MANAGEMENT AND CUSTOMER-
ORIENTATION  
   
The Kazakhstani OSS policy encourages decentralising management as part of the 
effort to “debureaucratize” the public services (Ingraham, 1996: 255), as well as 
“delayer” the hierarchies within them. The key concern here is “whether managers 
are free to manage their units in order to achieve the most efficient output” (Hood, 
1991: 5-6). This aspect of NPM has taken several foms, which are outlined here and 
help to bring useful insights in analysing service integration processes in the 
transitional context.  
 
There are several related elements of management decentralization, which can be 
infered from the NPM literature. The first, and the k y trend, is that traditionally 
huge and monolithic public bureaucracies are downsizi g, contracting out functions 
and breaking up internally into more autonomous business units or executive 
agencies (Pollitt, 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). This involves a split between a 
small strategic policy core and large operational arms of government with increased 
managerial autonomy (Greer, 1994). Agencies are then required to conduct their 
relations with each other and with the central departments on a contractual basis 
rather than through the traditional hierarchy, i.e. th y relate on an arms-length basis. 
In practice, executive agencies have meant structural changes in the organisation of 
government. These agencies have greater managerial fl xibility in the allocation of 
human resources in return for greater accountability for results. The United 
Kingdom, United States, Australia and New Zealand provide some good examples of 
executive agencies. The development of executive agencies has been accompanied 
by the delegation of authority to senior management in public agencies – giving top 
management freedom to manage, with clear responsibility and accountability, and 
reducing the management role of the centre.  
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Devolving budgets and financial control is the second element of decentralised 
management and an important complement to the creation of executive agencies. 
This may take the form of creating budget centres or spending units. Devolving 
budgets and financial control involves giving managers increased control over 
budgets for which they are held responsible (Walsh, 1995). This usually goes with 
the setting of explicit targets for decentralised units.  
 
Organisational unbundling is the third element of management decentralisation. It 
involves the delayering of vertically integrated organisations, i.e. replacing 
traditional “tall hierarchies” with flatter and more responsive structures formed 
around specific processes, such as the paying of benefits as in the United Kingdom 
(Ferlie, 1996; Pollitt, 1993).  
 
The fourth element of decentralised management is downsizing, i.e. rationalising the 
public sector in order to achieve a “leaner” (smaller or compact) and “meaner” (cost-
effective) public service. This has taken different forms, for example, sub-contracting 
government activities to private providers. Downsizing arises from the concern for 
the size and cost of public sector employment. Rapid expansion of civil service 
employment reflected a high degree of government intervention in the economy, as 
well as practices such as guaranteeing employment to ew graduates, and the use of 
employment for political patronage.  
 
The fifth dimension of decentralised management is the separation of provision from 
the production of public services. This separation of provision from production 
implies making a clearer distinction (organisational and financial) between defining 
the need for and paying for public services (the indirect provider role) and actually 
producing those services (the direct provider role).  
 
The sixth and final dimension of management decentralisation is the adoption of new 
forms of corporate governance and a move to a board of directors model in the public 
services. The benefits and the objectives of management decentralisation may vary 
from one organisational context to another. However, the economic and 
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administrative cases for management decentralisation rest on bringing service 
delivery closer to consumers, improving the central government’s responsiveness to 
public demands, improving the efficiency and quality of public services, and 
empowering lower units to feel more involved and in co trol (Larbi, 1999). It is also 
meant to reduce overload and congestion at the centre a d speed up operational 
decision making and implementation by minimising the bottlenecks associated with 
over-centralisation of powers and functions at one r two points in the hierarchy of a 
public service organisation of ministry. Thus, management decentralisation seeks to 
increase the operational autonomy of line managers and agencies, leaving only broad 
policy guidelines to be worked out at the centre. It also entails flatter internal 
hierarchies. 
   
Another component of the NPM theory, which holds a central place in the debate on 
managerial reforms is customer-orientation. The main aim of the service integration 
policy is to make services more transparent, accessibl , affordable and usable. 
Through structural adjustment, use of techniques of quality and performance 
management, and a shift in language, recipients of public services are to become 
something akin to customers of the commercial sector. The rationale is the shift of 
power from providers to users of public services, which is argued to produce benefits 
in flexibility, quality and cost effectiveness (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Reformers 
face a number of challenges in repositioning public service recipients as customers. 
One of the reasons is the complexity of the new role, wherein the “user as customer” 
typically must be integrated with more traditional positions occupied by recipients. 
Public service users typically get standardized entitl ments and owe legal obligations 
of some kind. In many spheres, and for many users, public provision remains the 
only option. Critics have pointed out the contradictions between these positions and 
the concept of customer sovereignty, with its associati ns to individual preference, 
choice and power (Alford, 2002; Foster and Hoggett, 1999), rendering any 
meaningful application of the customer concept in the pubic sector a complicated 
proposition at best. Reformers also address all the usual problems and challenges of 
change in organisations, including effective communication and the shifting of 
entrenched practices, attitudes and values (Burnes, 1992; Kanter et al., 1992).  
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Front-line workers represent the most significant internal target of these efforts. 
Reformers can design and impose initiatives intended to customerise public sector 
organisations, but they cannot directly enact the appropriate treatment of recipients. 
For this, they must rely on front-line staff, street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980), 
who must reconcile the new complexities of the role in their concrete interactions 
with customers. This raises an important question relevant for the service integration 
policy, of how government officials perceive and reposition themselves as public 
service providers, and citizens as service users. The application of management 
decentralisation and customer-orientation as key elem nts of NPM in varying 
contexts and in different forms suggests that there are different forms of constraints 
for policy implementation, which are discussed in the following section (2.3). 
 
2.3 IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS  
 
Despite the tremendous appeal of the NPM, the new model has not been welcomed 
uncritically. There are some institutional constraints with implications for the 
capacity of central agencies to manage the process in both developed and developing 
countries. Questions are raised as to whether the new model has sufficient conceptual 
coherence to provide an alternative to public administration as either a theoretical 
construct for academic research or an approach to the management of public services 
(McLaughlin and Osborne, 2002). Doubts are raised rgarding its universal 
applicability. Bodies, such as the World Bank and the IMF have adopted it as a 
universal panacea for both public service and civil society failures across the world 
(McCourt, 2002). Particularly, the applicability ofthe new model in the developing 
world has faced as many problems as developing countries in that they do not fulfil 
some preconditions for its effective implementation (Minogue, 1998; Larbi and 
Bangura, 2006). Sobis and de Vries (2009) argue that much of the technical 
assistance, from Western Europe to Central Europe, during its transition period was 
ineffective due to the structure in which technical assistance was embedded and the 
lack of care from international consultants with regard to the impact of their work.     
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There are also socio-cultural constraints in reforming the administrative system 
along the NPM model. NPM initiatives are difficult to implement where there are 
social and cultural inertia (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001; Ray, 1999). State-civil 
society relations also remain problematic. The civil society has not been able to put 
enough pressure on the state apparatus to implement reforms (Sozen and Shaw, 
2002). Concerns about corruption have risen in recent y ars, together with growing 
evidence of its detrimental impact on government effectiveness (Abed and Davoodi, 
2000; Tomaszewska and Shah, 2000). Conceptually, NPM is expected to reduce 
opportunities for corruption (Von Maravic, 2003). Andrews and Shah (2005) 
integrate these ideas into a common framework of citizen-centred governance. They 
argue that citizen empowerment holds the key to enhanced accountability and 
reduced opportunities for corruption. Others disagree with such conclusions, and 
argue that NPM could lead to higher corruption rather than greater accountability, 
because the tendering for service delivery and the separation of purchasers from 
providers may lead to increased rent-seeking behaviours and enhanced possibilities 
for corruption (Batley, 1999; Von Maravic, 2003). Some argue that decentralised 
management leads to weaker vertical supervision from higher levels and the 
inadequacy of mechanisms to exert controls over decentralized agencies (Scharpf, 
1997). This loss in vertical accountability is seen as a source of enhanced 
opportunities for corruption.  
 
The empirical literature on corruption identifies the following key drivers based on 
in-depth country studies of developing, transition a d industrial countries (see 
Gurgur and Shah, 2002; Tomaszweska and Shah, 2000):  
1. The legitimacy of the state as the guardian of the “public interest” is 
contested. The line between what is public and what is private is blurred, so 
that abuse of public office for private gain is a routine occurrence.  
2. The rule of law is weakly embedded. Public sector corruption thrives where 
laws apply to some but not others and where enforcement of the law is often 
used as a device for furthering private interests ra her than protecting the 
public interest.  
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3. Institutions of participation and accountability are ineffective. Societies in 
which the level of public sector corruption is relatively low usually have 
strong institutions of participation and accountability (for example, citizens’ 
charter, the judiciary, the legislature) that contrl abuses of power by public 
officials.  
4. The commitment of national leaders to combating corruption is weak. 
Widespread corruption endures in the public sector when national authorities 
are either unwilling or unable to address it forcefully.  
Chapter 9 analyses the drivers of corruption in the Kazakhstani context and examines 
different forms of illegal practices adopted in the single-window centres. The final 
section of this chapter summarises the key issues that we learnt from the previous 
research of NPM reforms, which may be helpful for analysis of managerial reforms 
in the transitional context such as Kazakhstan.       
2.4 SUMMARY 
What have we learnt from the previous research on implementation of managerial 
reforms both in developed and developing countries? There is evidence that although 
public management has had a significant influence on the design of reforms in 
developing countries, “the actual implementation is rather thin on the ground and the 
outcomes are uncertain” (Larbi and Bangura, 2006: 277). In developing countries the 
NPM model has been considered as a necessity for implementing economic 
liberalization policy initiatives in order to take advantages of globalisation (World 
Bank, 2002). Transitional countries are still more blind to initial sketchiness of the 
ideas, unexpected erosion of the expectations and the high number of questions 
leaving the number of available answers far behind. As an outcome of NPM many 
public organisations in pro-NPM Western countries bcame more autonomous, but it 
also meant a greater fragmentation of service delivery, policy making and 
implementation. Unfortunately, these aspects are often not regarded and discussed by 
countries in transition.       
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The approaches outlined in this chapter widen the analytical perspective. As such, 
they potentially provide a lever for analysing managerial reforms in the transitional 
context. They do so either by broadening the understanding of NPM reform itself, by 
pointing to the complex nature of political, societal and cultural changes in the 
process of managerial reforms. So far it has been argued that culture-specific 
contexts tend to constrain rather than enable the analysis of public service reforms. 
These difficulties are further exacerbated when pursuing a case study approach 
employed in this research project, because of the cultural specificity of Kazakhstan 
as a transitional and post-communist country.     
The literature suggests that there are some preconditions for the successful 
implementation of the NPM approach. There should be a reasonable level of 
economic development and experience of the operations of markets, since NPM 
principles are essentially market-oriented. A well-developed judicial system is 
required to provide the rule of law. The new model assumes that the basic 
administrative processes are in order within the wider administrative system. They 
work as a foundation upon which a market-oriented system such as NPM can be 
implemented on the basis of a control-oriented system. These external controls are 
the building block for a formal, rule-based and honest public sector. The system also 
encourages managers to internalise a public ethic of proper behaviour (Schick, 1998). 
Once these basic conditions are fulfilled, central controllers tend to ease the 
regulations by giving line managers discretion in operating their programmes.  
Another precondition for the successful implementation of NPM programmes is tate 
capacity (Hughes, 1998). State capacity implies a condition where the state is able to 
take any reform measure decisively. This state capacity is thus characterised by 
institutional, technical, administrative and political factors (Wallis and Dollery, 
2001). Institutional capacity is marked by the ability of these countries to uphold the 
authority of governments, to legislate and implement laws and to hold public 
officials accountable in terms of these laws (Wallis and Dollery, 2001: 251). 
Technical capacity is evident when key decision-making bodies managed by 
qualified people are insulated from the pressure of unproductive clientelist groups 
(Wallis and Dollery, 2001: 252). Administrative capacity is characterised by the 
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state’s ability to undertake basic administrative functions and provide basic human 
services. This is particularly critical in so far as the NPM reform package is 
concerned. Political capacity refers to the ability of the state to mediate conflict, 
respond to citizen demands, allow for the representation of interests, and provide 
opportunities for effective political participation at different levels. Where the 
developed world fulfils most of these requirements, many developing countries do 
not.  
Dunleavy and Hood (1994) note concerns among traditional bureaucrats or 
“hierarchists” about the potential destabilizing effects of NPM if the processes of 
change should get out of control, become unmanageable and do irreversible damage 
to the provision of public services. Critics of NPM also point to increasing 
inequality, as market-type mechanisms produce “market niche-seeking” behaviour 
by public service providers (Pollitt, 1993). Thus, the cultural and organisational 
change in social provision, expressed in the concepts of markets and individualism, 
may arguably create conditions of social exclusion. Such reforms may therefore 
harm those in most need of state provision: the poor and the vulnerable.  
 
The critique of NPM (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994) also notes that NPM reform may 
promote self-interest and corruption as policy makers and senior bureaucrats opt for 
privatisation and contracting out because of increased opportunities for rent-seeking 
and other forms of unethical behaviour. Critics argue that NPM has led to falling 
ethical standards in public life, with increasing icidences of greed, favouritism and 
conflicting interests. For developing countries, where patronage systems are more 
prevalent and accountability mechanisms are weak, the adoption of NPM may lead to 
more abuses and the arbitrary use of discretion.  
Managerial reform in Kazakhstan as a transitional country characterised by a 
patronage system and clanism (Cummings, 2005; Duvanova, 2008; Emrich-
Bakenova, 2009; Perlman and Gleason, 2007; Schatz, 2004) is a particularly 
interesting case in this respect and offers potential to explore whether its origin 
provides explanation for the shape of reforms, which have taken place and the ways 
of implementation. Pollitt (2003: 38) argues that while public management ideas 
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“have had a wide influence”, and there are “certainly broad trends in ideas”, the 
interpretation and implementation of reforms have be n patchy, messy, diverse and 
reversible. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) offer “a model of influences on public 
management reform” which shows interactions between: background socioeconomic 
influences, political pressures and features of the administrative system itself. The 
model, they argue, allows for “considerable variation between countries … in the 
sense that each country has its own distinctive political and administrative system” 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 37).   
Hellsten and Larbi (2006) show that, indeed, cultura  patterns in the public at large 
influence the ethical performance of the civil service in developing countries. 
Although they reject the view that some national cultures are more tolerant of 
misconduct in the public sector than others, they suggest that corruption in parts of 
Africa and Asia emerges from a collectivist cultural tradition that conflicts with 
formal, bureaucratic institutions. In such cultures, personal relations are particularly 
important both as a value and as a means of survival; individualistic principles of 
market economies are regarded foreign. However, Hellsten and Larbi (2006: 138) 
also admit that contextual factors are important for institutional performance. They 
note that one of the reasons why public servants in developing countries are 
sometimes too inclined to engage in corruption is due to the fact that formal 
institutions do not perform their duties properly.  
Both institutional and socio-cultural factors contribute to the weaknesses and failures 
of reforms in developing countries. Overall lessons from the previous research is that 
the political, institutional, technological and cultural factors pose significant 
constraints to the applicability of NPM reforms from developed democracies to 
transitional countries. Therefore, it is important to explore and analyse state capacity 
and national culture of Kazakhstan as a case study country in terms of 




Looking across post-communist Eastern Europe and Eurasia, it would be hard to find 
a place that did not experience at least some kind of bureaucratic transformation. 
Seen from a perspective of bureaucratic efficacy, probity, and capacity, however, the 
region exhibits remarkable variation. Between the extremes of the lean and efficient 
bureaucracies of the Baltic states and the ineffectiv  and corrupt civil servants of 
Georgia and Moldova lays a wide variety of institutions with a varying degree of 
accountability, transparency, professionalism, and effectiveness (Kaufman, 2006). 
Given this immense variation in performance, it is rather surprising that most post-
communist administrative reform projects are remarkably similar in their rhetoric 
and design. They all call for greater professionalism, separation from political 
authorities, performance-based rewards, meritocratic promotions, accountability, and 
anticorruption measures. While seemingly straightforward and highly desirable, 
NPM reform could have some unexpected outcomes for transitional countries. Since 
NPM is followed by popular slogans like “better quality for less costs”, it is easy to 
fall into its traps, especially after the Soviet regime during which involvement of 
citizens and service quality improvement were not the issues under discussion. The 
question is whether NPM just leads transitional countries to the same pitfalls, but just 
through different ways?  
 
On one hand, NPM is aimed for very useful actions ad processes like involving 
multiple stakeholders, measuring and managing performance, empowering citizens, 
but on the other hand a general understanding of what is “public service quality” and 
“how to improve the service” should take place befor  that. If this is not the case, the 
new systems might grow out of control rather quickly and start to work against their 
purpose. Policy implementation might get out of hand even faster and further than 
during the communist period. If during the Soviet era there were at least formal 
bureaucracies in place regardless if they were effective or not, then during NPM era 
there are mostly autonomous self-governing networks that are much more difficult to 
be managed.     
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The preceding sections have looked at the ways in which NPM theories address the 
issues of managerial reforms and the extent to which they can contribute to a case 
study analysis of the pubic service integration. Universal application ignores 
conceptual ambiguity and hides the significance of specific contexts of public 
services (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). The conclusions to be drawn from this 
analysis are two-fold: the framework of NPM does not provide ‘ready-made’ 
solutions to the problems outlined above and the case study analysis in particular. 
The approaches outlined by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) and Hellsten and Larbi 
(2006) appear to be more suitable to the present research: they acknowledge the 
differences between countries and open up the way for a more empirically-oriented 
analysis of managerial reforms, as opposed to the testing of the validity of an ideal 
type. In so doing the analytical perspective is widened and the possibility of arriving 
at a more refined understanding of public service changes and the phenomenon of 
NPM itself is opened up. The core of this argument, then, is to begin with empirical 
analysis. It suggests the need for a theoretically informed map in which public 
service integration can be located. This attempts to address the dilemma that a 
definition of NPM is both a prerequisite for, and the outcome of the analysis. 
Implementation of managerial reforms is understood in ynamic terms, notably as a 
political struggle between different actors including the government itself. By 
stressing the role of the government this type of approach also encourages an 
analysis of the wider political, social and cultural context in which the Kazakhstani 
single-window centres operate. The importance of these contextual factors is also 
highlighted by the case study perspective. This suggests broadening the case study 
analysis of the managerial reforms by exploring public service integration, of which 
the single-window approach is an integral part. With this in mind, findings from the 
previous research in service integration and possible conceptual tools such as 
“organisational learning” and “communities of practice” are now discussed further in 







3. SERVICE INTEGRATION AND ORGANISATIONAL 
LEARNING   
 
This chapter aims to continue to explore different ways of conceptualising service 
integration. Whilst the previous chapter provides a discussion on the NPM literature, 
this chapter reviews the relevant management science literature to analyse service 
integration. These range from understanding service int gration as policy to 
examining the political implications of the managerial reforms. The concept of 
service integration (section 3.1) may provide a framework for exploring how the 
single-window policy is embedded in service integration, and for examining the 
underlying power dimensions and cultural changes. This requires broadening the 
focus of the analysis and, it is argued, that the concept of service integration can be 
used as a complementary conceptual tool. It can account for the multiple institutions, 
actors and, particularly, levels potentially involved in the governance of service 
integration. Furthermore, learning is an integral prt of service integration. Section 
3.2 provides the discussion of the concepts such as “organisational learning”, 
“communities of practice” (CoP) and “communities of coping”. It is argued that a 
synthesis of the concepts – NPM, service integration and organisational learning – 
can be used to build a suitable conceptual framework for analysing public service 
integration in the transitional context such as that represented in the case of 
Kazakhstan.      
 
3.1 THE CONCEPT OF SERVICE INTEGRATION    
 
This section looks at how different theorists have sought to explain the service 
integration processes and occurrence of organisational learning. This is important 
because popular literature on policy and management, for instance, often focus upon 
knowledge management within organisations, without explaining how learning 
occurs, what knowledge is, or by which processes learning organisations and learning 
regions are created and sustained (see for example, Toffler, 1990; Reich, 1991).  
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Service integration is framing policy debate around public service modernisation.  
Expressed variously as partnerships, joined-up-governm nt or holistic services, 
integration strategies aim to alter the interface between the diversity of public 
services, addressing issues of access, equity, efficiency and effectiveness. This 
research interrogates the meaning and challenges of service integration, focusing 
upon public service delivery through single-window arrangements in the transitional 
context. Bardach (1998) and Bloom et.al. (2008) argue that integration is best 
conceptualised not in structural or organisational terms, but rather that, integration is 
more richly textured encompassing accountability, the particular nature of services 
integrated, sets of people, and the strategic framework. Bardach (1998) highlight that 
integration is a learning process, and learning is necessarily situated and a non-linear 
subject. 
 
Bardach (1998) characterises service integration as sh red strategies, coordinating 
processes, without necessarily pooling resources or establishing new organisational 
forms. Rather it is based on trust between delivery agents, without emphasis on 
longer-term radical service remodelling. Organisational modelling, trajectories and 
terminological contests dominate European literature on integration. Thistlethwaite’s 
(2004: 16) guide for the Integrated Care Network contrasts integration with 
fragmentation as a single system of service planning and provision put in place and 
managed together by partners (parent bodies) who neverth less remain legally 
independent, uniting mission, culture, management, budgets, accommodation, 
administration and records, and operating at any level of constituent organisations. 
He envisions integration as deeper than coordinatio between autonomous 
organisations, creating a new partnership organisation delivering services via a 
continuum from autonomy to coordination and integration. 
 
Hudson (2002: 6) argues that structural integration evidently does not guarantee well-
coordinated practice on the ground. Perri et al. (2002) counter-pose holism to 
fragmented services, defining integration as shared goals in relation to shared 
problems, rather than particular organisational forms or coordination mechanisms. 
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) stress organisational col aboration as opposed to 
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organisational mergers. Little wonder that the practice of service integration is so 
little evaluated when the basic terms remain contested (Bell et al., 2008).   
 
Policy implementation is best guided by strategy - a long-term overview of goals 
within a particular risk environment. Purposive organisation mobilises resources 
around privileged outcomes: hierarchy and network choices. Public sector 
organisational forms are more constrained than those in the private sector, being 
prescribed by organisational boundaries, statutory duties, areas of operation and 
statutory accountabilities. The purpose of public service integration is access, 
efficiency and effectiveness. Moore’s (1995) argument for public value as a wide 
base from which to measure performance does not obviate the need for performance 
measurement: it defines a wider measurement base (Perrey et. al. 2004).  Thus, 
integration is a means to an end, not an end in itself. 
 
Integrated ways-of-working contest old accountabilities. Romzek et. al. (1987) 
identify four types of public accountability: bureaucratic (internal), legal, professional 
and political, the blending of which is contextual and situated. Adherence to standard 
operating procedures can protect the risk-averse bur aucrat and undermine policy 
objectives (Power, 2007). Outside of settled structural forms, accountabilities depend 
on the competence and responsibility of individual agents and groups and wider 
stakeholder interpretations. Without clear measurement and management referencing 
external standards, integrative organisations may lack accountability.  
 
Integrated, unlike new, organisations come with inherited middle management 
structures and roles. Middle managers, Bardach (1998) argues, may become 
responsible for decisions beyond their own knowledge domain, from different 
governances or ways-of-working. Middle managers in an integrating environment 
need to be fast learners: managing delivery (stabili y, existing roles and structures), 
whilst facilitating change (new structures and roles). This point is relevant for the role 
of the OSS managers as drivers for change in the public sector.   
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Resistance to change by middle managers may arise from uncertainty over their 
future, especially where hierarchy is flattening or where responsibility without power 
shifts downward. When costs and value-added are uncrtain, attributing value to 
function is difficult, especially in a dynamic environment, hence the importance of IT 
in the integration processes. Information gathering in public services helps to evaluate 
equity, efficiency and overall public value (Milner, 2002). Agreeing data fields 
between agencies can be problematic and using databases to bring decisions to point-
of-contact reaches deep into an organisation’s processes. Aligning new services and 
new IT systems with new roles is also problematic, and has too often treated IT as 
autonomous, promoting technical integration without referencing services. Databases 
are social and technical constructs and pose ethical issues. Negotiating shared new 
languages may be contested: Siehl et. al. (1991) refer to this a rite of integration. 
   
IT is critical to service integration, supporting shared assessments and tracking costs 
and value flows. However, the slowest partner can become a reverse salient. The OSS 
policy has placed high expectations on the use of IT, whereas, the literature suggests 
that IT investment often fails technically to give r turn on the investment - 
information gathering may conflict with inherited governances privileging particular 
data (Perrey et. al. 2004). Building IT capacity to a high level of integratedness is 
time consuming and expensive and often results in tensions between process cost 
reduction and adding richness into service products – in short, people’s ways-of-
working. 
 
Organisations are composed of people with competencs and motivation to lead, 
manage and deliver services, using changing knowledge domains, and negotiating 
new identities, spans of control and trust. Trust (risking harm by exposing 
vulnerability) lowers search and transaction costs. When organisations integrate, they 
re-balance price, authority and trust (Bardach, 1998). Though practitioners may have 
informally worked together and learned trust, negotiating formal integration takes 
time and has unforeseen consequences. The following section explores theories of 
learning and their appropriateness for analysing public service integration.  
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3.2 LITERATURE ON LEARNING  
 
This section provides a discussion of the literature on learning by examining the 
relevance of the conceptual tools such as “organisational learning”, “communities of 
practice” and “communities of coping” in the analysis of service integration in the 
transitional context.  
 
The difference between traditional approaches to public sector reform, where 
authority is vested in hierarchy, and the concept of organisational learning is that the 
former is rooted in top-down technical regulations, while the latter is rooted in a 
belief that the solution to all problems facing the public service lies in the 
transformation of the public servants themselves. In a sense, organisational learning 
provides a bottom-up, people-centred framework, which aims to unlock the human 
potential in the public sector. Learning occurs in “communities of practice” and non-
formal settings including skills and functional/numerical flexibility (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). Alter et. al. (1993) argue that new regulatory and professional 
standards made to facilitate integration, are also learning opportunities. 
Interdisciplinary communities of practice can become a milieu for renegotiating 
language, roles and identities (Wenger, 1998). Co-location understandably enriches 
interaction and enhances learning. Locating diversity of service at the point of 
customer contact within the single-window centres entails service re-engineering, 
bringing forward information and decision-taking, challenging existing structures, 
and power and knowledge distribution. Problem-solving judgement making 
characterises professions giving individual professionals their identity (Torstendahl, 
1990). Integration can threaten or strengthen professional identities. New learning and 
perhaps more difficult, new feelings involving changing attitudes towards 
functionality and cultural identity takes time (Wilson et al., 2004) precisely because 
the manager or professional is renegotiating the self in relation to others.   
 
Easterby Smith (1999) suggests that organisational le rning is a process of 
organisational transformation, and argues that indiv dual and collective learning 
fostered by learning activities plays a key role to furthering this process. The 
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cognitive perspective of organisational learning takes on two approaches. The first 
views individual learning as a model for organisational action, where organisations 
are able to learn, presuming that they have identical or at least similar capacities to 
those of humans. However, these theories tend to identify learning processes without 
reference to organisational context (Chiva and Alegre, 2005).  
 
Critics of this approach argue that the organisation is not human, and therefore 
human attributes such as “learning” and “thought” cannot be assigned to them 
(Easterby Smith et al., 2000: 785). The second approach proposes that organisational 
learning is individual learning within an organisatonal context (Bhatt, 2000a, 
2002b). According to this approach, theories present organisational learning as more 
than the sum of the learning of individual members, with the role of organisational 
culture being to increase the desire of individuals to learn. In the following sections 
the theories of “single and double loop learning” as well as “communities of 
practice” and “communities of coping” are discussed in relation to service 
integration.       
 
3.2.1 Single and Double Loop Learning   
 
The theory of single and double loop learning introduced by Argyris and Schon 
(1978a) takes account of the interplay between the actions and interactions of 
individuals and the actions and interactions of higher-level entities such as 
departments, divisions or groups of managers (Argyris, 1999). Single loop learning is 
described by Argyris and Schon (1978a) as a process where errors are detected and 
corrected in a continuous improvement process. The individual does not challenge 
taken for granted assumptions, which underpin the way things are done in the 
organisation. This level of learning questions how things are done in organisations, 
but does not challenge why. Senge (1990) parallels this approach through his 
definition of “adaptive” learning, where individuals develop capabilities to manage 
situations through making improvements and amendments. This type of learning 
tends to be limited to training needs arising out of an organisation’s requirement to 
 50 
have individuals do a job properly, within the systems that govern how the 
organisation is controlled.  
 
Double loop learning as presented by Argyris and Schon (1978a) entails individuals 
questioning and challenging the success recipes of the organisation, leading to a 
deeper level of understanding and reassessment of values and assumptions. The role 
of managers is assumed to be fundamental at this level, to encourage such 
questioning and challenging as well as facilitating the contexts which enable 
individuals to engage in risk taking activities and the resulting learning that takes 
place. Senge (1990) refers to this level of learning as “generative” learning, which 
focuses on developing new perspectives, options and possibilities.  
 
Lyons (1985) argues that a basic requirement if learning is to take place is a climate, 
which encourages, facilitates and rewards learning, with particular emphasis on the 
manager’s role. However, one of the biggest learning dilemmas facing most 
organisations currently is how to get middle and senior managers to learn how to 
change and think differently (Argyris and Schon, 1996b) as radically different 
managerial approaches are needed if increasingly ineffective controls are to be halted 
(Senge, 1990). What is required to facilitate individual and organisational learning is 
the commitment to learning and related management capability throughout an 
organisation’s hierarchy.  
 
Senge in The Fifth Discipline (1990) and The Dance of Change (1999) articulates 
how challenges inside an organisation, which stifle innovation can be countered by 
the diffusion of learning across boundaries, an analysis of assumptions and an 
understanding of the life cycle of change. These books suggest that only by learning 
faster than the competition can organisations stay ahead. The focus on systems 
thinking involves both an understanding of larger “systems” but also the discipline of 




Argyris (1999: 7) argues that individuals are the only proper subjects of learning and 
that if organisational learning means anything, it means learning on the part of 
individuals who happen to function in an organisational setting. However, in 
practice, Argyris (1999) further maintains that indivi ual learning is rarely 
encouraged by organisational members, and if learning is encouraged it is normally 
within the parameters of the individual’s job. Argyis and Schon (1978a) assume that 
managers are experienced at single loop learning; at performing well within their 
sphere of competence. However, this in itself contribu es to a fundamental constraint 
in their moving to a level of double loop learning. The assumption is that managers 
who engage in single loop learning seldom experience failure as they stick to the 
tried and tested, resulting in a lack of learning opp rtunities; this in itself creates 
defensive mechanisms to compensate for any failure that may occur (Argyris and 
Schon, 1978a). In general the theory from this traditional paradigm argues that 
managers tend to avoid criticism, blame others or ignore problems, precisely when 
the ability to learn is most vital. In short, their ability to learn shuts down precisely at 
the moment they need it most (Argyris and Schon, 1996b). In particular, the 
compliance culture of the post-communist countries  t nds to stifle staff initiative and 
communications – both critical attributes of organis tional learning and service 
improvement.  
 
Given these perspectives, those managers who endeavour to commit to the learning 
of individuals, providing them with opportunities to learn and enhance their 
capability, face issues of loss of control, status and power. As a result, managers may 
often behave in ways that maximize their security and status in role, usually at the 
expense of the learning of opportunities of their staff. Field (1997) argues that as 
individuals move into the role of the empowered learn r, managers feel insecure and 
feel the workplace to be unstable and unpredictable. Therefore, managers tighten 
control by undermining activities likely to facilitate learning and when controls 





The issues raised by the theory of single and double loop learning have a number of 
implications for the questions this research seeks to address and the research design 
adopted. The literature highlights the difference between single loop learning, which 
is planned, prescribed, learned and performed without question, challenge or 
generative learning, and double loop learning which entails individuals questioning 
and challenging the organisation, leading to a deeper level of understanding and a 
reassessment of values and assumptions. The role of managers is assumed to be 
fundamental to encourage questioning and challenging, a d facilitating contexts 
which enable individuals to engage in risk taking activities and resulting learning 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978a). Therefore, within a centralised political context, such as 
in Kazakhstan, the analysis of learning experiences of those who are involved in 
service integration process is particularly important.  
 
Issues around organisational learning underline the importance of the key analytic 
themes addressed in the research on the impact of policy on service providers and 
service users, and defining and promoting service int gration. Within the overall 
policy framework, the research is framed around experiences of the front-line service 
delivery. Two case studies in Astana are used to understand these experiences in 
more depth, and the interaction between responses at different levels, both at an 
individual level and at a more strategic organisational level.  
 
The following section attempts to synthesise other explanatory theories: situated 
learning within “communities of practice” (Lave and Wenger, 1991) and 
“communities of coping” (Korczynski, 2002a), which will add value to my 
conceptual framework in terms of focusing on localised work communities and 








3.2.2 “Communities of Practice” and “Communities of  Coping”  
 
As indicated in the previous section, double-loop learning focuses on developing 
new perspectives and possibilities for the individual and transformation for the 
organisation. Lave and Wenger (1991) argue that learning takes place within single, 
localised and small communities – “communities of practice” (CoP). At the core of 
situated learning theory is the assumption that learning and knowing are processes 
integral to everyday practice in the workplace, family and other social settings (Lave 
and Wenger, 1991). Learning and knowing cannot be separated from everyday 
practice; furthermore, learning cannot be isolated an then studied as if it were a 
discrete activity. Central to the literature around a situated perspective on learning is 
a focus on participation, identity, and practice (in communities or networks of 
practice), and the dynamics between them. As Lave and Wenger (1991) propose:  
 
Conceiving of learning in terms of participation focuses attention on ways in 
which it is an evolving, continuously renewed set of relations … [Learning is] an 
integral and inseparable aspect of social practice … learning and a sense of 
identity are inseparable: they are aspects of the same phenomenon. (49, 53, 115) 
 
Lave and Wenger (1991) argue that participation is central to situated learning, since 
individuals develop their identities and practices according to the participatory 
opportunities available to them. Participation involves the way individuals 
understand, take part in, and subscribe to the social norms, behaviours and values of 
the communities in which they participate. The examples of CoP represent an 
apprentice-to-master model, where apprentices move fr m peripheral to full forms of 
participation. The early examples have since been elaborated. For example, Lave 
(2004) now uses the concepts of “newcomers” and “oldtimers” to denote an 
individual’s lifespan within a community. In a parallel development, Wenger (1998) 
has elaborated various forms of community participation: “peripheral” and “full” are 
now contrasted with “marginal”; non-legitimate forms of participation are 




Situated learning theory brings a renewed focus on “identity”. “Learning” is 
concerned not only with developing ways of “knowing” in practice, but also with 
understanding who we are and what potential we have(Lave, 2004). A review of the 
literature reveals several conceptualisations of identity. These vary in their emphasis 
on structural or agential influences, their accounts of identity-development, and the 
possibility of stability around a single or multiple sense of self. Social identity theory 
argues that our sense of identity develops through the medium of the groups we 
belong to (or disassociate with): we “belong” to a small number of such groups and 
carry a small number of identities (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).  
 
The issue of possible multiple identity construction among front-line employees 
requires special attention, since individuals do strive to achieve a sense of coherence 
between their multiple identities (Giddens, 1991). This perspective seems to most 
closely fit with the proposition in situated learning theory that identities are 
continually evolving through participation in multiple communities of practice. To 
some extent, this continual reworking of identity arises because individuals 
participate in not one, but multiple communities and networks of practice. Each will 
have different norms of belonging and a different se of “typical” identities. 
Furthermore, individuals bring to these communities their early-socialised 
“dispositions” to act in similar ways across different contexts and communities 
(Mutch, 2003). The potential for identity conflict is therefore significant as 
individuals move between different communities. Identity conflicts may be 
particularly explicit in the service integration environment where government 
officials from different professions, departments and backgrounds attempt to build-
up an integrated service. Nevertheless, in spite of this internal conflict, individuals 
may still seek to present particular or even new identities to outsiders. For example, 
the front-line employees may seek to project a coherent identity which they believe 
their clients want to see (for example, being professional and customer-oriented), and 





In the context of situated learning, practice is always social practice (Wenger, 1998: 
47) because it is the “historical and social context” that provides structure and 
meaning to what we do. Through participation, newcomers “gradually assemble a 
general idea of what constitutes the practices of the community” (Lave and Wenger, 
1991: 95). Ibarra (1999) suggests that individuals develop their practice by observing 
and initially imitating others within their community of practice, and by 
experimenting with and adapting their own practice. She calls this process 
“experimenting with provisional selves”, emphasizing the close relationship between 
the development of identities and practices. Situated learning theory elaborates on 
this argument by suggesting that the opportunities to observe, adapt, and experiment 
are dependent on the participatory opportunities avail ble to the individual.  
 
It is important to emphasise the potential interactional effects of participation and the 
development of new identities and practices in the single-window centres where the 
front-line employees are expected to adopt new working practices and service 
arrangements. By bringing together these constructs, learning can be considered as 
the development of identities and practice achieved through participation in 
communities of practice.  
 
A number of research studies have explored the organisational characteristics and 
employment arrangements of customer service organisations (Callaghan and 
Thompson, 2002; Korczynski, 2002a; Mullholland, 200). Volume is managed 
through task routinisation, and a sophisticated ICT architecture configured to 
distribute, manage and monitor clients, while service quality is managed through a 
mixture of behavioural management and human resource st ategies. By these means, 
customer service organisations seek to balance the logics of efficiency and customer 
service. The tension between these goals is felt du to heightened visibility of cost 
trade-offs (Sturdy, 2001: 7; Wallace et al, 2000: 174). This tension unmasks a series 
of conflicts: between costs and quality, between flxibility and standardisation, and 
between constraining and enabling job design.    
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The front-line jobs have been characterised as “dead-end” with low status, poor pay 
and few career prospects. Moreover, the research has shown that much of the work is 
closely monitored, tightly controlled and highly routinised. Informational technology 
plays a critical part in this process: the speed of w rk can continuously be measured 
and the quality of interaction between the service provider and the customer can be 
assessed remotely and at management’s discretion. This “information panopticon” is 
said to continuously remind workers that, “although no manager may be physically 
present, every aspect of their performance may be … constantly measured” 
(Macdonald and Sirianni, 1996). Not surprisingly, it has been suggested that this 
form of service delivery bears the hallmarks of an engineering model (Herzenberg et 
al, 1998). Tasks have been simplified, services must conform to predetermined 
design specification and the production process has been constructed to minimise 
labour costs.  
 
A number of authors have developed theoretical approaches to the study of front-line 
service work that highlights the distinctiveness of this form of work. These authors 
have argued that there are difficulties involved in the simple application of 
bureaucratic principles of work organisation to jobs involving direct customer 
contact (Herzenberg et al., 1998). For example, Offe (1985) argued that it was 
difficult to simply bureaucratize front-line work because: 
 
On the one hand, the particularity, individuality, contingency and variability (of 
the situations and needs of clients…) must be preserv d… On the other hand, 
service labour must ultimately bring about a state of affairs which conforms to 
certain general rules. The definition of service labour … draws attention to the 
processes of individuation and differentiation on the one hand and coordination 
and standardization requirements on the other (105-6).  
 
Korczynski (2002a; 2003b) has further developed these ideas by arguing that much 
of contemporary service work is best analysed in relation to an ideal-type of the 
customer-oriented bureaucracy. The idea is that contemporary service work tends to 
be underpinned by dual logics of rationalisation and of customer-orientation, and that 
these logics potentially lie in contradiction to each other. Kerst and Holtgrewe (2001) 
suggest another theoretical way of looking at this idea of dual logics underpinning 
service work. They argue that it is useful to see front-line service work more 
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generally, as acting in a boundary-spanning role (Thompson, 1967) between the 
producing organisation and its customers.  
  
The concept of “communities of coping” introduced by Korczynski (2002a) may be 
relevant for the analysis of the work practices within the Kazakhstani single-window 
centres. Korczynski (2002a) called customer service organisations “communities of 
coping” because they are challenged with two fundamentally contradictory logics: a 
need to be cost-efficient and a desire to be customer-orientated. On the one hand, 
organisations seek to reduce costs per customer transaction by increasing the speed 
of service, yet on the other they encourage their employees to be quality-orientated. 
Customers are seeking to obtain services that are adapted to their needs and 
requirements, yet at the same time efficient and inexpensive.  
 
This approach suggests that traditional bureaucratic control in the form of the 
measurement and monitoring of the work process willbe joined by the use of 
customer-related normative values (Korczynski, 2002a). This can be seen in the 
substantial shift in recruitment criteria for front-line jobs towards the importance of 
the candidate having the appropriate customer-focused personality and values. Such 
values will also be developed through socialisation, training and appraisal (Leidner, 
1993).  
 
This approach suggests important contradictions within management control at two 
levels. Firstly, there is the contradiction between the continued 
measurement/monitoring and the generation of normative values. While the former 
tends to rest more easily with low trust, command dynamics leading to compliance 
on the part of workers, the latter tends to be associated with high trust dynamics 
supporting active worker commitment (Fox, 1974). Potential contradictions take 
place within the use of customer-related norms. As Gabriel and Lang (1995: 9) 
suggest, the nature and definition of the customer is a contested terrain. This is 
coupled with the idea that control involving norms cannot be adequately understood 
as a simple top-down exercise in which management introduces certain norms within 
workers, who in turn adopt the norms unquestioningly (Kunda, 1992). Thus, analysis 
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of the work practices within the single-window centr s must be sensitive to the active 
role of the employees in the creation of customer-related norms. The fact that 
management actions are underpinned by the dual logics of customer-orientation and 
efficiency means that they will prefer workers to identify with a collective, 
disembodied concept of the customer (Korczynski et al., 2000). However, the 
literature suggests that front-line workers may be more likely to identify with 
embodied individual customers, for interaction with specific customers may be an 
important arena for meaning and satisfaction from the work (Marshall, 1986; 
Williams, 1987). The Kazakhstani front-line workers’ concept of the customer may 
work against management aims of meeting both quality nd quantity performance 
targets. This research examines the issues of customer-related values, their use in 
control and their contradictions within the context of he Kazakhstani single-window 
centres.     
 
Service work cannot be separated from the supplier. Customers care how services are 
delivered; the way in which employees display their f elings towards customers can 
have an important effect on the perceived quality of the interaction. It is becoming 
commonly accepted that customer service organisations are required to perform high 
levels of emotional labour (Mullholland, 2002; Taylor and Tyler, 2000). The concept 
of “emotional labour” which was popularised by the work of Hochschild (1983) into 
the way airline cabin crew are taught and told to manage their emotions in order to 
present a pleasant face is highly relevant for the front-line staff of the OSS. Staff 
must suppress feelings of tiredness or irritation and, Hochschild argues, if this is 
done consistently and in a concentrated way workers can move beyond “surface 
acting” and actually change their own emotions a process known as “deep acting”.  
 
The involvement of the customer as a third party brings a greater degree of 
complexity and uncertainty to the labour process. Although management may wish 
to standardise the behaviour of customers and limittheir options, it is not always 
possible to achieve predictability and compliance in the service exchange. Where 
customers’ requirements cannot easily be standardised, workers will require some 
degree of flexibility and discretion in negotiating their interactions.  
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Monitoring and standardisation of customer service is the dominant forms of control 
at the front-line organisations. However, tightly specified work regimes are often not 
sufficient to secure quality of service. Consequently, most organisations have sought 
to instill values of good customer service in their staff by way of cultural or 
normative control. Leidner (1993: 37) describes this as “transforming workers’ 
characters and personalities”. The aim is to develop an internalised commitment to 
quality service. This may be done through induction, training and performance 
appraisals. Callaghan and Thompson (2002) also point t  the importance of 
recruitment, with customer service organisations focusing on personality traits and 
service-orientated attitudes.  
 
Wallace et al (2000) have argued that one way of resolving the tension between 
service and efficiency is to adopt what they refer to as the “sacrificial human 
resource strategy”. Rather than resolving this tension by improving employee 
morale, organisational commitment or job satisfaction, employers deliberately 
sacrifice the wellbeing of staff, accepting “high levels of stress and emotional 
burnout of the front line staff, accompanied by high turnover’, as the price for 
maintaining high levels of service at low cost” (Wallace et al, 2000: 182). However, 
in order to achieve this result, managers must have acc ss to a pool of skilled labour, 
jobs that require minimal organisational knowledge and the ability to closely monitor 
job performance. In concluding, this section has examined the concepts of 
“organisational learning”, “communities of practice” and “communities of coping” in 
relation to the research on working practices in customer-service organisations. The 
final section summarises the findings of the literatu e review on service integration 









3.3 SUMMARY  
 
This section has highlighted a number of important issues learnt from the previous 
research on the service integration and organisation l learning, and explains how 
these help to construct my analysis of the service int gration processes within the 
transitional context. Service integration has different explanations in the academic 
literature, such as shared strategies, partnerships, joined-up-government, holistic 
services, organisational collaboration, trust. Significant arguments against integration 
include the visibility of financial control and accountability, clear control routes for 
policy makers and limited span-of-control of senior managers (Rhodes, 2000). Inter-
organisational integration may introduce responsibilities beyond the competence of 
managers; raising for users issues of confidentially, assessment or inequitable 
distribution. Service integration may centralise standards that challenge professional 
integrity. Where financial imperatives drive integration, benefits may prove illusory 
or dependent on transitory inspirational leaders. Organisational inertia can pull back 
the reform of public services, where ways-of-working are locked in organisational 
memory. Thompson (1997) concludes that whilst integration is a useful concept, in 
practice clumsy institutions and diversity of strucures may be better delivery 
vehicles. Hence, service integration poses even more se ious challenges for the 
transitional context of Kazakhstan characterised by the lack of public accountability 
and top-down hierarchy.  
 
Arguments favouring public service integration refence efficiency, effectiveness 
and fairness. However, as Behn (2001) argues, the accountability dilemma is a trade-
off between accountability for finances and fairness and accountability for 
performance.  Collective accountability to the citizenry as a whole accommodates 
competing objectives since on-demand integrated services rarely eradicates over-
capacity, transaction costs and competition. Centralised hierarchy, for example in UK 
public services, seems now to be migrating to networking organisational forms (Bate, 
2000), typified as Bardach (1998) suggests by organisational forms differently 
combining price, authority and trust.   
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The literature suggests that service integration is particularly challenging for post-
communist hierarchical centralised bureaucracies due to the lack of relational trust 
between government institutions. Having trained and practiced separately, public 
service integration brings professionals together, p haps for the first time, often with 
a heritage of distrust (Glen and Reeves, 2003). As integration formalises joint 
decision taking, professionals are challenged to renegotiate roles, identities and norms 
patterned over time in vertical structures. Integrating functions necessitates 
integrating competences re-energising of demoralised staff (Abbott et. al., 2005). 
Sennett (2000) emphasises the importance of allowing time for discourse and identity 
renegotiations in service environment. Thus, it is mportant to explore the change of 
identities perceived by the government officials, while introducing customer-oriented 
working practices.     
 
Where one group of professionals dominates new arrangements, this may create inter-
professional resentment. Further, codifying professional judgements in simple tick-
box assessments can dehumanise professionals who respond by abrogating 
responsibility and in extreme cases suffer organisation l violence (Adams and Bray, 
1992). All integration widens the scope of accountability, broadening professional’s 
knowledge and competence domains. In such domains and interdisciplinary teams, 
some professionals thrive. Professionals flourishing i  integrated services may be 
those embracing broadened domains of knowledge and practice (Glen, 2003).   Such 
changes blur distinctions between control of the profession and control by the 
profession, the functions and knowledge constituting a profession. Transformative 
service integration involves unlearning old ways-of-w rking, old terminology, old 
roles and functional mixes. By posing the questions, what is the problem and what is 
the solution, service integration unfolds a new learning environment for staff and 
stakeholders. 
 
Several common features have been described in the context of front-line service 
work, including high turnover, low status, poor pay nd few career prospects 
(Korczynski, 2003b; Russell, 2002; van den Broek, 2003). The human management 
practices that characterise front-line service work have been described as 
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routinisation, control, and a strong emphasis on emotion management (Burgess and 
Connell, 2004). Many studies have drawn critical attention to the customer service 
organisations as “electronic sweatshops” – a post-industrial, high-tech IT 
organisational form, which nevertheless reproduces th  Taylorist paradigm of task 
routinisation and de-skilling (Winiecki, 2004; Korczynski, 2003b). While some 
researchers have examined “high commitment management” in the context of 
customer service organisations (Houlihan, 2002), others described the forms of 
resistance to management and its extensive controls (Bain and Taylor, 2000; Sturdy 
and Fineman, 2001). The work of customer service organisations can be described as 
fraught with contradictions. They are required by the management to be both cost-
efficient and customer-orientated. However, as previous studies of customer service 
organisations have already pointed out (Korczynski, 2002a; Houlihan, 2002; Bain et 
al., 2002), these twin objectives are fundamentally contradictory. These 
contradictions are manifested in daily confrontations with dilemmas concerning cost-
efficiency versus quality-of-service and empowerment versus de-skilling.       
 
This research examines how these attributes of customer service work relate to the 
single-window centres in the Kazakhstani context, and question what of sort of CoPs 
might develop among the front-line staff in the single-window centres. To answer 
these questions posed, a case study was conducted in wo single-window centres in 
Astana. Organisational learning is challenging both conceptually and practically, and 
the difficulties of defining and promoting double loop learning are a recurrent theme. 
Examining these issues in a context which discourages challenging existing work 
practices raises important questions about what organisational learning means and 
how it can be evaluated within a situation where it may only be implemented to a 
limited extent. The issues raised in the literature reviewed led to the development and 
refinement of three research questions, on experiences of those involved in the OSS 
policy design and implementation, the value of “organisational learning” and 
“communities of practice” as conceptual tools for analysis of service integration, and 
the nature of service integration in the transitional context. These questions, and the 
methods that were employed to investigate them, are discussed further in Chapter 4. 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND PRACTICE  
 
The previous chapter highlighted the theoretical basis for this thesis, which analyses 
the implementation of service integration policy in the transitional country such as 
Kazakhstan. This thesis targeted managers of the OSS and MJ defined by legislation 
as being responsible for the design, coordination and control of public service 
integration through single-window arrangements. The front-line personnel was 
another particular group targeted by this research project as being involved in 
customer service delivery and, for this reason, able to provide insights on learning 
new practices and skills as well as perceptions of their new professional identities. In 
addition, the customers were taken into consideration to explore their views on the 
quality of service delivered through OSS.  
 
This chapter is concerned with the development of the research aims, selection of 
data gathering methods and analysis, issues in policy research and some comments 
related to my two-fold role as a researcher and a former civil servant. The choices 
made throughout the research process are discussed, the implications considered, and 
the strengths and weaknesses acknowledged. Researching within the area of public 
service integration has a number of important research design implications. It is a 
highly politicised area, especially in the context of the transitional country 
characterised by the lack of democracy and top-down political system, therefore, 
ethical implications arise at every stage of the research process. The Social Policy 
Association Guidelines on Research Ethics (2009) were used, and ethical concerns 
are discussed throughout in relation to different aspects of the research, as well as in 
a separate section 4.3.    
 
My professional interests could be a possible source of bias. For example, my 
sympathetic attitude to the problems expressed by the participants in facing 
resistance to change might have influenced the resea ch findings. Gummesson (1991: 
53) warns that pre-understanding can be blocked or become a pre-disposition to 
particular findings, meaning the inability to apply sufficient reflexivity to challenge 
pre-existing judgements and assumptions. However, my pre-understanding of the 
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context and connections with the Kazakhstani policy-makers were extremely 
beneficial for this research project, which could hardly be conducted by an outsider, 
particularly from a Western institution.  
 
There are three main sections to the chapter dealing with research design as an 
ongoing process, data collection, and data analysis and presentation. The first section 
considers why a qualitative approach was deemed more appropriate for the research 
questions, explains the further choices that were made, such as the selection of 
Kazakhstan as a country, and the context and selection of the single-window centres 
as case study organisations. The key points from the original research proposal, 
issues of arranging access to the participants, and the changes that arose following 
the results of the pilot study and during the main study are discussed. The data 
collection is then discussed in depth, considering the choice of five qualitative 
methods: semi-structured interviews, unstructured interviews (cognitive 
conversations), participant observation, documentary analysis and virtual 
ethnography. The final section deals with data analysis and presentation. The starting 
points and development of the analysis are discussed. There are a number of difficult 
issues in terms of the presentation of the research findings, particularly transcription, 
translation, anonymity, confidentiality, and the ways in which these issues were 
addressed are discussed. The final section summarises the research design process, 
the choices made, and the limitations and strengths of the methods employed. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide a r flexive and transparent account of 
the research process.       
 
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN: A REFLEXIVE PROCESS  
 
This section sets out the overall context and structu e for the research, discussing the 
initial choices that were made and the changes that occurred following the results of 
the pilot study and during the process of carrying out the research. The initial design 
was intended to be sufficiently flexible to allow space for learning and adjusting 
while undertaking the fieldwork, and to take into account the fast moving policy 
implementation in which changes could have significant implications for the research 
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questions. Understanding the changes in the research design is important, for as 
Silverman (2005: 36) argues, what happens in the field as you attempt to gather data 
is itself a source of data, rather than just a technical problem. The development of the 
research questions is discussed first, followed by an overview of the research design.  
 
4.1.1 Research Questions  
 
The review of the literature in the preceding Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted a number 
of important issues relating to understanding the processes of shaping NPM reforms 
in transitional countries, the impact of contextual f ctors, the concepts of 
organisational learning and “communities of practice”, and the challenges faced by 
the customer service organisations. Following Blaikie (2000: 83), my research 
questions provided exploration, description, understanding, explanation and change.  
• Exploration and description. This research explored and described service 
integration processes in Kazakhstan, where the topic f research as well as 
the context of the country in which the research has taken place were very 
little known about. This thesis was aimed to identify the key stakeholders in 
the service integration policy, explore their behaviours, relationships and 
perceptions, their role in shaping the policy decision .   
• Explanation. This research sought to explain specific patterns in policy 
implementation such as power dimensions, control, performance management 
and personnel practices. It aimed to explain if and to what extent 
organisational learning took place within the single-window centres, and 
what type of “communities of practice” developed among the front-line 
personnel.      
• Understanding. While understanding is also aimed at finding out why the 
observed patterns occur, Blaikie (2000: 74-77) distinguishes it from 
explanation as it is based on the subjective viewpoint and motivations of the 
social actors involved. This thesis attempted to understand the underlying 
reasons for the adoption of the country-specific “alternative-access model” of 
service delivery, the change processes related to the new working practices 
and transformation of professional identities of the front-line personnel from 
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different perspectives: those involved in policy design and control (managers 
of the MJ), those involved in actual implementation f the policy (OSS 
managers and staff), and those who received the services through single-
window arrangements (customers).    
• Change. This thesis aimed to analyse how implementation of the public 
service integration policy could be improved on thebasis of the experiences 
learnt so far in the conclusion chapter. 
 
The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 led to the development of three research 
questions, which were outlined above in the introductory chapter (see Table 1): 
 
Table 1: Research Questions  
 
 Research Questions 
1.  What are the experiences of those involved in the implementation of public 
service integration through single-window arrangements in Kazakhstan? 
2.  In what ways is service integration a problematic concept in a transitional 
context such as Kazakhstan? 
3.  Are concepts such as “organisational learning” and “communities of 
practice” useful tools in analysing public service integration?  
 
While these questions have been refined during the course of the research, the 
modifications have been for the purpose of clarification rather than introducing any 
substantial shifts in direction, and the underlying aims and intentions have remained 
the same.  
 
The rationale behind each question is now discussed. The intention of question one 
was to understand the experiences of the OSS managers nd front-line employees 
who were directly involved in the policy implementation: from design and delivery 
of joined-up services, negotiation with the stakeholders, adoption and adaptation of 
new service arrangements, and to use these experienc s to evaluate the policy 
framework developed and applied at the national and local levels. The views of the 
government officials in a coordinating role from the MJ and customers were also 
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taken into account to analyse policy implementation fr m different perspectives. The 
literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted the nature of ongoing service reform 
changes in transitional countries and the impact of the managerial reforms on public 
service organisations. The importance of contextual factors in implementing service 
modernisation has been addressed in a number of research projects, as highlighted in 
the literature review chapter. There is a debate qustioning the applicability of 
Western managerial ideas in transitional countries characterised by the weak 
accountability, top-down hierarchy and high corruption. Hence, question two aims to 
analyse the ways in which service integration is a problematic concept in the 
transitional context of Kazakhstan. Several studies indicate the importance of 
contextual factors in interpreting the change processes as the institutional framework 
and public sector culture play significant roles in shaping the managerial reform 
agenda. This led onto a consideration of service int gration, both in theory and in 
practice, as addressed in question three. The literature review demonstrated that the 
concept of service integration has become increasingly prominent in research though 
its meaning and usefulness remain contested. The literature suggested that successful 
service integration involves organisational learning, and learning that occurs in 
“communities of practice” and non-formal settings. Therefore, the purpose of 
question three was to review applications of the concepts of “organisational learning” 
and “communities of practice” in relation to the analysis of service integration in a 
Kazakhstani context. The intention was to gain an understanding of the learning 
experiences of the managers and front-line staff in implementing the service 
integration policy and explore the type of “communities of practice” developed 
within selected case study organisations. The aim was for both a conceptual and 
practical understanding of the usefulness of the concepts, such as organisational 
learning and “communities of practice” in relation to service integration within the 
context of a transitional country such as Kazakhstan, so that selected case study 





There are a number of features of the research that suggest a qualitative approach is 
the most appropriate means for addressing the three research questions set out in 
Table 1. The research aims required detailed, empirical data, best collected through 
an in-depth exploration of the issues with the select d participants. Only in this way 
could an understanding of the situation could be def nded. As such, the qualitative, 
more than quantitative methods seemed more appropriate as they are contextually 
driven and require a high degree of interpretive work, whereas quantitative methods 
rely on already established categories of investigation that do not necessarily link to 
organisational contexts (Langan-Fox and Tan, 1997). Different groups of the 
participants such as the OSS managers and front-line staff, senior managers of the 
MJ and service users were selected for detailed investigation of service integration 
processes based not on statistical representativeness of the study population, but on 
their potential to help in the exploration of the srvice change processes and the 
development of the understanding. 
  
Though the quantitative survey could provide a general picture of trends and 
relationships, this method did not fit my research questions, as the nature of 
relationships between the participants changes in the service arrangements and 
perceptions of professional identities are non-linear and difficult to capture with 
quantitative measures, which may not be sensitive to issues such as political, cultural 
and organisational context. For background information I gathered quantitative data 
in the form of statistics on the number of the services delivered, customers served, 
investments made.        
 
Most importantly, qualitative research, whilst recognising all the variations contained 
within that term, allows for an emphasis on context and experience that is vital in 
understanding the impacts of policy for service providers and service users, and the 
responses to policy changes. Bryman (2001: 279) also notes that qualitative research 
tends to emphasise process. This is important in allowing an understanding of the 
ways in which responses to service integration policy have unfolded over time, since 
service integration itself is a process. The issues under investigation are not static, 
and while the research can provide only a snapshot of these processes, it is important 
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to recognise the fluidity that characterises the research environment. The literature 
review indicated a number of reasons why context is important: the characteristics of 
the political system and state capacity (institutional, administrative and technical) are 
critical factors in shaping the public service refom.            
 
4.1.2 Triangulation  
 
Important choices associated with qualitative methods such as case study, interviews, 
observations, documentary analysis and virtual ethnography are considered below. In 
each case the choice is justified by appropriateness to the research questions. 
Triangulation is an approach to gathering data rather t an a method in itself. Harvey 
and McDonald (1993) suggest that it can involve either one researcher using more 
than one research technique, or two researchers using the same technique, or two or 
more researchers using two or more techniques. Bell (1999) sees it as a multi-method 
approach that involves the study of a phenomenon through cross-checking individual 
accounts and data from a number of sources. This allows the researcher to produce a 
balanced account by comparing and contrasting evidence from the data generated. A 
third definition is given by Rose (1982: 309) who describes triangulation as: 
 
A term used by Denzin (1970) to describe an important methodological 
principle. It means the use of two or more different methods in studying the 
same phenomenon – the point is that no one method is infallible, so the use of 
several methods gives more conclusive results.  
 
However, even if triangulation is used, Rose (1982) warns that the usual constraints 
of access, time, confidentiality, and so on will sti l be experienced by sociologists 
using the approach in their research. An important element of this research is the way 
the processes and changes have been interpreted by key players, and primary sources 
of data have been used to obtain a first hand account f different interpretations.  
Figure 2 illustrates the research design framework, which involved triangulation of 









Figure 3 presents Research Design Framework for this research project stressing 













As Figure 2 illustrates, a number of primary sources were used to generate data for 
this part of the thesis. One was in-depth case studies to examine service integration 
processes through observation of daily work practices, dynamics of multi-directional 
interactions between the managers, front-line staff, stakeholders and clients, and 
learning experiences. Second were semi-structured int rv ews with the managers of 
the OSS and MJ who were able to comment on the design of the strategy, selection 
of service delivery arrangements and technologies, control mechanisms and 
personnel policies. Third were unstructured interviws with the front-line personnel 
who shared their experiences on learning new work practices, changing their roles 
and tasks, perceptions of the professional identitis. Another element of this research 
is more “local” in terms of the exploration of the way in which single-window policy 
was implemented, and what impact it had on the public service delivery in 
Kazakhstan. Four types of the data have been used to examine the policy 
implementation process. Firstly, there are official documents that provided a 
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legislative framework for service integration policy. Secondly, there are mass media 
publications, which give indication of the type of issues raised within public debate 
on the policy. Thirdly, there are existing international and local surveys that relate to 
the evaluation of the Kazakhstani government in terms of government effectiveness, 
control of corruption, technological infrastructure, and readiness for e-government as 
combination of these factors could facilitate or constrain the progress of policy 
implementation. A final and important component is v rtual ethnography, which 
analyses the citizens’ views expressed via the Interne  that provide rich data on the 
customer experiences of the quality of services delivered through single-window 
arrangements.     
 
Hence, triangulation has been used to apply a “family of methods” to construct a case 
study enabling an examination of public service intgration from the perspectives of 
service providers, service users and policy coordinators. Primary and secondary 
sources have been employed in this research and strengthened through triangulation. 
The details of sampling and the way each method was used in the research are 
presented below together with their respective ration les, advantages, disadvantages 
and problems faced during research.  
 
4.1.3 Selection of Case Studies 
 
Case studies offer a number of advantages and disadvantages. Case studies offer the 
opportunity of developing an in-depth understanding of an issue within a specific 
context using a multi-method approach. As Yin notes (1994: 13): “A case study is an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between pheom non and context are not 
clearly evident”. There are several common critiques of case studies including a lack 
of rigor, a lack of basis for generalisation, and the suggestion that they are too time 
consuming to analyse and present (Yin, 1994: 10-11). These concerns are refuted by 
Yin (1994: 32) who argues that the goal of case studies is to expand and generalise 
theories and understand policy implications – what e refers to as level two 
inferences, as opposed to level one inferences froma sample of a population, a point 
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reiterated by Bechhofer and Paterson (2000). The choice of cases and the methods to 
be used are clearly crucial in ensuring the strength of he method. The reasons for the 
selection of Kazakhstan as a case country and case organisations in Astana were 
noted in the introductory chapter. Anticipated problems with generalisibility have 
been minimised as much as possible. The significance of the OSS policy as a key 
element of the service modernisation reform has been alr ady demonstrated both for 
the government and citizens of the country. The main purpose of the single-window 
centres was stipulated by the Government Resolution No. 1 dated 5 January 2007 as 
“the provision of public services based on the one stop shop principle to accept 
applications from clients and deliver processed documents”. Within four years of 
implementation since the launch of pilot projects in November 2005 over 300 single-
window centres were set-up and the number of servics was increased from 25 to 57, 
with a short-term vision to expand up to 100 services across different government 
departments. Thus, the rationale for using OSS policy as a “case” is robust. 
Moreover, public service reform spread rapidly and was backed by national 
legislation. This means that, by and large, the public sector in Kazakhstan has been 
affected by the NPM ideas and generated similar experiences across regions. 
 
Second, a case study method would help me to answer the research questions – to 
explain and interpret transformational changes in service integration in the 
transitional context – that are too complex to capture with the quantitative research 
strategies. By employing a case study method I relied on multiple sources of 
evidence: structured and unstructured interviews, policy documents, observation and 
virtual ethnography, “with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” (Yin, 
1994: 13).        
 
The use of the case study in this research is made in ifferent ways and on different, 
but related, levels. On the one hand, there is the “case” as a “theoretical construct”. 
In this instance the case of OSS policy is used to examine service integration 
processes. The case is used to exemplify the theoretical concepts of NPM, service 
integration, organisational learning and “communities of practice”, and the way 
different key actors have interpreted these concepts and processes – thus 
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demonstrating the areas in which there are “contested domains”. As well as the case 
being made at a theoretical level, the OSS policy is used as an “empirical unit” 
presenting a case study of service integration to illustrate change processes and 
transformations within selected single-window centrs.  
 
I used a theoretical rather than statistical sampling to select cases. Mason (1996: 93-
4) explains that theoretical sampling means selecting groups or categories to study on 
the basis of their relevance to research questions, theoretical position of a researcher 
and the explanation which a researcher is developing. From a practical point of view 
the case studies needed to meet certain characteristi s to develop and test my theory 
and explanation:  
• Area of function - they should represent explicit examples of public service 
integration; 
• Time - they should have had enough time to introduce new service 
arrangements and technologies, generate organisatioal learning and 
renegotiate their roles and professional identities.  
 
Given my intention to understand and explain servic integration processes, it 
seemed reasonable and appropriate to select the singl -window centres among other 
public sector organisations as a new, innovative organisation aiming to deliver high 
quality, customer-oriented joined-up services. The choice of the single-window 
centres as case study organisations allowed particul r processes of service 
integration, use of personnel policies, control mechanisms, technologies, nature of 
relationships between key stakeholders and change of the roles of the front-line staff 
to be identified and examined through the analysis of a range of data.  
 
The next question was to decide on the type of casede ign – multiple or single. 
Given my interest in understanding service integration processes, I wondered if there 
is a “replication logic” (Bryman, 2001), if similar experiences can be found in 
different case study organisations. Hammersley and Atkinson acknowledge that “the 
researcher must make a trade off here between breadth an  depth of investigation” 
(1995: 40). Two case studies were selected for detailed scrutiny to demonstrate in a 
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rounded way the particular changes in specified contexts rather than examine surface 
patterns within a larger sample. The reasons for chosing case study organisations in 
Astana such as OSS-1 and OSS-2 rather than anywhere els  were highlighted in the 
introductory chapter. I was interested in exploring the adaptation of the new service 
delivery model, as well as examining the learning experiences of the managers and 
front-line staff, and change in the roles and professional identities of those involved 
in front-line customer service. For this reason the time variable was critical in my 
research. Both case organisations were launched on a pilot basis in November 2005, 
and during the period of data collection for this research project (from December 
2006 to December 2008) they had already accumulated more experience in joined-up 
service delivery compared to other OSS, which were established one-two years later 
and were not able to provide rich empirical data. By selecting case studies in Astana 
I had a unique chance to observe change processes from the pilot stage to the actual 
implementation of the single-window arrangements over a three-year period. Two 
case studies were a manageable number for me as a single researcher and enabled me 
to develop explanations through detailed scrutiny of h w change processes were 
implemented in particular contexts. However, as Mason notes we “cannot expect a 
context to be representative of all contexts of that ype” (1996: 97). Table 8 presents 
background information on the selected case study organisations in Astana.  
 
Table 8: Background Information on Case Study Organisations 
 
 One Stop Shop - 1  
(Almaty district area) 
One Stop Shop – 2 
(Saryarka district area)  
Access to the 
location  
 
Both cases are located in the densely populated areas, have good access 
by public transport, and are accessible for wheelchairs  
Number of 
staff 
50 employees, including manager, 2 deputy managers, 2 supervisors,  
30 front-line personnel, 8 consultants and administrative staff 
 
Number of 
clients per day 
 








150 square meters 
re-furbished building  
hot desking 
250 square meters 




As apparent from Table 8, both case study organisations had a similar number of 
employees, level of workload in terms of the number of clients to be served, and 
common features in the physical design of the office. The detailed description of the 
OSS physical environment is presented below.  
 
The question could be raised that it might have been too early for policy 
implementation to demonstrate the success or failure of the reform and visible 
changes within three years of development. However, it seemed unreasonable for me 
to delay the research to allow more time to pass since the policy launch for a number 
of reasons. The single-window centres did exist and provide 25 services of different 
government departments during the period of my fieldwork; the issues that I was 
interested to explore, such as change processes in service design and delivery, 
learning new practices, changes of professional identiti s, did take place so my 
participants were capable of providing primary data on their experiences, values, 
roles, and perceptions of new identities.    
 
It could also be argued that the single-window centres from the regions rather than 
from the capital could have been studied as the latt r might have received more 
resources, staff and control from the policy coordinators. However, in this instance 
the choice of case studies was intentionally limited to the OSS located in the capital 
due to the fact that they were the first to pilot single-window arrangements, introduce 
new technologies and policies, and, for this reason, had accumulated more experience 
to offer rich, empirical data for my analysis compared to the regional OSS, which 
were recently established. In order to strengthen external and internal validity of my 
data I did examine the single-window centres at the regional level to capture general 
patterns of the change processes. I was interested to know whether similar or 
different trends in service integration process could be observed across different 
regions. It was difficult to make a choice out of 200 offices available at the period of 
data collection. Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame (1981) claim that the size of sample is 
dictated by the social process under scrutiny. I used two variables to select the cases 
relevant for my research questions: geographical locati n and time. Four 
geographical regions were selected: north – south – east and west to get insights from 
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different parts of the country with two OSS in each region and one OSS in Almaty 
city, a former capital and now a business and cultural centre. Using a time variable I 
selected those single-window centres which were establi hed earlier (at least a year) 
than others in the same region and had accumulated some experience introducing 
new service practices. Remembering that the sample size should help a researcher to 
understand the process rather than to represent statistically a population (Mason, 
1996: 97), in total eleven single-window centres were selected including two case 
organisations in Astana that proved to be enough to provide unique, primary data 
from different regional contexts for cross-checking and strengthening the validity of 
my data:  
• two in-depth case studies in Astana; 
• two in the south region (South-Kazakhstan and Kyzylorda regions),  
• two in the north region (Karaganda and Pavlodar regions),  
• two in the west region (Western-Kazakhstan and Atyrau regions),  
• two in the east region (Eastern-Kazakhstan and Kostanay regions), and 
• one in Almaty city.  
 
In other situations I might have used a set of multivariate analysis to select case 
organisations out of 200 OSS by type of technologies, socio-economic indicators, 
number of customers, services, personnel, invested resources etc. However, at the 
time of data collection the OSS at the city and regional levels had standard 
organisational structures, facilities and a list of services, similar number of staff, 
therefore, these parameters could not be relevant as variables in this research. In this 
instance, the choice was based on the relevance of ase organisations to my research 
questions and conceptual framework. As Mason (2002: 136) emphasises, the key 
issue for qualitative sampling is how to focus, strategically and meaningfully, rather 
than how to represent.  
 
Hence, the choice of two case study organisations in Astana and nine OSS in the 
regions as cross-check comparators is robust given th ir relevance to my research 
questions and conceptual framework as well as theirability to provide rich, empirical 
data both for in-depth examination of service integration process and surface 
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exploration of policy changes across the country. The following section discusses 
issues of arranging access to different groups of participants: senior managers of the 
MJ and OSS, front-line employees and stakeholders.    
 
4.1.4 Arranging Access to Participants  
 
Lofland and Lofland (1984: 25) suggest that when negotiating access to a research 
setting it is necessary to be “armed with connection, accounts, knowledge and 
courtesy.” As was noted above, given the hierarchical system of the civil service it 
would have been hardly possible to approach the senior managers of the MJ and OSS 
for information in the role of a researcher for two reasons. Firstly, the managers of 
the MJ and OSS are not easily accessible for people who work outside civil service. 
The government officials of the MJ do not have direct interactions with customers, 
and work within a closed, hierarchical system and cooperate with colleagues from 
the stakeholder departments who hold similar management positions. The OSS 
managers are perceived by the public as important figures in the local context as they 
coordinate delivery of public services in high demand such as, for example, starting-
up a business, property registration. The managers of the MJ, OSS, stakeholder 
departments and local municipalities constitute professional network based on 
mutual obligation, personal relations and exchange of benefits. Secondly, there is a 
lack of cooperation between researchers and practitioners on policy evaluation 
projects. The Kazakhstani government officials perceive research as an inspection, 
quality control, and are concerned to see positive research findings rather than a 
realistic picture. For these reasons a researcher, particularly from a Western 
university, would hardly be able to get access to the participants without getting prior 
official permission from a higher authority.   
 
As was highlighted earlier, my position as a former civil servant proved to be 
extremely beneficial to get access to the participants through both formal and 
informal recommendations from my employers. Throughout the research project I 
always reminded myself that I was a researcher and the findings of my research 
should not be influenced by my previous work experience within the government. I 
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was financially independent from my employer as I took unpaid study leave for four 
years as well as from the OSS coordinating body.       
  
In autumn 2006 I was invited by the Agency to participate as a translator in the 
training course organised by the Dutch Institute for Public Administration on the 
experience of the Dutch single-window centres for a delegation of the Kazakhstani 
civil servants. The representatives from the MJ, stakeholder departments and pilot 
OSS were included among the list of delegates. At tha stage I was developing my 
research proposal and had concerns about the issue of access to the participants. This 
trip provided me a unique chance to find “gate-keepers” to the participants, build 
trust through socialising in informal settings, and identify challenges related to 
research design issues in terms of data access, ethics, and choice of methods. During 
that training workshop which took place in December 2006 I met the manager of 
OSS-1, three representatives of the Tax Committee who piloted tax services jointly 
with the OSS, and four managers from the MJ who were responsible for the 
coordination of the single-window policy. I presentd myself for the delegates as a 
doctoral student from the University of Edinburgh wo was doing research on public 
service reform in Kazakhstan. They were informed that I would approach them on an 
individual basis to ask their views on the OSS policy implementation, all information 
would be kept confidential, and they had a right to refuse being interviewed. In order 
to secure a positive reaction from the potential participants, I intentionally 
emphasised that my research was funded with support fr m the Presidential 
scholarship and, besides producing a doctoral thesis the government of Kazakhstan 
expects me to produce a policy paper with recommendations to improve the policy 
implementation.        
 
The OSS manager, Mr. Aybek Alipbay, immediately became interested in the topic 
of my research, and we had a number of informal chats when Alipbay explained 
various aspects and problematic issues related to the OSS policy implementation. 
Alipbay, 37 years old, was originally from the south region, Zhambyl oblast (the 
same oblast where the Minister of Justice and most senior managers came from, as it 
turned out later), where he worked at the local department of justice. He seemed to 
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be enthusiastic about his new role as a manager of the single-window centre and had 
excellent communication skills. Alipbay suggested that I would be introduced to Mr. 
Nurlan Baimurzayev, the Head of the Department for Public Service Quality Control 
within the MJ, who was responsible for the design of the strategy and performance 
monitoring of the OSS in the regions. Baimurzayev played an important role in my 
research as a “gate-keeper” and participant. Baimurzayev had been working in the 
MJ for the last seven years starting from the Committee for Registry Service under 
the MJ where he was responsible for property registrat on. Prior to his job in the civil 
service Baimurzayev worked in the business company at the managerial position. 
Given the fact that he came to the public sector from the business sector, his way of 
thinking and working style contrasted to those practiced by other managers. 
Baimurzayev was open to new ideas for service improvement and innovation, had a 
strong character and determination to overcome challenges, and he was explicitly 
critical towards patronage and the corrupt system flourishing in the public sector. He 
could be considered a symbolic figure in the Kazakhstani public sector – a 
representative of a new generation of the government officials who were highly 
motivated for public service improvement and fighting corruption. Given his 
experience both in the public and business sectors as well as strong personal 
characteristics, Baimurzayev was appointed as the Head of the Department for Public 
Service Quality Control, a new department established specifically for OSS policy 
coordination. Baimurzayev agreed to be interviewed and promised to help in 
providing access to the OSS managers, which he actually did. As he noted:  
 
Ministry of Justice should not work alone in separation from others; we need to 
cooperate with experts, researchers, NGOs and mass edia as one stop shop is 
not for us, but for our citizens, and we can improve service if we join our efforts. 
Go and speak with directors of OSS, and if you have problems, just let me know.       
 
The Department for Public Service Quality Control cnsisted of ten employees, 
including the director who was accountable to six political managers: the Minister of 
Justice and two Vice-Ministers, as well as the Chairm n and two Deputy Chairmen 
of the Committee for Registry Service under the MJ. Upon return back to Astana 
Alipbay helped me to get access to one of his colleagu s - Mrs. Zhanar Aubakirova, 
the manager of the OSS-2 in Astana. Aubakirova, a 35-38 year old, active, bright, 
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business-like woman, was characterised by the managers of the MJ and her staff as a 
professional manager. Alipbay and Aubakirova were in good collegial relationships, 
at the same time competing between each other in terms of showing better 
performance in their offices. Aubakirova had also wrked in the local department of 
justice prior to her appointment as the manager of the single-window centre. As 
highlighted in Chapter 7 in more detail, the recruitment strategy for managerial posts 
at the OSS was based on the internal promotion of the managers of justice 
departments by recommendations from the senior management of the MJ.  
 
During the period of my fieldwork two of my former colleagues got appointments at 
the MJ: Mr. Marat Beketayev, my colleague from the Eurasian Civil Service 
Training Centre, was appointed as a Vice-Minister of Justice, and Mr. Altay 
Kulginov, former deputy head of the regional branch of the Agency, got the position 
of a deputy head of Legislative Acts Department. Kulginov did a Master’s degree in 
Law at the University of Aberdeen prior to his appointment at the MJ. During the 
academic year of 2006-2007 we were in regular communication about the progress 
of our studies and, for this reason, Kulginov was well aware of my research interests 
and passed this information to Beketayev. The Vice-Minister of Justice invited me 
for a meeting and introduced me to the management team of the Ministry as his 
friend who was doing  research on the single-window p licy implementation, asking 
them to provide support in data collection. This informal introduction with the senior 
managers proved to be extremely helpful in getting access to the participants, 
developing trustful relationships and taking intervi ws with the managers.    
  
My initial plan was that I would not go further than s a researcher. However, during 
the period of fieldwork I was invited to two official seminars participating with the 
OSS managers and asked to give presentations. As trust and relationships had 
gradually developed over a three-year period between th  participants and myself, I 
felt obliged to share requested information about the international experience of the 
OSS. In October 2007 I attended the first seminar for 30 OSS managers organised by 
the MJ which helped me to establish informal contacts with participants before 
conducting interviews. Initially, the managers seemd to be concerned about the 
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research findings and consequences for their career d velopment in case of 
discovering poor performance of their organisations. At that stage of policy 
implementation the image of the single-window centrs was distorted and criticised 
by the politicians, journalists, businesses and civil society. I explained that my 
research was not aimed at policy evaluation but rathe  it intended to explore and 
understand public service changes using the views and experiences of those who 
were involved in policy implementation. Chapter 8 provides a detailed description of 
the relationships between the management of the MJ and OSS during these seminars. 
    
In my initial research design I planned to conduct participant observation of the daily 
work practices at the case study organisations. However, I was concerned about the 
issue of access to the work environment and expected that the OSS managers would 
be reluctant to give their agreement to my presence within the customer service 
environment. This issue was not raised in our discus ions between myself and 
participants until Alipbay suggested himself to giving me an opportunity to observe 
the daily routine work by sitting next to his front-line staff for a week or two. As he 
emphasised:  
 
You will know much more by looking at how people actually work in practice 
than if you listen to our stories without seeing it: how staff provide a service, 
how customers behave, what database we use, etc.  
 
Aubakirova also agreed that I would be present at the OSS-2 for a period of two 
weeks. Both managers and myself agreed that if I were going to provide a report to 
the MJ about my research findings, I would first submit the draft report for their 
comments. It might be that my position as a former civil servant facilitated 
establishing trustful relations with the participants, as people are often merely 
concerned with what kind of person the researcher is than with the research itself 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 78). I spent two weeks in each case study 
organisation and had been in regular contact with the managers of the MJ and case 
organisations throughout the research project which enabled trust relationships to 
develop between the participants and myself. While reflecting on the progress of the 
OSS policy implementation, there were several occasions when some participants 
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raised politically sensitive issues such as corruption, nepotism and relations-based 
system on their own initiative. This usually happened in the informal settings when 
the participants could relax and share their views on the problematic aspects of 
public service delivery without concern to be recorded at the work setting. 
 
Ethical concerns could be raised regarding the extent of voluntary participation of the 
OSS managers after introduction of myself by the political management and getting 
official letter from the Vice-Minister of Justice in support of my research (see 
Appendix 1). However, in the highly centralised environment of the MJ it was 
important for me to gain political support, otherwise I would not be able to get access 
to the case study organisations and participants. Though Israel and Hay (2006: 63) 
note that “researchers have to ensure they negotiate consent from all relevant people, 
for all relevant matters and, possibly, at all relevant times”, it was difficult to assess 
whether participants did or did not have freedom of action. I always made clear 
statements both to the OSS managers and front-line staff that participation in this 
research was voluntary and they were free to refuse to be interviewed. As described 
earlier I managed to select case study organisations in Astana whose managers were 
willing to participate in the research project. I asked for informed consent from all 
managers whom I interviewed. I was introduced to the front-line staff by the 
managers as a researcher, however, I was not able to offer informed consent for all 
employees and service users because observation of customer service and informal 
talks were taken in the public setting. The following section presents a discussion of 
the pilot study: the process of piloting research tools, challenges faced, key findings 
and its impact on the changes in the original research project.       
 
4.1.5 Findings of the Pilot Study   
 
From December 2006 to January 2007 I conducted a pilot study as pre-testing or 
“trying out” of a particular research instrument (Baker, 1994: 182-3). My pilot study 
was based both on quantitative and qualitative methods involving questionnaire 
surveys of the front-line staff in case study organis tions, semi-structured interviews 
with the OSS managers, and unstructured interviews with the senior managers of the 
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MJ. Although some authors suggest that in qualitative approaches separate pilot 
studies are not necessary (for example, Holloway, 1997: 121), following my own 
experience I argue that a pilot study for qualitative research is necessary and 
important to identify appropriateness of the use of research methods and potential 
constraints in doing the main study. One of the advantages of conducting a pilot 
study is that it might give advance warning about where the main research project 
could fail, where research protocols may not be followed, or whether proposed 
methods or instruments are inappropriate or too complicated (Teijlingen van et al., 
2001). In my research project the pilot study helped me to identify problems and 
constraints related to the use of questionnaire survey and reduce time and resources if 
questionnaires were disseminated across regions among large sample of respondents 
in the main study resulting in poor response rates.  
 
Given the fact that public service integration in Kazakhstan was a new area, the main 
reasons to conduct pilot study were to collect background data on the research topic, 
establish initial contacts with the participants who may be useful in following 
“snowball” sampling in the main study, test adequacy of research instruments, and 
develop research questions and a research plan. Also the pilot study provided me 
with an opportunity to train research skills in practice which proved to be helpful, as 
Holloway (1997: 121) emphasised, for the researcher who was a novice, particularly 
when using the interview technique.  
 
Following Peat et al. (2002: 123) to improve the int r al validity of the questionnaire 
I administered the pilot questionnaire to the respondents in exactly the same way as I 
planned to administer it in the main study, discarded unnecessary, difficult or 
ambiguous questions, and asked respondents for feedback to identify difficult 
questions. I distributed the questionnaire with permission of the MJ through the OSS 
managers and gave a brief presentation for staff in both case organisations on the 
aims of my research, methods, and ethical issues. Dpite the fact that respondents 
were guaranteed anonymity and not required to mention their names and positions in 
the questionnaire, I faced serious concerns about the appropriateness of the use of 
this method in the main study.  
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It turned out that it was hardly possible to avoid the OSS managers and supervisors 
in administering the questionnaire survey. Every step in conducting the questionnaire 
survey had to be implemented under the surveillance of the managerial staff: 
distribution and collection of questionnaires, reminding respondents to fill-in 
questionnaires. Given the shortage of time available during working day to fill-in 
questionnaires or the lack of interest or maybe a combination of both factors, the 
respondents tended to copy responses of their colleagues resulting in identical 
answers in many questionnaires. The participants might be concerned to express their 
views in the written form as they could be easily identified by their writing style. 
However, the participants were much more eager to talk about their experiences 
orally rather than to express their views in the written form: the questionnaire, being 
a paper document, which could have been misused, was perceived with mistrust. 
Many respondents faced difficulties in providing answers for open questions given 
inadequate levels of literacy and a lack of writing skills, despite the fact that most of 
the staff were university graduates. Overall, the pilot questionnaire survey resulted in 
poor response rates. The questionnaire survey was not able to capture complex issues 
of service delivery changes, nature of interactions between the managers, staff, users 
and stakeholders, and their learning experiences. By contrast to the questionnaire 
survey, unstructured interviews with the managers of the MJ, OSS and stakeholder 
departments proved to be effective research tools in exploring their views on the 
policy strategy and establishing contacts with the participants who were included in 
the main study.      
 
Pilot interviews helped to identify a number of benefits and barriers of public service 
integration from the views of those who were involved in policy implementation, and 
provided a useful starting point for the main study. Responses to the pilot question 
“What are the benefits of the OSS policy?” can be clustered around three 
fundamental benefits:  
1. time and cost saving - customers could apply for several public services at 
one visit to the OSS which significantly saved time and cost expenditures, especially 
for people from remote regions.    
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2. reducing corruption - the OSS policy was expected to reduce level of 
corruption by eliminating direct contact between government officials and clients, 
thus, decreasing opportunities for bribe-seeking behaviour.   
3. improving performance of the government - the OSS policy had the potential 
to facilitate more transparency, public accountability and reduce bureaucracy through 
introducing integrated databases and encouraging working across different levels and 
professions.  
 
Five types of barriers were identified during the pilot: political, organisational, 
economic, technical and cultural (Janenova, 2008a). In regard to the political barriers 
the respondents highlighted ambiguity in the policy mplementation when the 
government bodies could decide to participate in the single-window project on a 
voluntary basis. Openness to public scrutiny was defined as another political 
constraint as service integration facilitated sharing information among stakeholders 
and making services more transparent and accessible for users. These factors raised 
concerns among some political managers who were not interested in losing access to 
illegal payments for public service provision. Organisational barriers included 
traditional hierarchical structures and top-down management whereas service 
integration appealed for “flatter” Organisations, encouraged critical thinking among 
personnel about working practices for better quality improvement. Economic barriers 
related to the shortage in the number of OSS, personnel, resources, inadequate salary 
level of the front-line staff. In terms of technical barriers the participants highlighted 
incompatibility of databases of different government bodies, low level of computer 
literacy among the population and a lack of Internet access. Cultural barriers were 
acknowledged to be the most challenging in the views of the participants given the 
corrupt nature of the public sector; lack of trust among stakeholders as well as 
between service providers and customers; resistance from the government officials to 
change their roles and ways of working.  
 
While service integration offered great promise for improving service quality and 
government performance, the new policy posed a challenge to the status quo and put 
a strain on existing social contracts on “who gets what”. The pilot study found out 
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that some government officials met the new policy with skepticism, frustration or 
even active opposition; while others reacted with passive acceptance. It should be 
highlighted that some civil servants were quite enthusiastic about introducing new 
managerial reforms and innovations.  
 
In my research project the pilot study was time-consuming and raised unanticipated 
problems, however, as Mason and Zuercher note (1995), it is better to deal with them 
before investing a great deal of time, money, and effort in the full study. Hence, my 
pilot study provided a useful starting point to test the appropriateness of the research 
tools and develop research questions to explore service integration in the specific 
contexts. Following the pilot study experience, I deci ed to select case studies, 
interviews, observations and documentary analysis as my research tools, discarding 
questionnaire surveys as they proved to be ineffective in capturing complex issues of 
service integration, nature of interactions between stakeholders, learning as well as 
due to the reluctance of the respondents to express th ir views in written form.   
 
My observations at the case organisations, which are presented below provide a 
visual description of the front-line service from the customer’s perspective. As 
highlighted in the introductory chapter, the single-window centres have become part 
of the daily lives of the Kazakhstani citizens. Every citizen uses the services of the 
OSS, at least, four times in their life: to receive birth, marriage and death certificates, 
and for a passport.  
 
I visited OSS-1 in Astana in the role of a service us r at three different stages of the 
policy implementation since the establishment of this single-window centre: a) in 
August 2006 after 9 months since the policy launch; b) in July 2007 after 18 months; 
and c) in December 2009 after 4 years. These visits to the single-window centre 
provided me with a rich source of data for analysis on how the policy has developed, 
what improvements and mistakes have been made, and how relationships between 
the government officials and citizens have transformed over time, all these processes 
were observed both from the customer and researcher’s p spective. Neither the 
front-line staff nor the manager knew me personally when I visited OSS-1 in August 
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2006. By the time of my second visit, July 2007, I had already known the manager, 
but was not still familiar with anyone among the staff. I knew that the manager, who 
had an office in the back of the building, was unable to see clients and my visit did 
not attract anyone’s attention. During the third visit, in December 2009, the previous 
management and staff of the OSS were replaced by the new employees who did not 
know me. Thus, I managed to organise three visits to he same single-window centre 
as a customer without being recognised by the managers and staff, which otherwise 
could have reduced validity of data because of the subjective attitudes towards me as 
a client from the service providers. 
 
The OSS-1 is located in the densely populated district with easy access by the public 
transport and limited parking space. The office building is visible from a far distance 
because of its bright blue colour among surrounding grey apartment buildings. The 
colour blue symbolising “freedom” for Kazakhs (a colour of sky), with yellow stripes 
symbolising “prosperity” (associated with “wheat”, “welfare”) is the corporate 
colour of the single-window centres following the example of the Kazakhstani 
official flag. As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, the workplace is split 
into five sections: waiting area for clients, front-li e service area, back-office section 
(where chancellery and IT services are located), management office and open space 
for support services (banking, photo, notary and copying services). The opening 
times of the single-window centre (from 9 a.m. till8 p.m., Monday to Saturday, 
without a lunch break) are more convenient than the working hours of the 
government departments (normally from 9 a.m. till 6 p.m., Monday to Friday, with a 
two-hour lunch time). In fact, the civil servants at the government departments also 
continue to work until very late (around 8 p.m.) exc eding official working hours, 
however, they do not interact with customers during this period of time. Some 
government bodies accept applications only on particular days (for example, three 
times a week) and during a limited period of time (for example, from morning until 
lunch time) in order to allocate time in the rest of the day for review and decision-
making process.  
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The manager of the single-window centre has three dputy managers who are 
responsible for different functions: managing customer service, cooperation with 
stakeholders, and the use of technologies. There ar two front-line jobs: “consultant” 
and “operator”. Consultants provide advice on the requirements for a variety of 
services and help clients to fill-in application templates. Operators check the 
correctness of the application and accept or reject the application for further 
processing. The work of the front-line staff is coordinated by the customer service 
supervisor. Unlike managers and deputy managers who have their offices separated 
from the customer service area, the supervisor is constantly visible both for the 
clients and staff. The supervisor deals with conflict situations between service users 
and staff, and controls personnel discipline. The staff work on a six-hour shift 
including 1 supervisor, 4 consultants and 15 operators. Administrative employees in 
the back-office are responsible for the delivery of processed documents to the clients, 
coordinating postal transportation of documents betwe n the OSS and stakeholder 
departments, as well as IT support to ensure the smooth operation of computer 
databases. 
 
The physical environment of the typical single-window centre presents positive 
differences compared to those available at the governm nt departments until the 
recent time. Open bright layout of the design, new furniture, large TV-screen, access 
for wheelchairs have been introduced to create a business-like atmosphere of 
customer service in the public sector organisation. At the entrance of the single-
window centre there is an electronic dispenser, which issues a ticket with a client’s 
position in the queue. The electronic dispenser suggests several options for 
customers: application for services; applications by the veterans of the World War II 
and Afghan War; and banking services. The last option is available for those who 
want to pay service fees, housing utilities etc. Electronic queue facilitates discipline 
among clients as they know their exact position in the queue and waiting time until 
they approach the front-line operator. Banking, photo, copying and notary services 
are available within the same building of the OSS, which enable customers to save 
time compared to their previous experiences of the public sector organisations. 
Comparative description of the service user’s experience at the traditional 
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government departments using the examples of passport authorities and traffic police 
are presented below in this chapter. Large information boards provide contact 
information about the management staff of the OSS (names, phone numbers, e-mails, 
and drop-in time for customers), service standards, legislation, and application 
templates. This type of information was not easily accessible in the earlier practice of 
the public organisations. All members of the staff wear a badge containing their 
names and positions to ensure that the customer can remember the name and send a 
complaint in case of any unethical behaviour of the employee. Overall, the single-
window centre sought to create an outward-looking ad user-focused environment. 
The organisation of the work process in the single-window centre is illustrated in 
Figure 3 to structure my analysis.  
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Figure 3 illustrates that customer service at the single-window centre contains several 
stages: initial consultation - collecting documents - filling-in application and 
submission - receiving processed documents (in case of correct submission of 
application) or rejection (in case of incorrect submission of application). As Figure 3 
shows, since the front-line personnel do not make decisions on applications, then, the 
emphasis is only on quick and correct acceptance of the documents. The main 
functions of the front-line personnel include consultation and acceptance of 
applications, thus, the knowledge and skills required to handle the customer service 
interactions are contextually bound.  
 
During the first visit to the single-window centre I needed to change my residence 
address. My visit coincided with the recent adoption of the new rules aimed at the 
provision of land for citizens for individual housing construction. The Kazakhstani 
population who actively migrated from poor rural to fast developing urban areas 
faced a critical housing shortage. The situation was p rticularly dramatic in the 
capital where the number of officially registered inhabitants had increased three 
times within the last 10 years (from 300 thousand to around one million people). 
According to the new legislation potential applicants for a free piece of land were 
obliged to provide copies of their national insurance number and documents 
certifying a lack of land and private housing ownership. These documents were 
issued through the OSS by the local Property Centres which were accountable to the 
local departments of justice. It is important to provide a brief background on the 
economic situation with the property market in the country in order to understand the 
massive reaction of the Kazakhstani citizens to the new policy. During 2002-2006, 
the property market experienced a sharp boom in price where property became the 
most profitable business investment. The cost of prperty in 2006 in Astana and 
Almaty cities reached the European level varying from 1000 GBP per one square 
metre, and cost of land varied from 3000 - 4000 GBP per 0.10 hectare. The average 
monthly salary of the public sector employees (doctors, teachers, policemen) was 
100-150 GBP at that time. Unsurprisingly, the government’s proposal on the 
distribution of free land was accepted by the Kazakhstani families, with great 
enthusiasm and new hopes for better life especially among those with many children.  
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The clients stayed in the queues of the OSS from the early morning, 5 a.m. until late 
evening in order to submit an application. The building of the OSS-1 with limited 
capacity of 150 square metres was unable to occupy all customers whose number 
sharply increased from 1000 up to 4000 on a daily basis. The high level of demand 
for service increased the number of corrupt practices among OSS employees, some 
of whom were accused of selling electronic queue ticke s to the clients to accelerate 
the speed of service, thus transferring technology riginally aimed at promoting 
equal access and social inclusion into a tool of corruption.  
 
The consultants were supposed to give advice on filli g in applications but because 
of chaos and disorder they could not fulfil their functions properly. The small group 
of front-line employees were physically unable to pr vide customer service to the 
huge number of clients. Despite modern office conditions, the customer service 
environment was inhuman both in physical and moral terms. The OSS office was 
crowded with people, some with children, some were lderly people, for whom 
getting a free piece of land might be the only chane to own their property, who were 
staying for several hours in the queue. People looked tired and angry about the poor 
performance of the government. Both managers of the case study organisations 
acknowledged that there were registered cases of anti-social behaviour among 
customers who broke windows and doors in order to enter the building, and had 
conflicts with the front-line personnel. The managers were concerned both for the 
safety of their staff and customers. They asked the MJ for support in the form of 
recruiting security guards, however, given the lack of funding such assistance was 
not provided. Customers who intended to apply for other services, which were not 
related to the land ownership documents complained about the government and OSS, 
as they could not get services in these conditions. It was dangerous for anyone to be 
present there, for this reason I decided to return to the OSS next time. 
 
To solve the problematic situation and reduce social tension, the Property Centre 
opened five additional service counters to enable cli nts to apply for a service 
directly at the centre in order to share the workload with OSS. However, many 
customers still preferred staying in the queues of the OSS rather than going to the 
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Property Centre. As the manager explained, the OSS had an electronic queue and 
customers knew that if they got the ticket, they would be definitely be able to submit 
an application whilst the Property Centre did not guarantee service provision even if 
a client had stayed for a whole day in the queue. Th  Property Centre had a negative 
reputation with regular public scandals related to official allegations of their 
managers and staff in corruption. After several months of negotiations between the 
MJ and local municipalities, which required these documents, the akimats had finally 
agreed to cancel this requirement. Rather, the local municipalities would request 
information on client’s ownership of the land and private housing directly from the 
Property Centre. As a consequence, the number of customers reduced, and OSS 
across the country were able to return to the normal working rhythm.  
 
In a couple of months the government abolished that resolution as there was no spare 
land to distribute among citizens for individual housing construction. Hopes of 
thousands of customers to get a free piece of land and build their own house were 
broken and contributed to the general negative perce tion of the government among 
the public as an indifferent, bureaucratic machine, which served the interests of the 
officials and their relatives rather than ordinary citizens. This situation left highly 
negative impact on the image of the OSS and caused wide criticism from clients, 
journalists, stakeholders and central government. 
   
My experience as a service user during my second visit to the OSS presents a 
contrasting picture compared to the first visit. By July 2007 the OSS-1 had already 
existed for one and a half years and accumulated more experience in managing 
customer service compared to the earlier practice. Customers seemed comfortable 
with using the electronic queue dispenser as they might have used it before at the 
OSS and local banks where similar technologies were introduced. A Grievance 
Record Book was available for customers to make comments and suggestions. The 
consultants - young females and males of 23-28 years old - were sitting at the table in 
the customers’ waiting hall and provided consultation to the clients. In response to 
my inquiry about requirements for property registration service, one of the 
consultants handed me a small piece of paper with information on required 
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documents, service fees and waiting time, as well as explaining this information 
orally. The consultants had a large pile of papers with information in the Kazakh and 
Russian languages on different services. If a client faced difficulty in filling in an 
application, he/she could use a sample application. F ur consultants worked in each 
shift, and if someone did not know the answer to the customer’s question, they asked 
a more experienced colleague for help. Consultation allowed the saving of time both 
for the customers and operators who accepted applictions. The important 
observation is that information on requirements for application submission and 
service fees was accessible by the public both at te OSS (in written and oral form, in 
Kazakh and Russian languages) and on the web-site of the MJ, which was a 
significant step forward from the traditional practice. In the traditional practice a lack 
of access to the information on public services enabled government officials to seek 
bribes and manipulate citizens. Although information on service requirements, fees 
and sample forms were available on the information b ards, it was evident that 
customers preferred to receive this information in a face-to-face contact with the 
consultant. This might happen because Kazakhstani people were not used to having 
transparent access to public service information and still trusted personal contacts 
with officials rather than written information. The consultants could provide a more 
personalised service, which was particularly important for vulnerable groups, for 
example, migrants from rural areas who might lack literacy, and people who had 
writing and hearing problems. One of the significant improvements in terms of 
service access was introducing visits to the disabled c ients at home by the OSS staff, 
which had never happened in the traditional practice. Overall, getting information on 
service requirements took me about 15 minutes.  
  
There was a telephone inquiry line, which I learnt f om city call-centres, however, I 
failed to get through by phone after several attempts on different days: either the line 
was constantly busy or nobody took the phone. At the later stage of policy 
development in October 2008 a pilot call-centre with an easy-to-remember telephone 
number, “58-00-58” was introduced to provide information on the service 
requirements and procedures as well as accept complaints from customers about 
unethical behaviour among the front-line staff and managers. In July 2009, when I 
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called the OSS call-centre with an inquiry about the service for property registration, 
I was provided with information on the required documents, service fees and waiting 
time which helped me to avoid a physical visit to the OSS to get this information and 
save time.     
  
After I collected the necessary documents I visited OSS to submit an application. I 
took the electronic queue ticket from the dispenser and joined other customers who 
were waiting for service. Some of them were watching advertisements on the TV, 
some were reading newspapers or talking. Customers could see on the large 
electronic screen how many clients had been already served that day and how many 
were still waiting in the queue. I waited for half n hour until the number of my 
ticket appeared on the screen together with the number of desk where I should 
submit the application. The operator looked through my documents and checked 
their conformity with requirements by looking at the computer screen. The front-line 
staff used a specially designed computer programme in which by clicking on the 
selected type of service they could see a list of requirements, speed of service and 
fees. The operator sent a request online to the database of the Property Centre to 
know if the house which I was going to register for passed state control registration 
(as the apartment building was recently built), and within several minutes got a 
confirmation that the documents could be accepted. In case the construction 
company had not passed state registration for the apartment building, the operator 
would receive corresponding information and reject the application until the building 
was registered in the state database of the Property C ntre. The employee asked me 
to pay a service fee in the bank and return back to the desk without queuing. I took 
second e-ticket, for the banking service, and spent about 20 minutes in the queue for 
the bank to pay the service fee. Then I returned to my operator and submitted the 
documents with a slip of payment. In return I received a confirmation note that my 
documents were accepted, and I could expect the issuing of a document within 15 
working days. This confirmation gave information to the client about the exact date 
and number of the office where processed documents could be collected. There were 
about 15 operators who accepted applications for all types of services.  
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After three weeks had passed I visited OSS to collet the document. This time I did 
not have to take e-ticket as documents were issued in the separate section of the 
office which had a different entrance. The employee asked for proof of my ID and 
written confirmation on submission of documents. After she found my document 
among a large pile of other clients’ documents on property registration, she asked for 
my signature in the registration book. My document was ready within the stated 
period of time and correctly processed, although, some customers complained about 
mistakes in their documents. In response to these complaints the employees 
explained that it was not their fault as documents were processed in the Property 
Centre, and clients had to re-submit their application for correct property registration 
documents. Some clients complained that their documents were not processed in the 
due time as stated in the service standards. Again, the staff could neither explain the 
reasons for the delay of the documents nor provide assistance in contacting the 
Property Centre to make an inquiry. They suggested that customers contact the 
responsible department themselves. These cases illustrated the lack of effective 
communication between OSS and traditional departments, as well as attempts by the 
OSS employees to avoid responsibility for poor servic  quality.            
 
In December 2009, I visited the OSS-1 for the third time to learn if there had been 
any visible changes in customer service. One of the improvements was access to the 
legislative database provided to the service users. However, the use of this service 
was limited to computer literate people. The queues had become longer compared to 
my second visit, which may be related to the increased number of services provided 
through OSS. While in June 2007 the single-window centres provided access to 25 
services, two years later they delivered 57 services.    
 
Three visits of the case organisation in different time periods (9 months, 18 months 
and 4 years since the policy launch) enabled me to observe visible changes in policy 
development from a customer’s perspective. The resea ch findings suggest that 
certain positive progress had been achieved in terms of improving the physical 
customer service environment (electronic queue, nice office layout, uniform for 
employees, banking, notary, copy and photo services combined in one location etc.) 
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and making information about public services more transparent and accessible for 
clients compared to the previous practice (service standards became available on 
paper, online and by telephone, in Kazakh and Russian languages). However, 
improvements in the front-line service delivery still had limited impact on the overall 
service quality given the lack of effective communicat on between the OSS and 
government bodies and resistance from the traditional bureaucracy which is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6. The following section 
presents a discussion of the data collection process, with justification of each method 
used and highlighting its advantages and limitations.  
     
4.2 DATA COLLECTION  
 
This section explains the data collection process, how the choice of participants and 
methods in relation to each group of participants wa  made, what  the advantages and 
limitations of the selected research tools were. Assuming that policy is a complex 
network or process of decision-making, which takes place at different levels and in 
different departments, inconsistencies in communication and coordination will 
clearly impact on how decisions that are made. By looking at different groups of 
participants, senior managers of the MJ, OSS and front-line staff, whose main 
functions differed from the design of the strategy, coordination and control to 
customer service provision, I was able to examine this process in action. In addition, 
this study involved interviews with stakeholders, in particular the Prime-Minister’s 
Chancellery (control function), Tax Committee (stakeholder at the pilot stage), and 
local municipalities (stakeholders which took over coordination of the policy after 
the end of the research project since January 2010). Consequently, it was interesting 
to study how different participants had influenced policy design and strategy. Finally, 
I examined views of the service users on the quality of public services delivered 
through single-window arrangements.   
 
Every manager of the single-window centre who was contacted was given an official 
letter from the MJ, which contained a brief explanation of the research aims, issues 
of confidentiality and anonymity, and preliminary list of questions. I had extensive 
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informal communication with the senior managers from the MJ and stakeholder 
departments during participation in the study visits of Kazakhstani government 
officials on public service reforms organised in the Netherlands and Scotland during 
2006-2008, as well as at the official seminars related to the single-window policy 
implementation aspects (in September 2007 and June 2008).  
 
The following sections present a discussion of four research tools: interviews, 
participant observation, documentary analysis and virtual ethnography, in relation to 
different groups of participants, as well as defining advantages and limitations of 
each method used.  
 
4.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
  
Interviews were one of the key research method in this research project, both semi-
structured and unstructured (or “cognitive conversations”). Here, the reasons for 
conducting interviews are explored; subsequently, the rationale behind the selection 
of interviewees is discussed; and finally, the way in which the interviews were 
conducted is outlined.  
 
Given that I was exploring an under-researched area nd hence was unsure what was 
important to the people operating within the new system, semi-structured interviews 
were chosen as the most appropriate method to get information, and at the same time 
allow flexibility for me in asking new questions during the interview. Interviews 
allow the researcher to gain an insight into experiences, events, cultures, and 
processes experienced at an individual level (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). Three 
important areas of exploration in this thesis include the nature and extent to which 
service integration process has been introduced and developed, the nature and extent 
to which organisational learning has taken place to design joined-up services, and the 
ways key players have renegotiated their roles and identities, and interpreted 
particular principles such as “single-window approach”, quality of public service, 
learning – with the proposal that many of these areas are contested domains.  
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In order to ascertain this, it was important to seek the views of those who could 
comment on, provide support for, or refute, the intrpretations made from other data 
relating to service integration practices and wider managerial and political influences 
- in this case, the process of reform, the control and accountability mechanisms as 
well as technologies employed by the government, and the implications for key 
players. As Kvale (1996: 30) argues: 
  
The purpose of the qualitative research interview treated here is to obtain 
descriptions of the lived world of the interviewees with respect to interpretations 
of the meaning of the described phenomenon. 
 
For this reason a horizontal sample was chosen for in-depth semi-structured 
interviews to reflect the views of 11 OSS managers involved in the management and 
coordination of integrated service delivery, who had accumulated experience and 
knowledge in the areas being investigated. The use of a vertical sample was used for 
unstructured interviews with the senior managers of the MJ, stakeholders and front-
line staff in selected case organisations, as I felt that it would be relevant to compare 
the views and perceptions of key players at different l vels of government. The 
choice also reflects varying interests in the public sector over power, budgets, 
personnel, technologies and functions. Given the nature of research questions, it was 
important to refer to specific experiences of the case organisations and people who 
delivered services, which helped to strengthen reliability and validity of findings.  
 
I decided to use semi-structured interviews as these have the advantage of giving 
parameters for discussion thus limiting “rambling” but they also leave room to 
explore particular aspects and ideas. The areas of questioning were devised around 
the central themes but questions were also tailored for each individual to draw out 
aspects on which the interviewee had expertise, for example, design of policy and 
negotiation, or learning to use new technologies and deliver services in new ways 
(see Appendix 2 for topic guide). The aim here was not to gather quantifiable data 




OSS Managers  
Semi-structured interviews with 11 OSS managers were ca ried out during the period 
October 2007 – March 2008. The preliminary set of questions was sent by mail and 
agreed by phone or personal conversation, and questions were reiterated at the start 
of each interview. Discussion of definitions and meanings of the “service quality” 
was introduced at an early stage in the interview. Such conceptual questions were 
challenging for participants, however, it proved to be useful to hear their initial 
reflections on the concept of “quality” rather than sking these questions later when 
their definition had been influenced by the interviw that had taken place. The 
managers were asked to pay special attention to the process of development of the 
OSS policy, particularly the process steps, how they b came involved in the policy 
implementation, how they negotiated with stakeholders, recruited and trained staff, 
chose technologies, what the constraints were, and how they tried to overcome 
problems. Particular emphasis was paid to the managers’ reflection on learning 
processes taking place in their organisations, how t ey and their staff introduced new 
service arrangements, how their roles and perception of professional identities 
changed. Towards the end of the interview the questions were asked for participants’ 
thoughts about suggestions for how policy implementation could be improved to end 
on a positive note.  
 
Interviews, each ranging from 40 to 60 minutes, were conducted in the Russian 
language, digitally audio-recorded. Interviews with managers from case study 
organisations in Astana were conducted face-to-face, with managers of other OSS in 
the regions – over the phone. Unfortunately, it was too difficult to conduct face-to-
face interviews with the OSS managers located in different regions across the 
country given shortage of time and resources available for a single-authored research 
project. The following section explains the reasons for the choice of unstructured or
cognitive interviews and the ways in which this method was used to collect the data.   
 
4.2.2 Cognitive Conversations  
 
During interviews with the managers from the MJ, stakeholder departments and 
front-line staff the cognitive conversation method was employed with open-ended, 
broad questions that enabled interviewees to think aloud about their experience in 
designing and delivering joined-up services, choose their own language, context and 
framework in a process guided as a conversation to i terrogate the focus research 
questions and often reiterating stories to explore depth (Willis, 2005). Cognitive 
interviews with the managers from the MJ and stakeholder departments were taken 
during the period between December 2006 – December 2008, whenever 
opportunities emerged. The front-line personnel were interviewed during the 
observation period in case organisations from March to April 2008.   
 
Senior managers of the MJ  
This group of participants were asked to explain processes of design and 
development of the OSS strategy, reflect on the typof challenges they faced while 
introducing new policy, and expressing their views on the policy progress. In order to 
get an understanding of the policy implementation process from multiple 
perspectives, I interviewed five senior managers from different departments: the 
Department for Public Service Quality Control, IT Department, Department for 
Organisational Control, Department for Business Registration, Legislative 
Department.  
 
Front-line employees  
I had many informal chats with 25 front-line employees during the observation 
period. The questions for the participants were related to their personal experiences, 
learning new knowledge and skills, the nature of their interactions with customers, 
managers and colleagues, their perceptions of the new roles and identities, challenges 
experienced in the new work setting. Most staff at bo h case organisations were 
young, friendly and keen to share their views and concerns about different aspects of 




Although I did not plan initially to include stakeholders as my participants due to the 
shortage of time and resources available, it proved to be extremely useful to get the 
views from this particular group, which helped me to explore underlying power 
dimensions and reasons for resistance from the government bodies to implement the 
new policy. As was highlighted above, I had opportunities to establish contacts and 
build relations with the government officials during training workshops abroad. I 
conducted cognitive conversations with 15 senior managers from the Presidential 
Administration, Prime-Minister’s Chancellery, Tax Committee, and local 
municipalities to explore their views on the single-window arrangements and 
progress of policy implementation. The following section explains the choice of 
participant observation method which is able to capture multidimensional data on 
social interactions between key players within the customer service environment.    
 
4.2.3 Participant Observation  
 
As part of the case study strategy, participant observation was conducted in two 
selected case organisations. Here the purpose of partici nt observation and the way 
in which the observations were conducted are discussed.  
 
Observation as a research method has been used in many ways – simple observation, 
non-participant observation, participant observation, and so on. In some cases, the 
purpose of the observation and the role of the observer or participant observer may 
be known to those being observed but in other cases the purpose and presence of a 
researcher may be unknown or disclosed only to a few k y people. Each type of 
observation has particular advantages and disadvantages ranging from observations 
of “natural” behaviour to subjectivity and bias on the part of the researcher. 
However, the common aim of observation studies is that observations are systematic. 
Consistency is managed by deciding the areas, issues, behaviour to be observed in 
advance and observations are recorded. Methods are ag ed before research 
commences to reduce bias and make analysis more manage ble. Observation does 
inform the data and analysis of this research.  
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Observations will allow the generation of multidimensional data on social interaction 
in specific contexts as it occurs rather than relying on people’s retrospective 
accounts, and their ability to verbalise and reconstruct a version of interactions or 
settings (Mason, 2002: 85). I used observations because I was interested in 
examining a range of dimensions of service integration that were performed in the 
context of a “setting”, including daily customer service interactions, relationships 
amongst staff, managers and stakeholders, conversation  and language used, 
challenges and constraints faced by the staff, which cannot be captured entirely by 
interviews and documentary analysis. I was also interested in an examination of the 
physical setting and ways of using technology, as well as the impact of the physical 
environment and new technologies on the nature of interactions between employees, 
managers and service users.   
 
There are two types of observations that have been us d for analysis in this research:  
• observations of interactions among participants during training workshops 
abroad and official meetings; 
• observations of the customer service environment and work practices of the 
front-line personnel.  
 
As an observer I am able to offer a view and interpretation of the processes discussed 
from the perspectives of a researcher and service user. For this reason I would prefer 
to see myself as a witness rather than as a formal observer where observation is used 
as a main method of generating data. As with systematic observation, bias and 
subjectivity are a concern. However, I would argue that my contribution as an 
observer is that of a social actor who interprets the events in a particular way. Such 
observations are as valid as other witnesses to the service integration, for example, 
people involved in the policy implementation. My ext nsive interaction with a range 
of participants has also given me the advantage of in-depth knowledge and the ability 
to probe with particular questions.  
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Observations within case organisations involved thedevelopment of trustful 
relationships between myself and participants, and this raises specific ethical issues. 
For practical reasons I was not able to gain informed consent from everyone 
observed (front-line employees, customers, stakehold rs), and not all participants 
were aware that they were being observed. Questions about confidentiality and 
anonymity were given careful thought as I gained insights and knowledge, which 
were not shared with everyone, therefore, I had to make difficult moral choices about 
what I could count as data. As Mason notes, these kinds of decisions are not easy, 
always contextual, and demand an active moral practice (2002: 101).     
 
I acknowledge that reliance on unstructured interviews is problematic, but qualitative 
data facilitated the capture of nuances of resistance and accommodation in a way that 
was not possible with any other research method. As Whipp (1998: 54) notes, 
“interviews enable individuals to reveal the personal framework of their beliefs and 
the rationales that inform their actions.” Hence, although it is unwise to draw 
conclusions applicable to the front-line service industry in the public sector as a 
whole on the basis of an in-depth study of two case study organisations, the data 
collected do permit the formulation of tentative new perspectives. The following 
section provides an explanation of the choice and use of documentary analysis 
method, and sources of documentary data in this resea ch project.  
 
4.2.4 Documentary Analysis   
 
Documents are useful in research on organisations or governments where policy 
documents are kept and actions are recorded officially (Rose, 1982). Documents may 
also contain “witting” and “unwitting” evidence. The former refers to information 
that the original author wanted to convey and the latter refers to what might be 
inferred from the tone, language, and so on. The task for the researcher is to ascertain 
what significance “unwitting” content has in relation to the research (Duffy, 1993). 
In relation to this research, a range of documents have been utilised to examine 
public debate, changes and transformations within service integration policy. This 
includes: 
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• national legislation, which provides the legislative framework for service 
integration policy and strategy for further development, as well as by-laws of 
the MJ which regulate personnel policies and servic standards of the single-
window centres;  
• relevant statistical reports published by the government bodies, international 
and local research organisations; 
• mass media publications.   
 
In this way documents, as defined by Duffy (1993), will be used as both primary and 
secondary sources of evidence. The witting and unwitti g aspects of these documents 
are also relevant as they contain the content of government policy but also reveal the 
ideas and ideologies behind the policies. Using Duffy’s notion of witting and 
unwitting evidence, they provide the opportunity to examine both stated intentions of 
particular governments and to explore and interpret unstated aspects of government 
(Duffy, 1993). Documents were obtained from a variety of sources including 
Kazakhstani Law Database, web-sites of the government of RK, MJ, international 
organisations, foreign and local mass media. The purpose of the analysis of 
documents, therefore, was two-fold. Firstly, it provided a central source of 
information. Moreover, it was instrumental when redefining the research questions 
and formulating an initial set of categories for the data analysis. The following 
section provides justification of the choice of virtual ethnography method, and 
discussion of benefits and methodological difficulties encountered.  
 
4.2.5 Virtual ethnography 
 
Virtual ethnography is the process of conducting and constructing an ethnography 
using the virtual, online environment as the site of the research (Hine, 2000). It 
extends the traditional notions of field and ethnographic study from the observation 
of co-located, face-to-face interactions, to physically distributed, technologically 
mediated interactions in virtual networks and virtual communities (Clark et al., 
2006). Virtual ethnography was used in this research project to collect data on the 
service delivery at the single-window centres from users’ perspective. Although I did 
 105 
not initially plan to include the service users as my participants, their views 
expressed online describing personal stories of interac ions with the OSS and their 
perceptions of the service quality provided me a rich source of data enabling to get 
insight in the customer service experiences.  
 
As part of my documentary analysis I analysed online mass media publications 
related to the OSS policy implementation. I found out that the readers left their 
comments after these publications describing their experiences at the single-window 
centres. The participants were dispersed and fragmented in time and space (they did 
not group together within an institutional or geographical location). According to 
Miller and Slater (2000: 21-22) the immersion in a particular case, the reference to a 
specific locality and participant observation are still the cornerstones of ethnographic 
research, even when using the internet as the research nvironment. I collected my 
data through independent commercial web-sources Vr mya (http://www.time.kz) and 
Zakon (http://www.zakon.kz) which provided opportunity for their readers to leave 
comments unlike the pro-governmental web-sources such as Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda (http://www.kazpravda.kz) and Kazakhstan Today (http://www.kz-today.kz) 
that restricted users to leave feedback. The moderators of the web-sources Vremya 
and Zakon deleted comments which contained abusive language, whereas the 
majority of the comments remained unchanged.   
 
Virtual ethnography as a method offered me new possibilities to explore service 
users’ experiences unrestricted by time and location, h wever, it also presented many 
limitations. Face-to-face interviews with customers could have provided me an 
opportunity to collect a larger and richer amount of data, use probing and clarifying 
questions, and capture emotions of the service users, all of these that the virtual 
ethnography method was not able to provide. On a prctical level, virtual 
ethnography as a method brought more acute methodologica  challenges, in terms of 
the demographic composition and technical restrictions (Taylor, 1998). Only a 
limited group of the Kazakhstani users had access to the computer and Internet and 
were able to leave their comments - a factor which made generalising about research 
findings from Internet users to the general population highly problematic. However, 
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the sample size was of less concern for me as I was interested in particular 
experiences of the customers rather than more repres ntative behaviour.  
 
Holmes (1997) suggests, the perceived advantage of virtual reality lies in its ability 
to simulate the “real” world without any of its limtations, thus, potentially, leaving 
the individual “free” to create. Virtual ethnography as a method enabled me to 
explore service users’ views for less cost and time compared to the face-to-face 
interviews, which was significant in my case of thesingle-authored project. The use 
of virtual ethnography lifted the restrictions of geographical boundaries and opened a 
new research horizon for my project enabling me to strengthen the validity of my 
research findings from the customer’s perspective.  
 
My reliance on the virtual ethnography as the additional method for this research 
project highlighted important issues. Internet offered personal anonymity for the 
participants which enabled them to share critical views regarding performance of the 
OSS, however, they might have been reluctant to participate in face-to-face 
interviews or focus groups, and express freely their views of the public service 
providers. In this respect, online research afforded greater insight into the users’ 
experiences and offered respondents greater freedom - a factor that may have 
remained hidden in the face-to-face interviews. Chapter 9 explores customer service 
experiences on the basis of the data collected throug  virtual ethnography and 
documentary analysis.  The following section considers the issues of data analysis 
and presentation, presents the discussions of ethical issues and limitations of methods 





4.3 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION   
 
There are different views regarding the nature of analysing data: some authors have a 
more narrow understanding of the process of data analysis and define it either as the 
handling of data, for example by coding it, or as the interpretation of data (Coffey 
and Atkinson, 1996). A second group of authors takean intermediate position: Morse 
and Field (1996), for example, stress that analysis consists of ‘comprehending’, 
‘synthesising’, ‘theorising’ and ‘recontextualising’ data. Similarly, Miles and 
Huberman (1994) distinguish between data reduction, data display and conclusion 
drawing/verification. In the context of the research this last, broad understanding of 
data analysis is adopted. This section discusses the process of analysing the data 
gathered in the course of the research and begins by outlining the underpinning 
research approach. Then, it outlines how the data was initially organised. The 
challenges of interpreting the data are addressed by looking at the issues of validity 
and reliability.  
 
4.3.1 Research Approach  
 
The challenge is to deal with a considerable amount f data which originates from a 
transitional cultural context such as Kazakhstan, which remains an unexplored area 
in academic literature. The framework of analysis, therefore, has to be broad enough 
to allow for exploration. Consequently, the research starts off with a ‘theoretically 
informed’ framework, which maps out the field of managerial reforms in developed 
and transitional countries. Using the concepts of service integration and 
organisational learning, it points to the central issues and dimensions of the analysis. 
At the same time, however, the analysis aims to explore individual experiences of the 
front-line personnel of learning, changing their professional identities and roles as 
opposed to testing a hypothesis. Thus, the analytic framework evolved in the 
course of the different stages of the research. More generally, this points to the 
independent relationship between theory and empirical esearch: “… theory suggests 
problems, but the answers given to those problems may then contribute to the 
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development, refinement or confirmation of theory” (Roberts, 1978: 289). Then, the 
aim of the research was to integrate both understanding and explaining.  
 
4.3.2 Organising the Data  
 
The stage of organising data corresponds to Morse and Field’s (1996) notion of 
“comprehending”, which they characterise as “making sense of the data”. Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 11) describe this as the process of “data reduction” “… that 
sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards and organises the da a in such a way that ‘final’ 
conclusions can be drawn and verified”. Therefore, ganising the data prepares the 
ground for the final part of the analysis, by making it more manageable and 
accessible. More specifically, it aims to establish a link between the data and the 
initial conceptualisation of the research topic (Bryman and Burgess, 1994: 5). In 
practice, organising data means bringing together different segments of the data, 
which have similar characteristics, by way of a thematic analysis (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996: 26). Morse and Field (1996: 108) suggest that initial categories 
should be kept as broad as possible and only when more data is accumulated, 
categories should become more specific. In this context an interesting issue concerns 
the relationship between theory, data and categories: to what extent do the categories 
emerge from the data and to what extent do they reflect the initial theoretical 
conceptualisation of the research topic? (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 31) This is 
closely related to the original research question and the underlying research 
paradigm: if the research aims are testing a theory, the categories will be determined 
to a large extent by theory; if, however, the research ims at understanding a certain 
phenomenon, the categories will gradually evolve from the data itself. This research 
aimed to integrate inductive and deductive approaches and categories were informed 
by theory and the data itself. The categories helped to reduce the volume and the 






4.3.3 Selection and Presentation of Data  
 
All types of secondary data were integrated and analysed in order to explore, in an 
inductive and contextual manner, service integration processes, implementation of 
new practices by those who designed the new policy and coordinated implementation 
versus interpretation by those who were at the front-line of service provision as well 
as those that were delivered with joined-up services. Statements that were thought to 
indicate the respondents’ stances were extracted from the interview and online texts 
and organised in themes on a cross-case basis. In the following stage of analysis, the 
commonalities of each subject’s narrative were interpreted further and compared 
with patterns observed in the legislative texts andmass media publications studied. 
Finally, in the contextualisation stage, the patterns that were noted were applied back 
to the subjects’ narratives to reveal how the meaning of service integration, learning 
and renegotiating professional identities changes from individual to individual. 
Respondents were grouped, at the beginning of the data analysis process, according 
to their relation to the particular professional groups (managers of the OSS, MJ, 
stakeholder departments, front-line staff and servic  users). However, the process of 
inductive thematisation showed that similar dimensio  were evident within selected 
OSS. In what follows, I focus on the similar processes found to characterise 
implementation of service integration policy, organis tional learning and 
development of “communities of practice” within the single-window centres.  
  
4.3.4 Transcription and Translation 
 
It was highlighted above that all interviews and majority of data collected in this 
project were in Russian and Kazakh. As a result, al interview data had to be 
transcribed, and data in Russian and Kazakh had to be translated into English for 
inclusion into this final thesis. Given the large quantity of data collected, only the 
data relevant to the study was transcribed. Similarly, only those sections of the data 
quoted directly in the text were translated into English. Given time and resource 
constraints of the research project, it seemed that full ranscription of all interview 
data and translation would be too time consuming.  
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Birbili (2000) argues that translation-related decisions have a direct impact on the 
validity of the research and its report. In this research project I was both the 
researcher and the translator, and ensured good quality of translation by utilising 
several factors. My first university degree was teaching English and Kazakh; I did a 
Master’s degree at the University of Durham; I was brought-up in a Russian-
language environment both in my family, school and university, and I have had 
extensive experience in doing translation during my professional work. I know not 
only three languages, English, Russian and Kazakh, but also the culture and 
mentality of my participants as I have worked in the public sector for six years.  
 
One of the major difficulties in this research project was gaining conceptual 
equivalence or comparability of meaning (Temple, 1997; Birbili, 2000). For 
example, I faced difficulties to translate the term “learning” as its direct lexical 
equivalence in Russian and Kazakh contains the meaning of formal learning gained 
at the professional development courses, whereas this term in English covers a much 
more comprehensive view on learning, such as “learning by doing”, “situated 
learning”. The term “communities of practice” was another challenging word to 
translate as it does not have direct lexical equivalence in Russian and Kazakh and its 
literal translation does not make any sense for participants. One more example is the 
expression of “mentality” in relation to public sector employees and government 
officials, it might not be easy for the English read r to pick-up the full implications 
the term carries for Kazakhstani participants unless it is accompanied by more 
“cultural” information on the negative associations and connotations that the term 
“mentality” has in a Kazakhstani context. Several researchers and linguists suggest 
on those occasions where two languages do not offer dir ct lexical equivalence that 
researcher’s efforts should be directed “towards obtaining conceptual equivalence 
without concern for lexical comparability” (Broadfoot and Osborn, 1993; Temple, 
1997: 610). The process of gaining comparability of meanings is greatly facilitated 
by the researcher or the translator having not only“a proficient understanding of a 
language” but also, as Frey (1970) puts it, an “intima e” knowledge of the culture.  
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I intentionally decided to translate selected quotati ns of my participants, both from 
interviews and web-forums, in order to enable readers of my thesis to “see for 
themselves” what participants “look like” (Wolcott, 1994). I faced the challenge of 
either going for “literal” or “free” translation of the text. Honig (1997: 17) argues 
that a literal translation could perhaps be seen as doing more justice to what 
participants have said and “make one’s readers understand the foreign mentality 
better.” However, other researchers argue that such practice can reduce the 
readability of the text (for example, Birbili, 2000). In this research project I decided 
to go for literal translation of quotes digitally recorded during semi-structured 
interviews or contained in online discussion, and choose more “elegant” free 
translation of comments expressed in informal talks, keeping in mind the risk of 
misrepresenting the meaning of the conversational partner (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 
273).  
 
During interviews I asked participants not only fortheir answers but also for their 
interpretation of the concept’s meaning to deal with translation-related problems. For 
example, at the beginning of each interview I explored understanding of particular 
concepts, such as “service integration”, “one stop shop”, “service quality” from the 
interviewees’ perspectives. Thus, the issue of the translation of words, which exist in 
one language but not in another, concepts which are not equivalent in different 
cultures, were given careful and specific decisions. The following section explains 
the ways in which data were selected and presented i  this thesis.  
 
4.3.5 Ethical Issues   
 
This study tackles politically sensitive areas, such as public service delivery 
characterised by highly corrupt nature, lack of accountability and redistribution of 
powers between key players, therefore, has to consider erious ethical considerations. 
The main ethical consideration of this study was with regard consent. The OSS 
managers were asked to give informed consent, and permission was requested and 
granted by the senior managers of the MJ and OSS in order to conduct observations 
of the customer service delivery and interviews with the front-line employees at the 
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case organisations. However, as highlighted above, for practical reasons I was not 
able to gain informed consent from everyone observed (p rsonnel and customers), 
and not all participants were aware that they were being observed as observations 
and informal talks took place in public settings.  
 
Confidentiality was guaranteed to the front-office staff to ensure safety for their 
careers. It was hardly possible to provide confidentiality for the OSS managers of the 
case organisations in Astana as they could be easily recognised by the location of 
their offices. I managed to provide anonymity for the OSS managers across regions 
and managers from the stakeholder departments by not mentioning their names with 
reference to the quotes of their comments. The senior managers of the MJ preferred 
to see their names and positions stated in the thesis rather than being kept 
anonymous. The following section considers limitations of the methods used in this 
research project.  
 
4.3.6 Limitations of Methods Used  
 
This thesis aims to analyse the implementation of public service integration in the 
Kazakhstani context. To answer this question this study employs a triangulation of 
qualitative methods combining six research methods: ca e study, semi-structured 
interviews, cognitive conversations, observations, documentary analysis and virtual 
ethnography. This study comprises analysis of: 
• 11 semi-structured interviews with the OSS managers;  
• cognitive conversations with 5 senior managers from the MJ who were 
responsible for policy coordination, 25 front-line employees during four week 
observations, and 15 government officials from stakeholder departments and 
local municipalities.     
 
Every research project has limitations imposed by choice of method and subject. 
Public service change is a complex matter particularly in the traditionally hierarchical 
bureaucracy. This research has complex findings that are a limitation when 
contrasted with the results of hypothesis testing. Re-integration of empirical data 
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with existing literature has been more important in his work than simply a critical 
review of existing literature. Although each of the methods used, case study, semi-
structured interviews, cognitive conversations, participant observation, documentary 
analysis and virtual ethnography, has certain limitations and weaknesses, which were 
discussed in detail above, triangulation of all six methods enabled a strengthening of 
internal and external validity of my data and ensured obustness of the empirical 
findings. 
 
Although the quality of empirical data collected through interviews, observations and 
virtual ethnography was very rich, this thesis benefited significantly from the 
documentary analysis of legislation, international and local survey reports as well as 
mass media publications. Triangulation allowed this re earch to explore service 
integration process in the context of the legislation and the public debate that 
surrounded it. It also provided a sounder structure o this thesis incorporating results. 
The following Chapters 5-9 present the findings of my research discussing key stages 
of the policy design and implementation, problems encountered during adaptation of 
managerial reforms into the transitional context, impact of the new policy on the 
changes in public service provision as well as impact of the traditional bureaucracy 
on the extent of policy implementation. In particular, this thesis analyses complex 
relationships between new, innovative organisation promoting customer-orientation 
and managerial culture and traditional bureaucracy, as well as transformational 











5. PUBLIC SERVICE INTEGRATION POLICY IN A 
TRANSITIONAL CONTEXT      
 
This chapter along with the following chapters present  an analysis of the single-
window policy implementation in Kazakhstan, a country that was not influenced by 
the prospects of EU enlargement and, thus, did not experience much of the direct 
foreign influence in the initiation and implementation of managerial reforms. Like 
many other post-communist countries, at the time of the inauguration of its 
administrative reform programs, Kazakhstan proclaimed the central principles of 
professional and accountable government. The reforms were directed at improving 
the quality of the public administration processes and service provision; improving 
professional skills and the efficiency of the state pparatus; and fighting corruption 
(Nazarbayev, 2005a, 2006b, 2007d). An emerging policy paradigm in Kazakhstan is 
the moving away from a command and control mode of g vernment towards 
integrated governance through multiple stakeholders. The rhetoric of the reform 
agenda has largely been adopted from the EU and the World Bank statements.  
 
As was highlighted in Chapter 2, transitional countries are still more blind to the 
initial sketchiness of the NPM ideas. This research shows that the Kazakhstani 
political government has put high expectations on the single-window policy as a 
panacea from poor quality of public services and corruption. 
 
Before implementing any changes it is important to keep in mind that the question of 
“why” should come before “how”. Since most developed countries have more or less 
undergone the discussion of “why”, they are now concentrating on “how”. At the 
same time transition countries try to concentrate on “how” without sometimes 
knowing the answers to the question of “why”. Over-attention to perfecting 
administrative processes could be harmful to democracy and the general 
development of the country. “Public bureaucracy anddemocratic polity should be 
seen as complementary; both are needed in our society… As long as democracy is 
valued, the big questions of public administration must go beyond the big questions 
of public management” (Kirlin, 1996: 416-8). That is why policy making and 
implementation requires both the discussions around “why” and “how”. 
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This case study represents an example of the implementation gap when the 
Kazakhstani policy makers assumed that the legislative changes would lead to the  
implementation of the single-window policy, and were more concerned with “how” 
to design and deliver joined-up services, “how” to introduce new technologies 
without undergoing a critical reflection on “why” the policy was initiated, “why” it 
shifted away from the original vision of a single-access model and “why” it adopted 
the country-specific alternative-access model of servic  delivery.  
 
This chapter analyses different stages of the OSS policy implementation: design of 
the vision, piloting new methods of service delivery and transferring experience of 
the pilot OSS across the regions. In particular, this c apter starts with an exploration 
of the underlying power dimensions among key stakeholders by examining the 
design of the policy and the progress of legislative changes in public service 
delivery. Then, it moves on to examine how the pilot projects were implemented, 
what constrained policy implementation and why the original single-access model 
was replaced with the alternative-access model of service provision. Finally, it 
summarises the reasons for the limited extent of single-window policy 
implementation in the Kazakhstani context.   
 
5.2 KEY STAGES OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION   
 
This section examines the progress of the OSS policy implementation by analysing 
how the policy vision was originally designed and changed over time, what were the 
outcomes of the pilot projects, what was the nature of relationships between the 
traditional bureaucracy and customer-oriented bureaucracy, and what were the 
underlying motivations of the political management a d administrative civil servants 
to constrain policy implementation to a full extent.  
 
5.2.1 Design of the Vision 
  
Introduction of single-window arrangements in the Kazakhstani public sector 
evolved into two key policies: e-government and OSS. As was highlighted in the 
introduction chapter, the single-window centres aim to be integrated in the e-
government system by providing public services both through face-to-face customer 
service and online. Kazakhstan is facing a much more challenging situation in terms 
of public service modernisation reform compared to many developed and developing 
countries on relatively small territories. There is a high disparity of population over a 
huge territory, with low level of computer literacy, limited access to Internet and low 
ICT penetration in the country. The government was ell-aware of the significance 
of face-to-face customer service at the current stage of socio-economic development 
and concentrated efforts on creating modern and technologically advanced single-
window centres, while improving ICT environment for the launch of e-government 
system.        
 
The OSS policy was initiated by the President of RK, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who 
was surrounded by the graduates from Western European and American universities. 
A young generation of policy-makers has brought from developed democracies new 
knowledge, skills and enthusiasm about success of managerial reforms in those 
countries where they have studied. Implementation of the OSS policy needs to be 
considered in relation to the changes that have takn place simultaneously in 
Kazakhstan within administrative reform. A range of new ideas driven by the NPM 
ideology, such as development of performance standards, external audits of 
government bodies’ performance, separation of strategic and operational functions, 
delegation of more autonomy to the managers, building partnerships between public 
and business sectors etc. have been initiated by the oung and ambitious members of 
government. The assumption was that, “by paying more attention to clients, public 
service organisations will learn to deliver better r sults, and that clients will notice 
the change and experience increased satisfaction” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000: 116).  
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The OSS policy was driven not only by the aims to improve cost-efficiency of 
administrative regulations and service quality, similar to other countries, but also by 
the political ambition to reduce the level of corruption. Given widespread corruption 
in the public sector criticized by the international observers, Nazarbayev announced 
the aims of the OSS policy with a strong emphasis on c mbating corruption and, 
then, service quality improvement in the following way:  
 
All regulations and by-laws, which intentionally or unintentionally create 
conditions for corrupt activities of officials must be re-reviewed. Business must 
be separated from civil service. We need to fight with shadow businesses, their 
owners, shadow banking systems, multiplicity of permission documents, and 
those who give bribes to avoid the law etc. What can we do for this?  
1. It is necessary to create Public Service Centres based on the one stop shop 
arrangement, where in one place citizens can receiv passport, national insurance 
number, driving license, etc. It can be done this year on a pilot basis in Astana 
and Almaty. (Nazarbayev, 2005a)  
 
The vision of the OSS as an anti-corruption tool in the public sector was then 
reflected in the State Anti-Corruption Strategy in Kazakhstan for 2006-2010. At the 
Plenary Session of the Foreign Investors Board, the President of RK stated that the 
single-window centres were introduced to reduce personal contact between 
businesses and controlling authorities, and make the government more transparent 
(Nazarbayev, 2006c). The draft Concept for OSS Development, which had still not 
been approved by the end of the fieldwork states that e main requirements for 
priority list of services delivered at the OSS are: 
• social and economic significance of the service (i.. services aimed at 
protection of social, economic rights and legal interests of citizens); 
• mass demand of the service by customers; and 
• corrupt nature of the service.    
 
All of these documents reflect high expectations of the government on the OSS 
policy as a panacea from public service failures and corruption. Borrowing ideas 
from the NPM theory, the Kazakhstani OSS policy became a huge public campaign, 
through which the government intended to demonstrate to the international 
community, as well as the public its efforts to achieve a “more responsive and 
transparent bureaucracy”.  
 118 
The OSS policy implementation process can be roughly divided into four stages (see 
Figure 4): 
1. design of the policy vision and launch of the pilot projects (February 2005 – 
December 2006); 
2. the OSS were assigned legal authorities to deliver 25 services and expanded 
from 30 to 300 offices, new channels of service access were introduced 
(January 2007 – December 2008); 
3. new stakeholders joined the OSS project with 32 servic s, new channels of 
service access were added (since January 2009); 
4. change of coordinating authority from the MJ to the local municipalities 
(since January 2010); 
5. combination of face-to-face and online customer servic  provision, 100 
joined-up services through 500 single-window centres. 
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Figure 4 illustrates that public service integration s a “policy-action continuum” with 
constant negotiation “between those seeking to put policy into effect, and those upon 
whom action depends” (Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 25), in terms of types of services, 
methods of service delivery, and re-distribution of power authorities among key 
actors. Following the policy announcement by the Prsident in March 2005, the 
inter-governmental working group was created, which involved representatives from 
the Prime-Minister’s Chancellery of RK and several government bodies. The 
working group was aimed at developing a vision and strategy for introducing a 
single-window service provision system which was a new, innovative area for the 
Kazakhstani public sector at that time. Overall, during the period of policy 
implementation four different inter-governmental working groups were created to 
develop recommendations for the improvement of the OSS performance. The second 
working group created in 2006 provided consultation and recommendations to 
introduce public service standards and regulations within pilot single-window 
centres. The third working group was established in autumn 2007 following public 
accusations from the political party “Nur-Otan” against the MJ for poor management 
and corruption flourishing in the single-window centr s. The political party accused 
the MJ of developing corrupt schemes to seek illega payments from the customers 
for accelerating the speed of property registration service.   
 
The most recent working group called a “Board of Co-Managers” was created in 
January 2009 on the basis of the OSS-2, which comprised of international 
consultants, representatives of the “Nur-Otan” party, the National Economic 
Chamber “Atameken Unity” and the MJ itself. This working group’s aim was to 
make policy decisions concerning the management of the OSS and public service 
provision to improve the performance and quality of public services. It was expected 
that the good practice of this pilot OSS, as a result of effective co-management 
among international and business consultants, and government officials, would be 




Overall, the work of inter-governmental working groups can be characterized by the 
short-term nature, lack of continuity, and low motiva on of participants. Each 
working group involved new members which made it impossible to establish long-
term and trustful relationships between stakeholders. One of the reasons for constant 
changes of the members is regular political changes which lead to the massive 
personnel rotations at the administrative positions. It is a common practice in the 
Kazakhstani public sector that a newly appointed minister brings “team” members 
who put pressure on their new subordinates replacing them with their relatives, 
friends and former colleagues. Such tendencies havea negative impact on the overall 
effectiveness of the government resulting in a lack of continuity and poor 
performance as the new staff require a certain period of time to learn their new area 
of work. Besides, members of the minister’s team are not interested in becoming 
competent in their fields of work as they serve their political manager and themselves 
meeting personal interests rather than being concerned with public service quality.     
 
Certain progress has been achieved in terms of making the negotiation process 
among stakeholders more transparent compared to the earli r practice. The first two 
working groups did not attract anyone outside the civil service, whereas the latter 
two commissions involved members from the political party, business and 
international sectors, although the government was still reluctant to involve 
representatives of the civil society (for example, non-governmental organisations, 
opposition parties and mass media). 
 
As the NPM reform was a new ideology for the Kazakhstani government, the 
government allocated significant funding to organize training of the top-level and 
mid-level officials abroad with the aim of examining the best international practice 
of single-window arrangements. During the period from 2005 to 2008 civil servants 
passed training at the Dutch Institute for Public Administration, Potsdam University, 
London School of Economics, Yale University, Georgetown University, and 
National University of Singapore on courses related to public service improvement 
and modernisation. The local institutions, such as the Public Administration 
Academy and Eurasian Civil Servants Training Centre, delivered training courses to 
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the managers of MJ and OSS on performance standards. EU Tacis project “Support 
to the Development of Performance Standards in the Public Sector of Kazakhstan” 
provided advisory support in introducing international experience of the performance 
standards and Charter Mark scheme with particular focus on the UK practice. As 
Knox observes this process,  
 
the main principles of public service provision (i.e. timeliness, quality, 
accessibility, politeness and a complaints procedur) have been approved […] 
Guidelines have been drawn up to assist in the development of service standards 
and the introduction of reglaments. In addition, officials from ministries, 
regional trainers and akimats have undergone training on the introduction of 
reglaments and performance indicators (2008: 489-490).  
       
Overall, the government has made large investments into civil service training to 
bring new knowledge on service integration from different parts of the world and 
adapt these ideas to the local political, societal, technological and economic situation. 
Many of the variations of this basic idea have been successful in other countries in 
reducing administrative burdens on businesses and the public, especially on license 
and permit requirements. However, there was no universal concept of single-window 
arrangements which were implemented in a vast number of combinations and 
variations across developed and developing countries. 
  
Despite high expectations from these study trips, the participants were not able to 
provide a clear policy advice on how to create joined-up services and introduce 
single-window centres. The participants of the training courses were eager to explain 
the visible part of single-window centres, such as the modern design of the offices, 
large open spaces, access for the disabled, availability of booklets and information 
boards about services, space for children to play etc. In fact, the Kazakhstani 
government has succeeded in creating a user-friendly physical environment within 
the OSS, which was described in the previous chapter (Chapter 4). The international 
consultants from the World Bank and EU Tacis provided a positive evaluation of the 
OSS policy progress, admitting that the Kazakhstani si gle-window centres had 
nearly met international standards and could even serve as examples of best practice 
for some European countries (Avvalova, 2009). The international observers 
positively assessed the physical customer service environment, which in itself is not 
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able to improve service quality and reduce corruption without more fundamental 
organisational and cultural changes in the service delivery processes both at the 
front-office (OSS) and back-offices of the traditional departments.  
   
Traditional departments were used to being separated by professional and 
organisational boundaries, in an environment of mistrust, lack of exchange of 
information, and in constant battle with political leaders over power and resources. 
There was a lack of literature on the managerial reforms available in Russian and 
Kazakh languages. Information on public service reforms was available only through 
the participants of the study visits, a few international consultants and Russian web-
sources.  
 
Following the recommendations of the first working group, the MJ was assigned 
coordinating functions as it provided legal services (for example, marriage/birth 
registration, business/property registration), which were highly demanded, socially 
and economically significant among citizens and entrepreneurs. Overall, three types 
of services which were perceived as highly corrupt by he public - legal, tax and land 
registration  - were selected for the pilot roll-out of the single-window service 
provision (Jandosova et al., 2002). At the initial stage of policy implementation the 
government’s actions provided evidence of serious intentions to reduce 
administrative burdens on the citizens and business organisations. Table 9 presents 
the list of services delivered through the single-window centres from November 2005 
to December 2008. 
 
Table 9: List of OSS Services, November 2005 – December 2008  
 








(Nov 05-Dec 06) 
Ministry of Defence 
(5 services) 
(from Jan 07) 
Issuing a passport, ID;  
registration of 




etc.    
Land registration  
 
Tax services  Registration of military 
officials in reserve; 
application for benefits for 
the participants of the 
World War II, Afghan 
war. 
 123 
As Table 9 illustrates, the type of priority public services selected for single-window 
provision are related to different types of registration, which enables the government 
to monitor and control customers (for example, their current residence, urban/rural 
movements, business activities etc.). Given the difficult socio-economic situation in 
the country, with high levels of poverty, unemployment, limited access to basic 
public services (for example, in terms of access to afe drinking water), especially in 
the rural regions, the Kazakhstani customers might have had more demand in social 
and health care services compared to the service users in welfare countries. However, 
the choice of priority services characterises the nature of traditional bureaucracy in 
Kazakhstan, which is used for centralised control over citizens, whereas the top e-
services in Europe include, along with legal registration, social and health care 
services for the citizens of European Union (EU). Another important observation is 
that OSS services have been selected without consultation with the service users, 
thus, the key principle of the NPM concept, such as “customer-orientation” was 
ignored.    
 
The traditional bureaucracy considers civil service as a means of power and personal 
benefits where personal interests dominate over public interests. In response to the 
question “How was the list of OSS services selected?”, the political manager of the 
MJ replied:  
 
We [the MJ] know what our citizens want and what they need. For example, we 
calculated that every citizen will visit OSS at least five times in their life: birth, 
getting passport, registration of residence, marriage, nd registration of property. 
We made the decision ourselves, and I think that it was the right decision. Of 
course, gradually we will persuade other government bodies to deliver their 
services through OSS. 
 
Decisions on the scope of services through single-window centres were made by the 
central government without an evaluation of customers’ needs following the 
traditional pattern of work in which the government has historically dominated over 
interests and demands of the citizens. For example, the list of new services launched 
since January 2009 included registration of railroad c rriage, confirmation on the 
absence of adjudication, while other services were socially-orientated (application 
for state nursery care, registration for municipal housing etc.). The customer-
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orientation principle has not been implemented to a full extent by the traditional 
bureaucracy. With regard to the policy progress, the government has not attempted to 
approach service users to assess their views on service quality and performance of 
the single-window centres (Chapter 9 provides the findings of the survey evaluation 
of the OSS among the public conducted by the Sange Research Centre). While 
declaring “customer-orientation” as a priority in administrative reform and 
introducing this principle into many strategic and legal documents, the Kazakhstani 
government has not taken into account needs and expectations of the service users.  
 
This section has explained how the government design d the OSS policy and why 
particular services were selected for single-window provision by exploring the public 
sector context. The following sections continue to analyse policy implementation at 
different stages of development by identifying policy successes and limitations, as 
well as challenges that have constrained service improvement. In particular, the 
underlying factors and power dimensions between the key actors that explain a shift 
from the original policy vision are examined below.      
  
5.1.2 Piloting Single-Access Model of Service Deliv ery   
  
This section considers the OSS policy development at the pilot stage. Figure 5 
presents a pilot model of the OSS as a single-access point of service delivery which 
functioned from November 2005 to December 2006. Pilot projects were launched in 
the four OSS: two offices in Astana and two in Almaty.  
 














Land services  
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 Social care services 
One Stop Shop Customer 
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Figure 5 shows that the pilot OSS provided single, joined-up access to the services of 
three stakeholder departments - MJ, ALRM and the Tax Committee. These 
stakeholders worked in close cooperation with the single-window centres, however, 
they were still reluctant to share information about clients with each other. The front-
line staff did not make decisions on applications, then, the emphasis was on the quick 
and correct acceptance of applications, and the delivery of documents. From the very 
beginning of policy implementation technical functions were assigned to the front-
line employees, who played the role of “mediators” between service providers and 
customers (Janenova, 2008a; 2009b; 2009c; 2010d).  
 
The strategic change from the earlier practice was delegation of front-line customer 
service to the OSS (consultation of the customers, application submission), while 
other administrative processes on application review and decision-making remained 
at the traditional departments. Single access point at the OSS enabled clients to apply 
for a range of public services provided by the three stakeholders at one visit. It 
allowed customers to save time and costs, and avoid bureaucracy during their 
application for public services.  
 
Service delivery through single access posed significa t challenges for the 
government officials who were used to work within strict professional and 
organisational boundaries. In the top-down, hierarchical and inertial public sector the 
civil servants were encouraged to shift professional add organisational boundaries, 
initiate changes for service improvement and learn to work in close cooperation with 
a range of stakeholders, including the business sector and NGOs. For the purpose of 
illustration Figure 6 presents an overview of policy development from the pre-OSS 












Pre - One Stop Shop 
stage  
OSS stage  
 
Future OSS  
Characteristics Paper phase Front-line service (paper phase) E-government 
 Separate, fragmented  




support services (photo, 
banking, copying) 
delivered in different 
locations  
 
Separate, fragmented  







support services  - in 
one place   
 
Integrated services 




 Lack of accountability 
to the public; limited 
access to service 
information 
Introduction of  
service standard and 
regulations, 
grievance system;   
transparent access to 




government;  equal 
access to services, 
social inclusion  
 




No corruption  
 Illegal payments to 
accelerate speed of 
service  
 
Legal payments to 





Local departments of 
justice   
 




One way:  
from service users to 
government  
One way:  









Paper and computer 
records  
Paper and computer 
records, 
informational 
services online and 





Figure 6 illustrates that in the pre-OSS stage customers applied for passports at the 
local departments of justice. Information on the servic  requirements was distributed 
orally by one or two employees and was not available by phone or online, for this 
reason citizens had to visit twice or even three times (in case they missed some 
information) and spend time in the long queues to get the initial information and 
 127 
application form, and then to submit the application. The service users also had to 
run between three other places: to take a photo, to pay service fee at the bank and to 
make copies of the documents, as support services were not provided at the local 
departments of justice. The citizens in the large citi s, where demand for this service 
was much higher than in small towns and rural areas, h d to take a day or two of 
unpaid leave from their work in order to have enough time to apply for a passport. 
Illegal practices were widespread as the clients wihed to accelerate the speed of 
service and avoid queuing. The MJ was widely criticised for poor performance, 
limited access to information on service and corrupt practices.  
 
The situation has changed and moved in a more positive direction after introducing 
single-window centres. The MJ started to introduce changes from its own 
organisation by selecting popular services including the application for a passport. 
Now the customers can apply for a passport during one visit, which should take no 
more than 40 minutes (Ministry of Justice, 2007). Information on service 
requirements has become available through multiple channels: during face-to-face 
consultation with staff, on the information boards at the OSS and online, on the web-
sites of the e-government portal and MJ (http://www.egov.kz; 
http://www.minjust.kz). Support services such as taking a photo, copying documents, 
and banking services are now available within the single-window centres. While the 
customers were responsible for filling in the application forms themselves in the 
earlier practice, now it is the responsibility of a front-line employee to fill in 
application. The customers receive a confirmation paper, which contains the name of 
the front-line operator who has accepted the application, a list of submitted 
documents, date, time and location of where the passport will be issued. In the earlier 
practice the clients were accustomed  to giving illegal payments to accelerate the 
speed of service, whereas now the customers have an alter ative of paying an extra 
legal fee, if they wish, to reduce time required for passport delivery. According to the 
Public Service Standard (Ministry of Justice, 2007), issuing a passport is normally 
provided within 30, 45 or 60 days depending on the distance of the local OSS to the 
regional level, and for extra fee the service is avail ble within 15 days or 5 days. As 
soon as the customers improve their computer literacy and get better access to the 
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Internet, they will be able to apply for passport online at their home or work 
computer or through single-window centres.   
 
This example of the passport application service illustrates that within a short period 
of policy implementation the government has progressed in improving access to 
information about public services by introducing a consultation scheme through face-
to-face meeting, phone and online, publishing servic  standards, thus, reducing 
administrative bureaucracy for customers. As the information about service 
requirements became transparent, access to the service was improved, and official 
fees were introduced to accelerate the speed of service, corrupt opportunities for 
officials have been significantly reduced.   
 
However, the pilot model of single-window service dlivery had a number of 
limitations and weaknesses, which proved constraining in terms of implementing 
service integration to the full extent. Improvement of public services delivered at the 
OSS was made in terms of the front-line customer service rather than making 
fundamental changes of the front-office and back-office processes. Modern offices 
with more convenient conditions were introduced, and pplications for a range of 
services and support services were provided in one place, however, the processes of 
applications review and decision-making remained uncha ged. In relation to the 
stakeholder departments delegated to the single-windo  centres, their functions on 
consultation and application submission as well as delivery of processed documents, 
continued in separation from each other following the raditional pattern of work. As 
a result, pilot public services remained fragmented an  non-integrated with the 
exception that they were made accessible at one single location.  
 
It is useful to remember that each partner in a collab rative undertaking has 
something at stake and brings in a host of preconceived notions to the partnership. 
The stakes may be reputation, but often entail more substantive considerations as 
resources (people and funds), turf, autonomy, or control (Bardach, 1998). Large 
investments were put into the pilot projects allocating the best resources in the public 
sector. The case organisations and other OSS which were established at a later stage 
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were provided with modern offices, with new furniture and computer equipment. The 
stakeholders were obliged to send experienced staff to the new organisation as team 
leaders for the duration of the pilot projects. Team leaders conducted intensive 
training for newly recruited staff and managers of the OSS on a range of services 
from the three different areas (legal, tax and land registration). As described earlier, 
the foreign and local training institutions, as well as international consultants 
delivered workshops on the international practice of service integration for the 
managers of the MJ and OSS (for more detailed description of training policies see 
Chapter 7).  
  
Several important points regarding the impact of the service integration policy on the 
power dimensions between key actors need to be emphasised. Firstly, in a certain 
way the new single-window centres were competing with traditional departments in 
terms of better public service delivery. The OSS provided the same services, but their 
purpose was to provide better quality and transparent s rvices in a more comfortable 
space and in more accessible ways. As was mentioned earlier, the opening times of 
the OSS (9 a.m. – 8 p.m., Monday to Saturday without lunch time) were more 
convenient than those proposed by the traditional departments (normally 9 a.m. – 6 
p.m., Monday to Friday with two-hour lunch time). Besides which, some government 
bodies accepted applications only on particular days nd during limited period of 
time (for example, only until lunch time), whereas the OSS accepted applications 
throughout the whole working day. Politeness of the front-line employees presented 
a striking positive difference compared to the behaviour of the traditional bureaucrats 
who were generally perceived as indifferent, rude and unethical among the public 
(Jandosova et al., 2002).  
 
Secondly, by being a single access point to the public services, the OSS were able to 
reduce personal contacts between civil servants andcustomers and corrupt 
opportunities for both sides. The front-line personnel were not able to influence on 
the application review process as they performed entirely technical functions by 
accepting and returning documents. The customers as well as front-line workers 
could not know who was going to review applications in the back-offices as 
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documents were distributed among officials on a random basis. This does not mean 
that the government officials could not still seek bribes to influence the results of 
application review, however, now they performed corrupt actions with much higher 
risk of being caught by the responsible authorities. Thus, the new policy encouraged 
traditional bureaucracy to become more transparent, more accountable and more 
cost-efficient in delivering better quality public services.   
 
The third important point is that the MJ got access to the statistical performance data 
of the stakeholders in terms of number of processed, r jected and delayed 
documents, and speed of service. This type of performance information was 
previously inaccessible by the external organisations, which enabled the government 
bodies to interpret statistical data for their own benefit and submit better performance 
reports than the actual practice was. The central government had to rely on these 
reports combined with financial reports of the Audit Commission. There was also no 
tradition to conduct evaluation of the government performance based on the 
customers’ views.    
 
However, the service integration policy has changed th  situation. In response to the 
public and government critique, the MJ was able to pr vide a report on the 
stakeholders’ performance, which held collective responsibility for poor service 
quality. This might have influenced the image of some political managers. Thus, the 
OSS could be used by the central government to monitor and compare the 
performance of the government bodies based on more reliable and transparent 
information of the integrated computer system. The service integration policy had the 
potential to offer remedies to “monopolies-of-information situations”, where the 
government bodies were used to withholding information from citizens and 
businesses, and restricting equal access and social in lusion in order to get illegal 
payments for public service provision.  
 
Given the combination of these factors, it was not surprising that the new initiative of 
service integration through single-window arrangements faced strong, aggressive 
resistance and scepticism expressed by the political managers. During one year of the 
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pilot project the central government held a series of debates between members of the 
government on the strategy of the OSS development in terms of the type of services, 
functions and potential new stakeholders of the OSS. As the policy was supported at 
the highest political level, the ministers could not reject the idea of service integration 
explicitly. By contrast, they expressed enthusiasm, and some of them introduced the 
single-window approach within their own organisations to avoid joining the OSS 
project. The terms “one stop shop”, “customer orientation”, “improving service 
quality” became popular, fashionable slogans, which were frequently used in the 
official speeches of politicians to demonstrate their d dication to the Presidential 
strategy for public service modernisation. However, the actual implementation of the 
service modernisation reform was a complex and contradictory process.   
  
The international practice suggests that government bodies might be reluctant to 
hand over competence and activities as this can bring a potential loss of power over 
human, legal and financial resources (Flumian et al., 2007). For example, in response 
to the initiative expressed by the MJ to deliver select d social and health care 
services through single-window centres, the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Protection of Population (MLSP) and Ministry of Healthcare (MH) resisted this idea. 
Both ministries expressed concerns regarding provision of their services by “non-
specialists”, i.e. front-line personnel who did not have degrees in social and health 
areas. The MLSP introduced single-window arrangements in the regional labour 
departments to deliver services for job search, training and re-training of the 
unemployed. Professional and organisational boundaries posed significant challenges 
to the service integration policy as different groups of professions attempted to 
protect their interests and job safety and were reluctant to share information and 
cooperate with colleagues from government departments specialising in other areas.       
 
Using the cases of two different services: “application for a driving license” and “tax 
registration”, the following examples analyse the reasons for resistance towards the 
new policy expressed by the government officials, and changes of the nature of 
relationships between key stakeholders as the policy has progressed. One of the 
services selected by the President among those to be piloted in OSS was the 
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“application for a driving license”. The Traffic and Administrative Police (TAP) 
within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of RK is responsible for issuing driving 
licenses, which is perceived to be a highly corrupt service among the public, 
businesses and government officials (Jandosova et al., 2002; Jandosova, 2007).  
 
To protect the personal interests of the political and administrative managers it was 
not surprising that TAP expressed strong resistance to the delegation of this service 
to the OSS. TAP introduced its own single-window centr s to improve customer 
service. In October 2007 in his interview to the newspaper “Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda” the Chairman of the Committee for Traffic Police, Mr. Omurzak Tussumov, 
informed: 
 
the work of registration departments in traffic police has been re-organised on 
the basis of single-window arrangement since 2004 to improve quality of 
service, reduce time for customer service and personal contacts with population. 
(Lukyanina, 2007)  
 
Following his argument the traffic police introduced the single-window arrangements 
even earlier (in 2004) than the actual service integration policy, which was launched 
in February 2005. The promises by many politicians, which have never been fulfilled 
caused a negative reaction from the citizens. For example, there were 38 comments 
written by the readers of this interview on the web-site http://www.zakon.kz, of 
which 37 users criticised the poor performance of the raffic police and shared 
examples from personal experiences of giving bribes to the traffic policemen, and 
only one comment from a traffic policemen who complained that they (i.e. 
policemen) had to take bribes as they gave illegal payments to their management and 
worked for 12 hours a day for miserable payment in order to meet quantitative 
targets.           
 
I visited the single-window centres organised by the TAP in Astana to compare 
customer service there with the OSS introduced by the MJ. In autumn 2007, there 
was one single-window centre of the TAP in the capital with a population of over a 
million people. Later it turned out that there were two OSS of the TAP at that time, 
but the information on the second one was not shared with the public, so most 
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customers visited this particular office. The office was located outside the city, about 
30 minutes drive by car, with limited access to public transport. The area around the 
office presented overcrowded chaos consisting of cars, drivers, police cars and it was 
hard to find a parking space.  
 
There was literally a single window desk in the TAP where services were provided. 
In order to reach the front-line staff it would take from one to three hours of queuing 
along with other tired and angry clients. When I reached the customer desk, it turned 
out that it was time for lunch, and the window was closed in front of my face. Most 
customers preferred to stay in the queue during the lunch time in order not to lose 
position in the queue so I followed their example. The customers came to apply 
mainly for two types of services: to register a caror to apply for a driving license. 
While we were standing in the queue, people complained about the poor performance 
of the TAP service, bribe-seeking behaviour of the traffic policemen and employees 
of this particular OSS, shared their life stories rlated to their experiences of getting 
services at this organisation for illegal payments.  
 
When the window was finally opened, the front-line employee looked through my 
documents and told me to pay a service fee at the local bank and then return with the 
payment confirmation. In response to the question why it was not possible to pay 
there to save time, the official replied sharply that these were the rules, and she could 
not do anything about that, and directed her attention to the next customer. The next 
day I returned, queued for the second time, and finally submitted the documents. One 
person, a “mediator”, approached me with a proposal to accelerate the speed of 
service for additional illegal fee, which I refused to do.    
 
Overall, the single-window of the TAP represented the traditional service provision 
and did not contain elements of service integration in the sense of reducing 
administrative burdens, and making information more transparent and accessible. 
However, despite the general public critique and complaints against the corrupt 
services of the TAP, the service on application for a driving license continued to be 
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delivered by the responsible authority and not included in the list of public services 
provided through single-window arrangements.  
     
Compared to the TAP practice, experience of the Tax Committee as one of the OSS 
stakeholders at the pilot stage presents an example of good practice. Tax services 
were also acknowledged to be highly corrupt by the government officials, businesses 
and civil society (Jandosova et al., 2002), as well as by the Tax Committee itself, 
which elaborated the Strategy of Corruption Control at the Tax Authorities. The Tax 
Committee has progressed from face-to-face service provision to the online service 
delivery very rapidly. The Chairman of the Tax Committee attracted the best 
qualified IT experts from other government bodies and the business sector to develop 
innovative, technological solutions to improve service quality. Specialists from two 
different professions, tax and IT, were encouraged to work together and develop 
recommendations on the improvement of service quality. As the senior manager of 
the tax service department described this process: 
 
For the first time in our practice we, tax consultants, were sitting with computer 
experts and explaining to them the problems we encountered in the process of 
service provision, and what difficulties our customers faced, so basically we told 
them what we wanted to improve. The IT guys returned to us with suggestions 
on how our ideas could be implemented in practice with the use of modern 
technologies. […] We were divided into small working groups, each working on 
a specific issue, for example, one group was dealing with tax service delivery for 
business clients, another – for civil servants, etc. Then we gave presentations and 
feedback on each group’s work. That was fascinating! Tax experts learnt some 
computer terminology and now they speak the same language as the IT guys, 
together we have developed innovative projects, which none of the government 
bodies has implemented! 
 
This quote illustrates enthusiasm and drive for quality improvement expressed by the 
Tax Committee, which was awarded for the “Best E-Servic  in the Public Sector - 
2006”. The Tax Committee launched tax service provisi n online at the portal 
http://www.taxkz.kz, both for business clients and citizens who were abl to submit 
tax reports in electronic form. The Tax Committee elaborated and published 
guidelines with detailed explanations on the tax application procedures online. Face-
to-face customer service of the Tax Committee was also significantly improved after 
introducing single-window centres within their organisations. Thus, the Tax 
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Committee represented a strong stakeholder for the OSS project: they have adopted 
an open environment for innovations and information exchange, they had already 
accumulated experience in service integration within a single organisation by the 
time the pilot projects were launched. The Tax Committee had a team of qualified tax 
and IT experts who learnt to work across professional boundaries and could share 
their experience with other stakeholders. The employees from the Tax Committee 
were keen and enthusiastic to work with the MJ within e single-window project as 
this was a new challenge for their organisation. One of the IT experts from the Tax 
Committee who was involved in the pilot project noted: 
 
We are now developing a web-site for the OSS to give information to citizens on 
the services that OSS deliver, and this web-site will be linked to the Tax 
Committee e-portal. So clients will have opportunity to apply for tax services 
both at the OSS and online. We have also developed an electronic system for 
tracking the flow of documents between OSS and Tax Committee to reduce lost 
and delayed tax applications. So everyone, we and OSS, will know exactly the 
position of each document at a specific time.  
   
The representatives of the Tax Committee, tax manager nd IT expert, whom I 
interviewed in December 2006 during a study visit to the Netherlands, who were 
keen to cooperate with their colleagues from the single-window centres. However, 
they did not always know the intentions of their political managers, who initiated 
leaving the OSS pilot project during this period of time. The Minister of Finance, 
Mrs. Natalya Korzhova, raised concerns that the OSS pulled back tax service 
provision due to the low professionalism of the front-line staff. She refused to sign 
the draft government resolution that would stipulate the official functioning of the 
pilot OSS. In order to reach a consensus with the Ministry of Finance and other 
stakeholders who expressed resistance to the delegation of their services to the 
single-window centres, the MJ had to play trade-offs and make strategic changes in 
the original design of the policy.  
 
First, the Tax Committee left the OSS despite certain positive achievements of the 
pilot project in tax service delivery. Second, the OSS were assigned service delivery 
on the basis of alternative rather than single access along with the stakeholders as 
key service providers. The central government made a cision that the OSS would 
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continue to deliver legal services on the single-window arrangement whereas the rest 
of the selected services would be provided both by the OSS and responsible 
government authorities. A more detailed description of shifting from the single-
access to the alternative-access model is presented below in the following sections. 
The senior manager of the MJ commented in this regard: “We had to make a step 
backward. It was the price to push the reform. Otherwise they would have not 
adopted the legal document on OSS establishment”.  
 
Hence, in January 2007, OSS were assigned the legal status of “state enterprise”, i.e. 
they were funded by the state budget, and staff changed their status from “civil 
servants” to “public sector employees” signifying lower salary, less social benefits 
and a lack of career prospects. Overall, reducing the s atus of the OSS employees has 
had negative impact on the progress of policy impleentation.  
 
This section has analysed the design of the policy, establishment of the pilot projects 
and nature of interactions between key stakeholders at the early stage of policy 
implementation. The next section moves onto the discus ion of the policy 
implementation at the second stage: when the pilot experience was rolled-out across 
the regions replacing the model of the single-access with the alternative-access model 
of service delivery.    
 
5.1.3 Shift towards Alternative-Access Model     
 
As was described earlier in this chapter, the main purpose of the OSS was stipulated 
by the legislation as “the provision of public services based on the one stop shop 
principle to accept applications and deliver processed documents.” Since the launch 
of the policy the functions of the front-line staff were limited to technical operations, 
such as checking for mistakes, accepting documents a d sending them to the 
stakeholder department, i.e. serving as ‘mediators’ between customers and service 
providers rather than being a service provider in itself. International practice suggests 
that single-windows can be used not just as a physical access points to services and 
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information, but as a single access point at which decisions are made (Hagen and 
Kubicek, 2000).  
 
However, the Kazakhstani government has chosen a less challenging option in terms 
of service integration under pressure by the political managers. The politicians were 
interested in keeping control over service provision, thus, keeping personnel, 
resources and power, rather than delegating service delivery to the new stakeholder. 
At the same time the central government had to report on the successful 
implementation of the Presidential initiative and, despite the resistance of the 
political managers, government resolution on the establi hment of single-window 
centres was adopted. The government managed to meet political ambitions to show 
the international community its intentions to build an effective and efficient public 
service system.   
 
In January 2007, after losing the Tax Committee as an important strategic 
stakeholder, a new partner, the Ministry of Defence (MD) joined the single-window 
project. The MD was the only government body which agreed to provide selected 
services through OSS. Although initially the MD was not considered as a potential 
stakeholder for the single-window centres given the sp cific nature of its services, it 
turned out that registration of residence, a servic delivered through OSS, depended 
on the registration of military servants in reserve, a service of the MD. In order to 
change residence address the clients needed to provide a confirmation from a local 
defence body that they were taken off the military record at the former area of 
residence and registered in the new area of residence. Thus, registration of residence 
at the pre-OSS stage normally could take a week becaus  the clients had to travel 
between the local department of justice and two defence bodies, one in the former 
area of residence and second – in the new location, and line up in three different 
queues.  
 
In response to the initiative from the MJ to deliver the service on registration of 
military servants in reserve at the single-window centres, at first the MD did not 
express enthusiasm. The managers from the defence bodi s argued that they could 
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not delegate military registration to the OSS given the lack of front-line staff’ 
competence in their specific field, and national security issues related to database 
access. After six-months of negotiations and a serie  of seminars, both sides 
managed to reach a consensus: service for registration of military servants in reserve 
was delivered at the OSS by the staff of the MD. Two fragmented services of the MJ 
and MD were brought in one physical location – OSS –, which enabled for both 
service providers and customers to save time and costs. The quality of both services 
improved in terms of reducing the speed of service and improving the accessibility of 
the service. However, the provision of two services in one location without 
integration at the back-offices (for example, by introducing unified database) could 
not change the nature of the administrative processes: civil servants at the MD 
continued to deliver services in the same way as at the pre-OSS stage with the 
exception that now this service was accessible in more convenient locations for 
customers. Figure 7 illustrates an alternative-access model of service delivery, which 
was adopted in January 2007 as a result of the longnegotiations between the 
stakeholders.  
 













The key difference between the single-access model (Figure 5) and alternative-access 
model (Figure 7) was the emergence of two new arrows linking the government 
bodies (departments of defence and land resource management) and customers. From 
 











Social care services 
One Stop Shop Customer 
 139 
January 2007, public services were provided on an altern tive basis both at the 
responsible authorities and OSS. Only the MJ being a policy coordinator continued 
to deliver services entirely through the single-window centres. The concept of 
service integration policy has been undermined by this strategic change in the policy 
design. This model enabled the stakeholders to deliver services directly to the 
customers and through OSS, which left opportunities for corrupt activities and 
constrained service improvement in term of social inclusion and accountability. After 
two years of policy implementation the government still did not have a clear vision 
of the single-window model, the process of negotiati ns was accompanied by the 
antagonistic and contradictory relations among stakeholders. For example, the draft 
Concept of the OSS Development elaborated by the MJ and submitted for review to 
the Prime-Minister’s Chancellery in 2007 was returned back to the coordinating 
authority for further development and has still not been approved at the time of 
finishing this research project. The Prime-Minister’s Chancellery and the Ministry of 
Finance provided critical feedback on this document sta ing that it lacked thorough 
analysis of the situation, evaluation of the reform progress, clear performance targets, 
estimation of budget resources and action plans. According to this document the MJ 
had ambitious plans to increase the number of services provided through single-
window centres during three stages: 32 new services of the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs, Transport and Communication, Culture and Iformation, General Procuracy 
and Local Municipalities were planned to be delegatd in 2008. At the next stage, 
from 2009 onwards it was envisaged that 35 new services of the Ministries of Labour 
and Social Protection, Finance, and Internal Affairs would be added. Finally, from 
2010 it was planned that 34 services within the Ministries of Education and Science, 
Energy and Mineral Resources, Health Care, Committee for Registry Service, as well 
as local municipalities would be provided at the OSS. However, in practice within 
two years of policy implementation from 2005 to 2007, the OSS still continued to 
deliver only 25 services, including 16 services of the coordinating authority. As the 
Prime-Minister, Mr. Karim Massimov, commented in this regard:  
 
The population have many complaints because of disagreement in actions among 
the state bodies. Because of this the idea of OSS is discredited, it means that the 
task given by the Head of the state to simplify access to public services and 
reduce corruption with the use of OSS has not been implemented, in my view… 
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Unfortunately, I need to declare that some state bodies are not interested in 
delegating services to the OSS. Otherwise, how could ne explain that during 
two years these centres have not yet developed and h ve not provided new 
services. (2007) 
 
The government bodies were still reluctant to enter into collaborative arrangements 
as they did not perceive benefits from their involvement: ministers were concerned 
with potential incursions into their fields of responsibility, loss of power and 
resources as well as access to illegal payments (Janenova, 2009b; 2009c; 2010d). 
The President of RK emphasised the need to increase number of services delivered 
through OSS, which would enable a reduction in burea cracy and make the work of 
the government more transparent (Nazarbayev, 2006c). Immediately, the government 
adopted the resolution that 32 new services of different state bodies would be 
provided through the single-window centres on an alternative basis from January 
2009. The important observation is that the scope of new services included some 
social care services such as the application for child benefits, registration for 
municipal housing, provision of health care benefits for disabled people and 
registration for public nursery care, thus, indicating positive progress in making 
services more customer-oriented.  
 
Although the single-window centres have achieved significant progress within a 
short period of time, Mrs. Zagipa Baliyeva was replaced by the new minister due to 
the series of corruption scandals (illegal practices of the MJ and OSS are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 9). The new Minister, Mr. Rashid Tussupbekov, the former 
General Procurator, immediately initiated the delegation of the single-window 
centres to the local municipalities, arguing that the MJ, being a service provider in 
itself, should not coordinate the policy, particularly given the expansion of the 
services outside of the scope of the ministerial competencies. As an experienced 
politician with over 30 years of experience in the government including the last 9 
years at the position of the General Procurator, representative of the Soviet Party 
system, he was not interested in contining the confrontations of the MJ with other 
political managers. It was normal practice that the new political managers tried to 
initiate a new policy, which would be associated with their names rather than 
ensuring the continuity of public service reforms.               
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The new minister was much less enthusiastic about service innovation compared to 
his predecessor. Within a month of his appointment, Mr. Tussupbekov initiated the 
delegation of the coordination authorities over theOSS from the MJ to the Civil 
Service Agency. In an official letter to the Prime-Minister of RK, the newly 
appointed Minister of Justice suggested that it would be more reasonable delegating 
coordination functions of the OSS to the state body, which was not involved in this 
project as a direct service provider and had responsibilities to monitor government 
bodies’ activities in public service field. For these reasons, in the view of the MJ, the 
proposed state body - the Agency - would be able to conduct more objective 
management and audit inspections over the service integration policy than the MJ, 
which was a direct service provider of the majority of OSS services. The MJ also 
highlighted the importance of the urgent delegation of coordination functions given 
the recent increase in the spectrum of services deliver d through the single-window 
arrangements. It is worth noting the reaction of the political management of the 
Agency at this stage. The Agency was also not keen to take over the burden of the 
service integration. One of the reasons for the anxiety of the political managers was 
related to their unwillingness to inherit the negative history of the OSS, in relation to 
poor performance, corrupt scandals and many organisational problems.  
 
Another reason was the fact that coordination over service integration policy in the 
Kazakhstani context put the responsible body at risk of being criticised by the 
politicians who resisted inter-departmental partnerships and service changes. In the 
Kazakhstani culture, relations and social networks possess more power and 
significance for the political elite compared to the moral and professional obligation 
of the public sector employees to serve the citizens’ needs. The Agency suggested 
delegating coordinative authorities over the OSS to the local municipalities as they 
had better knowledge of the local customer needs and would be able to control 
service delivery more effectively than any central government body could do. The 
issue of delegation of the OSS to the local municipalities was raised at the earlier 
stage of policy implementation when the heads of akim ts were asked to provide 
feedback to this initiative. The general response from the regions was not welcoming 
to this idea as the local municipalities lacked knowledge and the capacity to organize 
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integrated service provision and legal authorities o coordinate local departments of 
the government bodies. However, despite the resistance from the regions to take over 
leadership in modernising public services, the coordinating role over the single-
window centres was delegated from the MJ to the local municipalities in January 
2010. Hence, political barriers were important constraints to the integrated service 
governance.  
 
The strategic changes made in the design of the OSS policy replacing the single-
access model with the alternative-access model the hav  significantly undermined 
the idea of service integration and service improvement. The MJ, as a single driver of 
the service integration reform, was unable to overcome resistance of the traditional 
bureaucracy. Many political managers disliked the enthusiasm of the MJ about 
service quality improvement given their concerns about rising power authorities of 
the OSS. The single-access model of service provision, which was successfully 
piloted was replaced by the less challenging and more acceptable alternative-access 
model that enabled the government bodies to continue to provide services directly to 
the customers and through OSS on an alternative basis, nd engage in illegal 
practices.      
 
5.2 SUMMARY  
 
This chapter discussed how the new policy has progressed from the initial idea to the 
actual implementation, with particular emphasis on the three stages: design of the 
vision, piloting single-access model and shifting to the alternative-access model. The 
service integration policy was designed by the central government in consultation 
with government bodies, the political party “Nur-Otan” and international experts. 
The introduction of a single-access service delivery model (Figure 5) where public 
services were accessible only through OSS was a succe sful achievement of the 
policy at the pilot stage. The single-access model had real potential to reduce risks of 
corruption by eliminating direct contact between service providers and customers, 
improve quality of services by enabling equal access and social inclusion, and 
improving the accountability of the public sector by creating reliable monitoring 
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systems of government performance data. The policy fa ed strong resistance from 
the political managers, who were concerned about loosing their power over 
personnel, resources, and access to illegal payments. Traditional bureaucrats avoided 
service integration by ignoring the policy and introducing their own single-window 
arrangements (for example, within Tax Committee, TAP). Confrontation at the 
political level has had negative impact on the relationships at the low-rank level 
resulting in resistance between the front-office (OSS) and back-office staff 
(government officials). Under the pressure of the political leaders the government 
replaced the original single-access model with alternative-access model (Figure 7), 
which meant that services were provided both by the government bodies and the 
OSS. Certain positive achievements in terms of public service provision have been 
made within a short period of policy implementation:  
• information about public services has become more transparent; 
• physical customer service environment has significantly improved; 
• selected services have become more easily accessible;  
• staff have learnt new knowledge and skills to deliver diversity of services in 
one place and working across different professions and organisations; 
• consultation mechanism has become more transparent (involvement of 
international experts, political party and business a ociation).       
 
However, the alternative model of service delivery was not able to introduce 
fundamental changes to work practices at the governm nt bodies. The OSS seemed 
to offer a sort of choice for citizens to choose servic s at the new public sector 
organisation or traditional departments. They provided the same services as the 
traditional authorities, but in a more comfortable space and in more accessible ways. 
As demonstrated by examples, service quality has been improved in terms of 
accessibility and speed of delivery by putting services together in one physical 
location rather than making changes of the administrat ve processes at the back-
offices. The traditional bureaucrats continued to work without challenging their work 
practices from the customers’ perspective. Where many countries have introduced 
more result-oriented management and set up an evaluation criteria for performance, 
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the government of Kazakhstan really concentrated its attention on improvement of 
the front-line service delivery without considering changes in the back-offices.  
 
In NPM theory evaluation of customer satisfaction is one of the techniques to yield 
important data and improve quality. While the government declared customer-
orientation principle as a slogan for public service reform, the citizens continued to 
be ignored in the policy-making process. The OSS services were selected without 
evaluation of customers’ needs. The single-window centres introduced standards and 
regulations as performance measures following the NPM ideology. However, 
performance evaluation could not provide transparent and reliable information as it 
contained partial information because of the alternative model, which enabled the 
government bodies to avoid OSS when delivering servic s. The officials continued to 
have control over statistical data on their performance with limited access both by the 
public and central government. Further, the traditional bureaucrats could continue 
illegal practices as they had direct interactions with the clients and were able to 
influence on the results of the application review.  
 
The research findings show that service integration p licy has not been able to 
change service production processes mainly because change to a greater extent was 
not desirable for the traditional bureaucracy. Servic  integration policy has posed 
fundamental challenges to the traditional bureaucracy:  
(1) it competes with the government bodies in provisi n of the same services, 
but making them of better quality, in terms of accessibility, speed of delivery and 
public accountability; 
(2) it has the potential to reduce corruption;  
(3) it can provide reliable and transparent information on the performance data 
of the stakeholders.  
 
Hence, in the top-down, hierarchical and corrupt system, service integration policy 
which promoted transparency, public accountability and social equality has been 
constrained by the institutional framework and culture of the traditional bureaucracy. 
 
 145 
Following on from this the next chapter analyses power dimensions and relationships 
between the key stakeholders as well as control mechanisms applied within the 
customer service environment. In particular, it examines how the relationships 
between the traditional bureaucrats and customer-ori nted bureaucrats have changed 
over time; the way the performance of the single-window centres is controlled and 
measured with the use of technologies and physical environment, and the 
management styles that have been adopted by the OSS managers. The limitations of 
the control system to measure both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of public 
services are given special emphasis in the following chapter.         
 
  
6. POWER, RELATIONSHIPS AND CONTROL       
 
As was highlighted in the literature review, understanding local culture and context is 
important in explaining the successes and limitations f managerial reforms in the 
transitional countries. This chapter analyses the cange in power dimensions and 
relationships between the key stakeholders as the policy has progressed, and explores 
different types of control practices and managerial styles adopted within the single-
window centres. In particular, the use of technologies and the physical environment 
as a means of control are explored in relation to the performance management of the 
front-line personnel. This chapter also examines how the OSS managers and staff 
have addressed the contradictory dilemma between quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of public services.      
 
6.1 POWER DIMENSIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS    
 
This section examines the nature of relationships between: 1) the managers of the 
MJ, OSS and stakeholder departments; 2) the front-office and back-office personnel; 
and, finally, 3) the managers of OSS and staff. Understanding the power dimensions 
and nature of relationships at different levels (both political and administrative) helps 
to identify the constraints and challenges faced by the OSS managers and front-line 
staff in implementing the policy and examining how they addressed these issues. 
 
6.1.1 Interactions between Key Actors    
 
Figure 8 illustrates the diversity of the stakeholders involved in service integration 
policy, which enables to structure my analysis by the ypes of the stakeholders 




























Figure 8 shows that the MJ, being the coordinating authority of the single-window 
policy implementation, closely interacted with the Ministry of Economy and Budget 
Planning to allocate appropriate funding for the OSS. The MJ involved inter-
governmental working groups, political pro-presidential party “Nur-Otan” and 
international organisations to develop policy recommendations on the improvement 
of certain aspects of implementation. The Agency for Informatisation and 
Communication (AIC) provided consultative support and expertise on the 
technological side of the reform, for example, by assisting in the build-up of an 
integrated database among government departments. The AIC is responsible for e-
government implementation, which aims to transform the OSS corporate network 
into a shared network for all government bodies in order to share information on 
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illustrated in Figure 8, followed a traditional pattern: strict hierarchy, top-down 
vertical communication between the managerial staff. The MJ was responsible for 
maintaining all necessary conditions for proper functioning of the OSS. The senior 
managers of the MJ had powers to formulate the decisions of the policy concerning 
annual budget planning, service delivery methods, choice of technologies etc. The 
OSS had direct contacts with the local municipalities, the Agency for Land Resource 
Management (ALRM) and MD, which provided services through their regional 
departments. Communication with other stakeholders, which did not provide services 
through single-window arrangements such as internatio l organisations, political 
party, business associations and the AIC took place only by approval of the MJ. It 
was the coordinating body which made decisions on the appropriateness of 
participation of the OSS managers in the discussion f policy issues among 
stakeholders.  
 
Due to the lack of power in decision making at the local level, the OSS submitted 
regular reports to the centre and kept up daily communication with the MJ. 
According to the legislation the OSS had their own budgets and were supposed to 
have financial autonomy, thus, the government formally attempted to introduce the 
NPM principle on “letting the managers manage.” However, in practice whenever 
any expenditure was required for the single-window centres, for example, to 
purchase equipment, the OSS manager normally contacted the responsible manager 
at the MJ with a proposal to announce a tender. Tender advertisements were 
published in the local newspapers and online at the web-site of the MJ (the OSS still 
did not have their own web-sites as of December 2009). The OSS managers also 
requested permission from the MJ on the issues of remuneration and bonus payments 
for their staff. The OSS managers being concerned about their job security usually 
did not take any action without prior agreement and discussion with their 
coordinators from the MJ, thus, transferring culture of centralised control and 




The OSS manager at the regional (oblast) level was appointed by the Minister of 
Justice, and the managers of the OSS at the village (r yon) level were appointed by 
the OSS manager at the regional level. However, in practice managers at the village 
level were recruited only by recommendations of the senior officials from the MJ. As 
was mentioned in Chapter 4, many OSS managers were former heads of the local 
departments of justice who had professional and personal connections with the 
political management of the MJ (more detailed discus ion on the personnel policies 
is presented in Chapter 7). A well-designed IT system, discussed in more detail 
below in this chapter, established a corporate network between the OSS in the 
regions and the MJ which enabled the coordinating body “to know everything what 
is going on, even the behaviour of staff and managers”(unstructured interview, 
manager, MJ, January 2008).  
 
This section examines the nature of interactions betwe n the managers of the 
coordinating body, OSS and stakeholder departments. The type of relationships 
between the MJ and OSS is typical of the Kazakhstani administrative systems 
characterised by strong power at the centre. The OSS represented operative branches 
of the MJ in the regions being controlled through a hierarchical and centralised 
system imposed by the coordinating authority. The following discussion explores the 
nature of the relationships at the administrative leve : between the front-office and 
back-office personnel (i.e. government officials in the stakeholder departments) and 
how they managed to move from initial resistance towards cooperation to the design 
and delivery of services through single-window arrangements.  
 
6.1.2 Front-Office and Back-Office: From Resistance  to Partnership        
 
This section examines how relationships between the front-office and back-office 
staff have transformed during the policy implementation progress, why the 
traditional bureaucrats were antagonistic towards customer-oriented bureaucrats, and 
how stakeholders managed to overcome resistance and learn to work across 
professional and organisational boundaries.  
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As was highlighted earlier in this chapter, the front- ffice employees worked directly 
with customers, whereas the main focus of the back-office staff was on operational 
efficiency. The result of the operator’s work, i.e. providing a document to the client, 
was dependent on the approval and processing of applic tions by his/her colleagues 
from the responsible authority. Given the different na ure of work, the two sets of 
employees were put in a relationship of mistrust. One of the major challenges 
constraining successful service integration was the cultural dilemma of when the 
personal interests of the political leaders undermined the broader policy objectives. 
As was described earlier in this chapter, the governm nt bodies resisted cooperating 
with the single-window centres as the latter posed a threat in terms of taking power 
over finances, personnel and resources. The lack of mutual understanding and 
competition for budgets and resources between the politicians constrained building 
trustful relationships between the front-office and back-office staff. Due to the lack 
of encouragement from the politicians to enter into joint projects, both the front-
office and back-office staff felt isolated from each other and perceived each side with 
a high degree of mistrust. As the operator put it: 
 
We have no communication with the government officials by phone or e-mail, 
only through correspondence which is dry, and doesn’t sound encouraging for 
developing trust relationships.   
 
Another operator remarked that, “there has always been a gap between the OSS and 
government bodies – us and them […] It is a kind of paper war.” The tension in the 
relationships between the back-office of the governme t bodies structured as a 
traditional bureaucracy and the front-office of the single-window centres organised 
along the lines of a customer-oriented bureaucracy was not surprising. Part of this 
antagonism relates to the fact that the civil servants perceived themselves as 
“specialists”, “professionals”, and viewed the front-li e staff of the OSS as “non-
professionals”, “non-specialists” because the latter group might not have a degree in 
the area of specific services (in fact, they were not required to have a special degree 
when they were recruited). The concept of joined-up service delivery posed a 
significant challenge to the traditional bureaucracy, which was used to working 
within professional and organisational boundaries (tax consultants in the tax 
committee, land experts in the land departments, social workers in the social care 
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departments etc.). Service integration policy suggested that public services could be 
delivered to the customers by “non-specialists”, who were required to have good 
social skills and the ability to perform routinised tasks under pressure (as described 
in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8). The fact that e front-line employees did not 
need to have a special education to deliver a range of public services threatened job 
security and the specialisation of the civil servants. While more services were 
gradually delegated to the single-window centres and more resources were allocated 
to organise efficient front-line customer service, the traditional bureaucrats became 
concerned about losing their jobs as a result of downsizing state apparatus.      
 
Further, service integration policy challenged the traditional bureaucracy by 
encouraging them to become more transparent and accountable to the public, and to 
share information across organisational and professional boundaries. In the context 
of political inertia, “due largely to a highly centralised state dominated by an elite 
form of decision-making” (Knox, 2008: 479), the civil servants were used to working 
in “segmented” organisations, they “treat information as owned rather than shared, 
and take decisions on the basis of specialism and expertise” (Kanter, 1983: 146). As 
one front-line employee expressed, the general feelings among many colleagues was 
that “civil servants think that we are not clever enough to do their jobs.”  
 
Another part of such antagonism was the difference in the dominant modes of 
expression in the single-window centres and stakehold r departments. In the front-
line jobs the main medium of communication in the interactions with customers was 
verbal. By contrast, the main mode of expression for the back-office staff while 
processing the application, was the written word. In eed, the written word and the 
document could be regarded as the essential bureaucratic mode of communication. 
The government officials were not fully aware of the emotional and psychological 
burden demanded by the face-to-face customer service. One of the former civil 





I have never thought that it was so difficult to communicate with clients. My 
former work was entirely focused on the documentation, whereas here in the 
OSS I spend all the time talking with customers, and that is a tough job, I must 
say! But my former colleagues don’t understand it as they haven’t experienced 
such intensive customer service.    
 
The clash between different approaches to work and mo es of expression had 
become manifest in the civil servants’ complaints that the front-line staff had low 
competency and, for this reason, accepted applications with errors, which had 
negative impact on overall performance. In fact, the return of unprocessed 
applications and delays in the provision of documents created a negative image of the 
single-window centres at the early stage of policy implementation. The clients did 
not want to understand explanations of the front-line staff that applications were 
reviewed in the government bodies, not in the OSS, and sent complaints about poor 
performance of the OSS to the MJ and mass media. Moreover, some operators shared 
their suspicions about intentional delays in application review by the back-office 
employees that resulted in the public criticism against the performance of the single-
window centres.  
 
Strict segmentation of the front-office from the back-office had clearly negative 
implications for management aims, particularly in terms of failures in 
communication between the two sides of the system. Si ilar to their political 
leaders, many administrative managers from the governm nt bodies were also 
concerned about their power, status and access to the illegal payments, all of which 
were put at risk by the new policy. As was described in Chapter 5, the clash between 
the traditional and customer-oriented bureaucracies resulted in changing the original 
design of the policy replacing the single-access model with the alternative-access 
model of service delivery. The traditional bureaucrcy successfully managed to 
protect the interests of the political and administrative managers which, 





The antagonistic reaction expressed by the political leaders towards the MJ and OSS 
has been reduced after the alternative-access model of s rvice provision was adopted: 
the new policy did not pose threats to their power any more. Over time as a result of 
intensive negotiations and on-the-job training sessions, the managers from the OSS 
and stakeholder organisations have developed more trustful relations compared to the 
early stages of the policy implementation, and become more open to discuss ideas on 
designing joined-up services, sharing information and building integrated databases. 
An OSS manager described this process in the following ay:  
 
We work in close coordination with the managers of the government bodies, we 
call each other every day, in case of a delay of documents, and we try to solve it 
efficiently without causing problems for our clients. We have small working 
groups consisting of our staff and representatives of takeholder departments 
around each area of service, where the members negotiat  n service processes, 
reach agreement, inform and train other groups. 
 
The above quote is confirmed by the statement of anther manager who stated that 
the managers from the stakeholder departments provided training for the front-line 
staff where they informed about amendments to the rel vant legislation, provided 
professional advice within the scope of their competencies. These training sessions 
enabled the creation of friendly environments for sharing knowledge and experience 
among the key stakeholders, and learning from each other.     
 
Both comments from the OSS managers suggest an encouraging sign on the 
changing nature of the relationships between the front-office and back-office 
personnel. The managers and front-line staff at the OSS have gradually developed 
more trustful relationships with the government officials compared to their relations 
at the early stage of the policy implementation. In this respect, this research adds to 
previous research, which suggests that trust is a pre-requisite for effective service 
integration and partnerships (Bardach, 1998). The process of building mutual 
understanding and trust was characterised by regular discussions about varying work 




At the launch of the policy, the aim seemed to be clear and straightforward: 
“specialists”, i.e. civil servants, should explain to the “non-specialists”, front-line 
staff, the aspects of service provision to help them to understand work practices in 
order to deliver multiple services. The legislative regulations related to the selected 
pilot services was collected with the intention of adapting and combining them in 
procedure guidelines for each service. However, the MJ and stakeholders realised 
that the legislation was highly descriptive, complicated, enormous in volume, and 
could not provide a clear picture on specific steps in service delivery. The MJ 
decided to develop user-friendly and short regulations as the guidelines for the front-
line personnel, and public service standards for customers to provide information on 
the speed of service, required documents, opening times, costs and complaints 
procedure. The EU Tacis project, “Support to the development of public service 
standards” provided methodological guidance in drafting service standards and 
regulations for four ministries (Health, Labour and Social Protection, Finance and 
Justice) and two local municipalities (Shymkent oblast and Almaty City).   
 
Regulations included information about the main principles of serving the key 
performance indicators on quality and accessibility of public services in a form and 
language accessible to service users (Knox, 2008: 489). Service standards and 
regulations were published on the web-site of the MJ and information boards at the 
OSS. The regulation contained the main principles of public service provision such 
as timeliness, quality, accessibility, politeness and the complaints procedure. 
Performance indicators to measure these principles were developed and introduced, 
however, with more focus on quantitative targets which were easier to set compared 
to qualitative ones. It was decided that instead of examining bulks of documents, it 
would be more effective and time saving if the civil servants could explain their own 
understanding of the work and specific process-related issues. However, the 
government officials faced difficulties in clearly articulating the process steps for 
delivering public services. The colleagues from onedepartment could have different 
views on the same matter related to the service provision given highly descriptive 
nature of legislation that was open to various interpr tations. Diversity of knowledge 
and backgrounds of the government officials led to long discussions on each step in 
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the cycle of service production. The questions from the front-office were addressed 
to those who were identified as professionals in a specific service area. Primary 
contradictions occurred when these questions could not be answered satisfactorily. In 
these cases the civil servants and the front-line staff who were former officials 
exchanged views on service procedures and brought in varying perspectives. The 
contradictions were mainly related to the gaps and differences existing between 
legislation and work practices, and to different ways of working among the front-
office and back-office personnel who came from different organisations and 
professions. The senior manager of the MJ described this process in the following 
way: 
 
We asked every stakeholder department and our subordinating organisations, 
such as the Property Centre and Committee for Service Registry, to draw a cycle 
of work process on each specific service, identify stages of this cycle, 
responsible positions, and write descriptions of work activities at each of the 
stages in one sentence. […] This turned out to be not as simple as we initially 
expected. The government officials had no clear picture of what was happening 
with document in their organisation outside their department, they didn’t track 
the progress of the documents review after they finished analysis within their 
scope of responsibilities. For example, the law department may not interact with 
the budget planning department and the technical evaluation unit within the same 
agency. When they have finally drawn models of servic  delivery, they told us 
that it was an extremely useful exercise for themselve  to understand the full 
process.  
  
Many contradictions were solved as a result of extensive negotiations among 
stakeholders on possible solutions including minor changes in the work practices of 
the government officials and adaptation of technologies to speed up the process. For 
example, both case organisations introduced on a pilot shared a database with the 
Property Centre which enabled the front-line staff to issue a document certifying the 
ownership of the property within 20 minutes instead of the previous standard to 
deliver a document within two days. Another example relates to the pilot roll-out of 
service provision through postal offices in remote regions launched in autumn 2007. 
Following the agreement of cooperation between the MJ and National Holding 
“Samgau”, which coordinated postal services at thatime, the post offices started to 
accept applications from the citizens and send documents to the nearest single-
window centres. This cooperation was aimed at improving accessibility to the public 
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services for rural inhabitants as most of them did not have the funds to travel to the 
nearest OSS, which were often located hundreds of kilometres away. However, the 
rural citizens still remained in a disadvantaged position as the government officials 
traditional bureaucrats continued to seek bribes for delivering services which were 
not included within the scope of the OSS services. Management styles within the 
single-window centres and their impact on the organisational culture and 
relationships between the managers and front-line staff are analysed below.    
 
6.1.3 Management Styles  
 
The research findings signalled on the existence of various and sometimes 
contradictory methods of controlling staff. The analysis of responses expressed by 
the front-line staff brought to light three main categories of managers. These types of 
managers summarised complexities and the problems rlated to the control of the 
front-line workforce. The “innovative managers” were aware of the difficulties that 
this new way of working involved and developed a more pen attitude in adopting 
new strategies for managing front-line employees. The “traditional managers” 
carried on treating staff as civil servants in a centralised way by giving orders, 
demanding strict discipline and discouraging any creativity. Finally, the 
“technological managers” solved the issue of control simply by relying more heavily 
on the use of technologies.  
 
The “innovative managers” did not want to be considere  solely as controllers. They 
did not perceive their staff as simple numbers, but as important participants of the 
customer service work. 
 
I try to keep my staff updated with recent amendments in the legislation, strategy 
of the Ministry, not only with information about service procedures. It is 
important that my staff should be aware of the overall picture of reform and that 
the OSS is an important component in this picture. If you just talk about 





Some of the “innovative managers” honestly admitted hat they were not trained for 
the new role of the OSS managers, and they were willing to take training courses on 
customer service management and leadership. As one of the OSS managers 
commented in this regard:  
 
I observed a cycle of service provision from the very beginning until the end, 
and this was very helpful because now I have a clear idea of the entire process. 
The OSS were new organisations in the public sector and, as a manager, I learnt 
through experience. I would like to know more about the management of 
customer service and team working from literature and experts.  
 
The “traditional managers” represented those managers who tended to manage staff 
according to traditional techniques of control, which rely on personal surveillance.  
 
If you walk around, you can notice who is working and who is not. If he or she is 
quick or slow. You don’t need to measure them, you just see and perceive.  
 
The “traditional managers” knew staff personally and this had been a great help in 
controlling them.  
 
Since you know staff, their characters and personalities, you can motivate them. 
It’s more difficult with new entrants but after some time we get to know each 
other. 
 
The above quote emphasises that some managers still relied on personal knowledge 
of people for controlling staff. These managers adopted a traditional way of 
controlling employees which might create some problems with an increase in the 
number of the staff. At the period of doing the research project, because the number 
of personnel was not very large, both managers and workers could rely on personal 
knowledge. However, when employees become a larger group, this form of control 
may be changed to entirely electronic monitoring. The “traditional managers” were 
not completely against electronic monitoring, but were not too enthusiastic about 






The last category of managers is composed of the “technological managers”. These 
managers controlled staff as if they were numbers and their focus was only on 
productivity. They believed that control which relied only on technology could be 
effective. As one of the “technological managers” commented:  
 
If you think in terms of achieving goals, control with the help of IT is more 
effective and easier. You control them through computer monitors and video 
screens, and see how everyone is working in quantitative terms. It’s limiting, but 
from an efficiency standpoint, it’s simpler, more mechanical, easier and more 
objective.  
 
This manager seems over-optimistic about the use of electronic monitoring. 
However, in this quote, one can note the deficiencies of control based solely on 
technological systems: one can control employees from a quantitative perspective, 
but it is difficult to check their qualitative standards. The form of control utilised by 
the “technological managers” did not involve any shared responsibilities on the part 
of employees. They simplified the methods of controlling staff by using ICT. 
However, this method of control is far from complete. Several employees 
complained about this form of control solely based on production targets: 
 
It’s their job to control us. However, they should look not only at numbers, but 
also at the process of customer service, for example, they should ask clients how 
satisfied they are with our service. If you continuously receive the message that 
you are not meeting targets, you get depressed. I don’t think it’s positive for us 
to receive only negative messages.  
 
Many front-line employees sought interactions and accountability as single 
individuals, however, control, based entirely on electronic tools, could miss out the 
social interactions in the workplaces. Irrespective of the type of managerial style, all 
managers had to rely on technologies to get information on staff performance. Thus, 
control in the single-window centres followed the bureaucratic pattern of the 
quantitative measurement of the work processes. The front-line employees were 
measured on and assessed against their ability to accept applications accurately and 
quickly. The service standard, which was an active part of management policy was to 
accept a minimum 30 documents a day. If an employee frequently repeated errors in 
accepting incorrect applications, he or she was sent for additional training to the 
stakeholder department. As a manager commented: 
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When our employee makes frequent mistakes, we deliberately send him or her to 
the civil servant at the stakeholder department whooften returns the document 
unprocessed because of mistakes made by our operator. The operator can ask 
questions directly to this official, observe the process, remember, and is expected 
not to repeat the mistakes. 
 
Consistent mistakes were addressed in performance appraisal, potentially leading to 
the cutting of bonuses. In order to stimulate motivation and increase performance 
results, the case study organisations introduced a scheme when those operators who 
provided services to fifty customers a day, could leave their workplace earlier. As a 
result, this scheme motivated female employees who had children and the double 
burden of work and domestic duties, whereas performance of other employees had 
not improved so far. Few employees seemed to be comfortable with the performance 
appraisal system. One operator stated that: 
  
In the old practice we and managers did not know ho many clients each 
employee had served. This allowed some staff to cheat t  system and the others 
had to work hard without bonuses for their performance. Now figures tell a story 
of who works hard and who doesn’t. I think this is fairer than it was. 
 
However, the majority of employees were critical of the performance appraisal 
system:    
 
I don’t agree with the system. I don’t want my every action to be counted. I 
don’t want to be watched like this. But I would not raise this issue at the staff 
meetings as I don’t want to have problems.  
 
The managers could observe the actions of the staffthrough technological tools 
(computer system and video recording): when employees started working, when they 
logged off, when they took a break, if they were engaged in a conversation with a 
customer. As an OSS manager explained the use of a new technological system: 
 
Look, here is an employee who is just starting the s ift, she’s connecting now. 
She switched on her PC at 9:01 and put on a badge. Then she will press a button 
calling for a customer. When she will accept the application, the system will 
show the number of the document, the title of the responsible authority where 
the application will be sent and deadline for issuing a document.   
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Despite promising advantages to the electronic monitori g system, the traditional 
practice of watching over the staff’ behaviour was still widely utilised by the 
supervisors who were constantly present in the customer service area. Social 
interactions which relied on the visibility of the staff played an important role in the 
OSS. The limits of electronic monitoring had several implications for controlling 
staff. The front-line employees, knowing that their performance was constantly 
checked, their actions were perfectly visible from the monitor, and their 
conversations with customers were recorded, tried to discipline themselves.  
 
Through the electronic system the managers were able to monitor each operator in 
terms of the number of applications accepted and speed of service. At first sight, 
electronic monitoring, by making employees’ actions and performance visible, 
created an illusion of full control over the work processes: staff worked by following 
a regular pace, because they knew that they were watched. However, electronic 
monitoring did not give a definitive solution to the service quality improvement. 
Electronic monitoring generated employees’ resistance to managerial control. The 
managers dictated the length of working day and breaks, and controlled the 
adherence to these strict rhythms through supervisors’ personal surveillance and 
electronic monitoring. However, some employees resist d this rigidity, despite the 
fact that the supervisor could see them cheating.  
 
We can have breaks of five to ten minutes every two hours. A break of five 
minutes is too short for me, I just can’t have this short break. So [….] normally I 
extend this break. I know my supervisor can see me, but she never complained 
about this.  
 
The supervisors appeared to be aware of these smallviol tions, but overlooked them. 
The employees’ resistance was not considered to be he main limitation of electronic 
monitoring. Watching over the staff, the traditional surveillance was still considered 
an important technique for exercising control. It was possible via electronic 
monitoring to follow every single move and word of the staff. However, managers 
did not rely solely on this method. At both case study organisations direct visibility 
of the staff played an important part in the exercise of control. As one supervisor 
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explained, being able to wander around the front-line desk provided an effective 
method for controlling employees and helping, if required. 
 
If you are walking around, you can see if an operator is quick or slow. Of course, 
with the electronic system it has become easier to control them, you can time the 
length of each customer interaction. But if you seeth m, you can perceive if 
somebody is working hard or not.  
 
According to the supervisors, their presence in the OSS enabled them not only to 
facilitate the exercise of control, but also helped staff to deal with critical situations. 
  
Some customers have stereotypes that if employee is young, he or she is 
unprofessional and can be treated badly. Staff would immediately inform me 
about a difficult customer. In these situations I help to avoid conflicts by talking 
with clients, ensuring that service will be provided according to the legal 
procedures, and protecting our employees. 
 
The supervisor’s comment was reinforced by the operator’s statement:  
 
Eye contact with supervisor is important if something goes wrong. Our 
supervisor would approach us to help in dealing with d fficult client.  
 
Thus, the OSS management tended to ensure close monitoring and control of staff 
performance both through traditional personal surveillance and use of technologies. 
This section examined managerial styles adopted in the single-window centres: the 
“innovative managers”  aimed to find new solutions to support staff in fulfilling their 
functions; the “traditional managers” continued to treat staff as civil servants through 
centralised ways of giving orders and demanding strict discipline; and finally, the 
“technological managers” controlled staff mostly with the use of technologies. 
Irrespective of the managerial style the OSS managers p rformed monitoring and 
control of staff both through traditional observation and use of the technologies. 
Thus, control within the OSS environment followed the bureaucratic pattern of the 
quantitative measurement of the work processes. The following section explores the 
use of different types of control mechanisms in order to measure and manage the 




6.2 CONTROL PRACTICES  
 
This section presents the discussion of different types of control methods adopted 
within the single-window centres in order to measure and manage the performance of 
the OSS managers and front-line personnel. Particular emphasis is given to the 
contradictory dilemma between quantitative and qualitative characteristics of public 
service faced by the front-line staff, as well as the use of technologies and the 
physical environment as a means of control. It is argued that the utilisation of 
technological means and personal surveillance strength ed centralised control over 
the OSS and imposed threat over the front-line personnel.        
 
6.2.1 Quantity and Quality Dilemma of Public Servic e    
 
It was highlighted in the previous section that some front-line employees expressed 
dissatisfaction with the performance measurement sys em which was based on 
quantitative targets rather than qualitative ones. This section considers the 
performance control system in more detail by examining how the front-line 
personnel addressed challenges to meet both quantity d quality characteristics of 
public services. It is useful to suggest the characte istics of service quantity and 
quality dimensions (see Table 10) that lie at the polarities to understand more fully 
challenges faced by the personnel in meeting strict quantitative performance targets 


















Adopted and revised from Taylor, Mulvey, Hyman and Bain, 2002 
 
As Table 10 illustrates, at one extreme are simple, straightforward services which 
require standard employees’ actions and responses to cus omer requests, and which 
may well be written (for example, applying for a passport). These services are 
invariably subject to tight service-handling times and control mechanisms based on 
strict statistical criteria. At the other extreme are services where the nature of 
customer interaction is more complex, and staff respond more flexibly (for example, 
application for social and health care benefits). Service times are more relaxed, and 
while temporal measurements might still apply, other criteria, emphasising the 
quality of service to the customer, are given higher priority. Consequently, each 
workflow can be characterised by the relative importance of these quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions.  
 
Several points require emphasis regarding the relevance of quantity and quality 
dimensions to the service integration process. Thislist of characteristics is presented 
to indicate general contrasts that exist in the public service complexity. Service 
Quantity Quality 
Simple customer interaction Complex customer interaction 
Routinisation Individualisation/customisation 
Strict procedures adherence Flexible 
Tight service-delivery times Relaxed service-delivery times 
Tight time standards  Customer satisfaction a priority 
Statistics driven Statistics modified  
by quality criteria 
Task cycle time short Task cycle time long 
High service volumes Low service volumes 
Low value of service High value of service 
Low level of discretion High level of discretion 
Nature of service - simple Nature of service – complex 
Mass service delivery Customisation 
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delivery within the OSS environment operates at both polarities. However, the 
research findings suggest that quantitative measurement dominates in the single-
window centres undermining qualitative assessment and, s a consequence, reducing 
customisation of the service. The OSS is a closely monitored system where each 
party (managers of the MJ and OSS, front-office andback-office staff) are working 
towards their own statistics rather than the overall better quality of service. 
Furthermore, the research findings reveal that the employees’ perceptions of service 
quality collide with quantity traditions of bureaucra y, which tend to locate public 
service operations according quantity dimensions rathe  than combination of quantity 
and quality characteristics. An important part in performance evaluation is missing 
such as tacit skills and interpretative knowledge of the front-line employees as well 
as customer satisfaction and organisational development.  
 
The penetration of ICT “further into the customer interface”, the extensive 
monitoring of employees’ actions, the simplification f query/response screen menu 
in the OSS computer system and the constant supervisory surveillance defined 
frontiers of managerial control in the OSS, in which the statistical measurement of 
performance was combined in various ways with subjectiv  evaluations of 
employees’ behaviour and facial expressions. A regular agenda issue during staff 
meetings was how to improve “quality”, which related to reducing the number of 
errors in accepting applications from customers, providing updated information on 
legislation, reducing length of service etc. “Quality” discussions led to an increasing 
standardisation and routinisation of the front-line work tasks. A typical directive 
relating to the application review within the protocol of staff meeting reads:  
 
Contact telephone number of the customer must be written at the end of the 
application. Copies of documents must be verified with originals.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the operators used a specially designed 
computer system, which provided information on servic  requirements, standards 
and legislation. Over time, the operators learnt to work rarely using this system as 
they managed to keep information in their memory. Not surprisingly, given the 
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pattern of routinisation, the work was experienced as monotonous. A range of 
responses from the front-line employees demonstrate this: 
 
The work is routine, every day is the same day.  
There is a lack of creativity, we have a ready list of answers to all possible 
questions.  
It is a rather technical job, you are not expected to show your intellectual 
abilities. 
 
One supervisor acknowledged the high degree of routinisa ion in the work by noting 
that “repetitive work may cause a decrease of attention to details”. The monotonous 
and repetitious nature of the work often led to staff towards the end of the day 
repeating questions absent-mindedly and mixing-up information. This highlights a 
problem for the front-line staff in really hearing and meeting customer needs.  
 
Both the front-line jobs, “consultant” and “operator”, involved customer service 
interaction, but differed in the extent of interaction and level of responsibility. As 
was described in the introductory chapter, the consultants provided information on 
the service procedures and helped clients in filling i  application forms. Normally, 
customers sat next to the consultants, talked about their problems seeking advice. 
Important observation was that the consultants were not monitored according to the 
quantitative targets, such as speed of service and number of clients, which enabled 
them to deliver a more personalised service. By contrast, being aware of the limited 
time allowed for each client and aiming at a high number of customers for better 
performance reports, the operators were under constant pressure to provide fast, 
rather than high-value, service. The work tasks of the consultants and operators also 
differed in the level of responsibility. The operator could correct a mistake done by 
the consultant by returning an incorrect application, whereas an error made by the 
operator would result in the refusal of processing application by the back-office staff 
in the stakeholder departments. Although both the consultants and operators were at 
the front-line of customer service and, at first sight, conducted similar job functions, 
the consultants were able to deliver more a personali ed service and have a more 
complex nature of interaction with clients, within more relaxed and longer service-
delivery time compared to the operators. The operators, being trapped within tight 
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service-delivery times, routinised task cycle, low discretion, and driven by statistics, 
had more straightforward customer interaction (accepting or rejecting an application) 
and delivered mass and non-personalised public services.  
 
When asked to reflect on the quality of service that e OSS provided, there turned 
out to be a striking difference between the managers and staff. While the managers 
were generally positive about the service quality and work progress, many 
employees were critical of their services. As the following quotes illustrate, the 
mutual commitment of the front-line staff has probably developed through practice 
and burnout: 
 
Some clients like elderly people need special treatm n . On the one hand, to 
meet time standard I need to give a rapid service, on the other hand, from an 
ethical viewpoint I need to spend more time with the client by talking about how 
they feel, what they need and how we can help them.  
 
There are contradictions in our performance measurement. Who provides 
measurement – citizens who are not always happy with the service when you are 
trying to help them and managers who tell you to speed up the service.  
 
They say that we need to be customer-orientated and this is self-rewarding to 
help people, but I would be much more satisfied if we had a better salary. 
 
The managers were well aware of the difficult labour exercised by the staff as 
illustrated in the following quote:  
 
To be honest there is a contradiction between service quality and availability of 
staff. This could be easily solved if we recruit more staff, but we can’t because 
of the limited budget. So we are left with the current system, and despite all the 
criticism, the system works, clients and government bodies have become used to 
one stop shops.  
 
This section reviewed quantity and quality characteristics of the public service which 
makes the work of the front-line customer service ev n more challenging and 
contradictory. In many ways the OSS became victims of the ambitions of the MJ. 
The pressure to match political promises in terms of cost and time saving capacity, 
and the growing market, trapped the single-window centres in a cycle of short-term 
thinking about results. The following discussion examines the ways that the 
 167 
utilisation of technologies in the single-window centr s aimed at strengthening 
centralised control.     
 
6.2.2 Use of Technologies in Strengthening Control  
 
The great advantage of service integration policy was partly due to the extensive use 
of new technologies and innovations. Different types of technologies adopted in the 
OSS aimed at service improvement and reducing the lev l of corruption, the ways 
they were utilised and the views of both managers and employees are considered in 
this section. The single-window centres across regions were connected to the 
corporate network via the Internet with the main system located in the MJ, a 
technological advantage not yet adopted in the majority of the traditional 
departments. The OSS managers used electronic means to end statistical 
performance reports and financial reports to the MJ. As was illustrated earlier in this 
chapter, the use of ICT enabled operators to speed-up the process of property 
registration through the integration of the databases among the OSS and Property 
Centre. With the political support of the MJ and technological support from the IT 
department and AIC, the OSS actively adopted new technologies and, therefore, 
were able to process applications from citizens and businesses more quickly than in 
the earlier practice.  
  
During this research project both case organisations were introducing a pilot coding 
system that attributed individual numbers to each application, which contained 
digital information on the type of service and deadline of service provision. The 
digital information was included in the electronic etwork system, called “Interactive 
Map of Documents Flow in the OSS”, which enabled operators to track the progress 
of application review in the OSS and stakeholder departments and get updated 
information on each document in terms of its current physical location (either in the 
front-office or back-office) and status of review (under review, rejected, or ready for 
issue). The link to the “Interactive Map of Documents Flow in the OSS” on the web-
site of the MJ that would enable clients to monitor the progress of their application 
online was still under construction by the end of this research project. For this 
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reason, I was not able to describe the use of this system in practice from a customer’s 
perspective.    
 
The OSS introduced a number of informational servics using technological means.    
The customers received a confirmation notice through SMS-messaging, automated 
calls to the fixed-line phones or by e-mail according to their preferences made. 
Remote regions in Kazakhstan still have limited access to fixed-line communication, 
whereas mobile penetration in the country has reached t e 100% mark and is 
constantly growing (Nuttall, 2009). Thus, the use of mobile technology has the 
potential of making public services more accessible for customers. In response to the 
public critique about limited access to the information, a pilot call-centre was 
introduced in the case study organisations in autumn 2008, with a vision to transfer 
their experience across regions at a later stage of policy development.    
   
The OSS were among the first public organisations t use an electronic signature to 
send official documents and authenticate them, an innovation that was later extended 
to other public services. It was envisaged that the corporate network of the OSS 
would integrate sectoral databases, particularly registration of citizens and 
registration of businesses. It was widely reported in the mass media that electronic 
information kiosks were introduced in Astana in autumn 2008 to deliver selected 
pilot services (for example, residence registration) in electronic format. However, 
during my last visit to the case study organisations in December 2009 information 
kiosks still did not work due to the technical problems.     
 
Another innovation to facilitate service integration was the recent adoption of the 
Law on the National Register and Identity Code. In the traditional practice the 
government bodies used their own numbers to identify citizens and entrepreneurs: 
tax bodies used registration tax numbers, labour departments - social identity codes, 
justice departments – identification codes etc. Sharing information about clients was 
constrained with different systems of customer identification used by the public 
sector organisations. In order to facilitate information exchange and integration of 
databases, a unified identity code was attributed to identify citizens and 
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entrepreneurs for several sectors. For example, the MJ, OSS and ALRM planned to 
combine electronic databases of land and property in order to reach maximum 
transparency in the issues of land distribution and the simplification of land 
registration. This database was expected to feature over three million land and 
property owners.  
 
The team of IT experts within the MJ played a signif cant role in promoting 
technological changes within the service integration policy framework. Talented, 
bright experts, aged 23-30, were recruited from business companies, banks and 
universities, and encouraged to transfer innovations from the business to the public 
sector. Young specialists were attracted to the MJ by the fact that they could initiate 
and implement innovations in practice, thus, developing their practical knowledge 
and skills. One IT manager explained the reasons for leaving the business sector with 
higher salaries and taking the job at the MJ in the following way:   
 
After graduation from the university I participated in the project on the 
introduction of the smart-card and call-centre technologies in the 
KazKommertsBank for two years which received several awards by Global 
Finance and Euromoney. Then, I was invited to the Ministry by my former 
colleague from the bank who became manager of the IT group there. It is 
fascinating to implement new methods of service delivery, and to see the impact 
on the speed of service. Our style of work here is very similar to that in the 
business sector as we work in small teams on products and services.  
 
Another respondent from IT department of the MJ pointed out that new technologies 
were not implemented in other government bodies to the extent that they were 
utilised within the OSS context.  
  
Zuboff (1988) described the use of ICT to record and locate the organisation’s 
activities as the textualisation of the organisation. She was optimistic that this would 
manifest as a site for learning rather than a behavioural control device, in her words, 
“informating” rather than automating. Textualisation happened on two levels in the 
OSS. First, processes were streamlined by the simultaneous creation of electronic 
records on staff performance. Second, client – staff interactions were recorded on 
video cameras. The electronic and video records on staff performance were 
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transferred online to the electronic system “Situatonal Centre” located in the central 
office of the MJ. The Situational Centre enabled the senior management of the MJ to 
get access to the updated information on service performance from the OSS in terms 
of the number of documents (accepted, rejected and delayed) and the average speed 
of service etc. Availability of the statistical data provided the opportunity to make 
comparisons among the single-window centres in quantitative terms. Moreover, this 
system enabled the observation of video recordings of customer service interactions. 
For example, by navigating on a selected picture on the screen, which showed 
several OSS in different regions at one time, the managers at the MJ were able to 
select and enlarge a picture, change areas of observation within selected OSS 
(customer service area or manager’s office) and listen to the recorded conversations 
of people. In this way personnel were located in a cycle of accountability which 
aimed to increase reliability, performance accuracy and reduce risks of corruption.  
 
The managers and front-line staff had contrasting views on the use of video 
recording in the workplace. The managers emphasised positive sides of using video 
recording to help in dealing with clients’ complaints and reduce corruption. As the 
managers commented on the use of video technology in the workplace setting:  
 
If a customer complains about impolite and rude behaviour of my employee, we 
would invite HR manager, customer and front-line worker to view the recording 
and discuss the situation. Clients don’t know that eir interactions with staff are 
recorded and often we can see on the screen that it was a customer who 
provoked the conflict situation. However, if our staff member was impolite, we 
would impose a disciplinary penalty and cut their bonus.   
 
Video recording helps to reduce bribe-seeking behaviour because employees 
know that their actions and conversations are recorded. 
 
However, video recording was perceived by the staff in both case study organisations 
as “unfair”, “breaking their human rights” due to the constant moral pressure and 
additional stress which led to shared resentment.   
 
We are under someone’s eye all the time, this distracts from our work. Most of 
my colleagues are honest people, and those few who take bribes, can continue 
their practice outside the office. Did they [managers] really think that video 
recording would combat corruption?!!  
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This is unfair towards us to monitor our behaviour and interactions all the time: 
you can’t relax, you should always have to think about your words. 
 
These comments illustrate how the front-line staff who found themselves under 
similar pressures, have learnt the contradictions, realised the organisational limits, 
and turned to their colleagues for support. Both the management and staff were 
aware of the fact that they were being observed, however, the customers did not 
know about this, thus, the use of this system raises serious ethical issues related to 
informed consent and data protection. Whether explicit or not, a threat was 
embedded for the front-line employees where each of them was constructed as an 
object of suspicion to be observed and monitored. The utilisation of video recording 
could be constructed positively, however, its use within OSS context as a control 
device implied a low trust regime and suggested a culture of defensiveness – “an 
organisation at war with itself.”  
 
Statistical performance data and video recording of the service interactions that was 
available through technological means strengthened power authorities of the MJ. In 
the previous practice the central government had to rely on the subjective reports of 
the public service organisations about their performance and was not able to verify 
information given the lack of electronic records. Now the government could have 
access through the Situational Centre to the information on the OSS and 
stakeholders’ performance, thus, promoting a myth of “perfect information” and total 
control. In fact, the research findings demonstrate that control was far from total. 
This research project provides much evidence of employees’ strategies to resist the 
prescribed routine. For example, the operators tried to keep service length short in 
order to satisfy tight time standard and risked leaving clients’ problems unsolved, 
resulting in customers having to come again and again. This behaviour brings into 
question the “totalness of control”. Many examples of public complaints were 
observed in the case study organisations as a response t  such behaviour. Thus, while 
monitoring is framed as a developmental activity, i also takes the form of an 
organisational defence routine (Argyris and Schon, 1978a).  
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One of the goals of service integration policy was making public service more 
orientated to the customers’ needs and expectations. Sturdy (1998) reports employee 
frustration when systems force them to work against cu omers’ interests. As the ICT 
infrastructure set the context and content of what can and cannot be done in the OSS, 
the front-line employees were frequently prevented from responding to non-routine 
needs, and providing efficient and individualised customer service. Causes for 
customers’ complaints were often justified driven largely by an inflexible system of 
strict hierarchy that was unable to cope with exceptions without agreement by the 
senior management. Inevitably, the front-line workers absorbed and smoothed the 
resulting customer frustrations. Behind the “veil” of efficiency and control, there was 
a black hole. The personnel were not given the scope t  use their discretion to solve 
problems following the traditional bureaucratic pattern. Despite intentions of 
customer orientation, this reflects inherent system brittleness and core rigidity. As 
one operator commented: 
 
The fact that I can’t do anything to help the customer, makes me feel bad, I feel  
incompetent, though I am not […] The top-managers in the Ministry have big 
ideas, but they are too distant from reality […] They don’t understand how it 
should be done […] 
 
From the management perspective, the monitoring of performance was constructed 
as a supportive and developmental process. At the local level it was often with 
supervisors working with employees to improve their statistics from the point of 
view of personal gains in terms of appraisal grades. However, the dual function was 
close to the surface. The senior management at the MJ was increasingly distanced 
from the lessons of the bottom level, with the presence of OSS managers and 
supervisors, as buffers absorbing problems, and tight control systems which inhibited 
reflection. The simulated reality was far from the accuracy, reliability and 
completeness attributed to it.  
 
The OSS was a closely monitored system, and managers w re always looking at, 
checking reports and analysing performance. This raises issues of what they were 
looking at. Were they counting the countable, rather than what needed to be 
understood? Statistical data could be taken from computer systems on any 
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measurable aspects of activity, giving the impression of complete control. The main 
focus was on measurable outcomes: speed of service, number of services provided 
etc. Additionally measured were factors such as peronnel turnover rates, time off the 
front desk. But how did these figures explain the reasons behind these issues? The 
managers in the MJ were distanced from the front-line reality and relied on the 
virtual lenses of statistics. This meant that much information was being absorbed and 
hidden. Furthermore, measurement suffered from being retrospective and inward 
looking. As one operator put it:  
 
[…] so poor quality results come and they want us to improve quality again, and 
the next month they’re going to talk about long length of service and 
complaining customers, and the quality is gone again. I think instead of telling us 
about the  wrong things done in the past month, we should be more proactive of 
what could be improved next month […] It’s our managers and we, staff, who 
suffer […] 
 
A common theme in the responses of the staff members concerned the OSS’ inability 
to provide a safety net for developing professionalism. This realisation was 
expressed by the front-line employees through two main aspects:  
1. the failure of managers to provide practical solutins to the contradictions 
that staff experienced; and  
2. the failure of organisational technologies to support the goals of the 
organisation.   
 
This two-fold disillusion is captured in the following quote by the employee:   
 
You know what we are doing? We look at the computer system which tells us 
what documents are needed for this particular servic , we accept the application 
and send it to the chancellery, that’s all. It’s quite a technical work where you 
don’t develop professional skills. I don’t know why but we can’t use e-mail in 
communication with colleagues from other OSS, MJ and government bodies.   
  
An important part in realising the organisational limits was the accumulative impact 
of technological deficiencies as perceived by the staff. Many respondents mentioned 
the computer software specially designed for the single-window centres in order to 
illustrate this issue. The directory was originally developed as a constantly updated 
online manual of service descriptions, checklist of documents for submission, 
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standards and regulations, service flowcharts and triffs. Moreover, it was envisaged 
that the OSS computer system would deliver e-learning opportunities for staff 
members irrespective of their location in the country. In that sense the directory 
represented an attempt to formalise, standardise and stimulate organisational 
learning. However, the staff expressed concerns that the OSS computer system was 
too mechanistic and technical. In fact, it was not updated regularly following recent 
legal amendments. Given the shortage of funding the MJ decided that this system 
would be installed in the office computers at the OSS rather than being accessible 
online for a temporary period of time. As one employee said: 
 
For simple and frequent services you don’t use the database because you 
remember the checklist of documents by heart, so why bother searching on the 
screen which takes time. In the case of complex services, like property 
registration, you would check with the computer system. […] The legal database 
is outdated, and if we can’t find the required legislation, we would ask senior 
colleagues.  
 
Thus, when facing difficult issues the front-line staff relied on social networks by 
seeking advice from more experienced colleagues. The coaching method of work 
was actively used to transfer knowledge from the “vterans” to the new recruits. The 
operators summarised it in the following way:    
 
[…] It would be more useful if we had opportunity to ask questions, for 
example, by e-mail from our colleagues in the government bodies. But we have 
no communication with them so we rely on the database content, personal 
experience and advice from senior colleagues. […]  
 
The views of the managers regarding Internet access for taff were different. The 
“traditional managers” did not support this as they were concerned that Internet 
would distract the employees from work and have negative impact on the overall 
performance of the organisation. The “technological m nagers” were enthusiastic 
about opening new opportunities for staff related to Internet access in terms of 
improving communication among colleagues from other single-window centres and 
stakeholder departments.   
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This section illustrated that in the OSS context the culture of control intensified down 
through organisational levels, based on institutionalised self-protection and defensive 
behaviour. Although new technologies and innovations have improved the speed of 
some services, they have also strengthened centralised control and power over OSS 
in the coordinating authority. The overriding focus in the performance control system 
was on quantitative goals. The easiest things to measur  and quantify had been 
selected that were overt and obvious – surface behaviours and skills. However, the 
important parts were missing, such as tacit skills and the interpretative knowledge of 
the front-line staff. In assessing overall performance, the OSS used only statistics 
without measuring customer satisfaction and organisational development. The 
operators worked without any qualitative feedback beyond being able to check their 
statistics. The measurement philosophy was based on the reductionism that only 
what could be measured could be done, which ignored many crucial things beyond 
measurement. The next section continues the discussion of the managerial practices 
in the single-window centres by focusing on the physical environment as a means of 
control.   
 
6.2.3 Physical Environment as a Means of Visual Sur veillance                        
 
Modern and business-like office facilities have thepotential to encourage employee 
accommodation in the labour process. However, the res arch findings from both case 
study sites suggested that office design was capable of promoting individual and 
collective resistance. Despite the better physical environment of the OSS offices 
compared to those at the traditional departments, the personnel seemed to attribute a 
lack of productivity to inadequate working conditions. 
  
Management could take into account our needs. If they would give us a more 
comfortable environment, we will be able to work more effectively, but we have 
little chance[…] At my previous jobs I always had my own desk and phone calls, 
and things like that, and I was able to move freely without being watched.  
 
This comment also illustrates how the physical environment may be utilised to give 
tangible expressions for a desire for greater control over the work process (“my own 
desk and phone calls”).  
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After the Soviet Union collapse, many public buildings were privatised and used for 
commercial purposes. One such building, a three-storied former nursery was bought 
from the business company and renovated specially for the OSS-1. In the case of 
OSS-2 it was based in the new, modern building. As was described in the 
introductory chapter, both offices were located in the densely populated parts of the 
city, had open-plan design and decorated in a blue colour. At both sites the 
employees had no control over lighting, heating andir-conditioning. Overall, the 
office design and furniture were similar in both case study organisations.                           
 
Over time buildings come to represent their organisations and have the effect of 
helping people construct what they think and feel about the organisation (Hatch, 
1997: 253). The evidence from the case study sites suggests that overcrowded 
buildings, especially at the early stage of policy implementation, contributed to staff 
discontent. The management were aware of physical environment issues. The 
manager of OSS-1 explained the importance of physical environment facilities:  
 
When we opened, a team from the Ministry came to design office according to 
the uniform standards so that OSS would be recognised by the customers across 
the country. They made a really good office! 
 
The above quote was confirmed by the statement of his colleague from the OSS-2: 
 
We wanted our customers to see that the government has really improved 
conditions for service provision. There is a huge difference between the past 
experience of getting service in a government department and now when you 
enter bright, modern and clean buildings, now our clients feel respected. A nice 
environment also makes our staff feel happy.  
 
The management’s claim that “a nice environment makes staff feel happy” was only 
partially confirmed by the employees. All staff interviewed liked the modern 
physical conditions of the workplace, however, there were several critical comments 
regarding the environment: 
 
We don’t have our own space, desks, we have to share everything with 
colleagues from the next shift, which is inconvenient.  
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It’s cold during winter because of the lack of heating. Some days we have to 
wear warm jumpers on the uniform. It’s hot during summer due to the poor 
airconditioning […] And we don’t’ have enough toilets […] one for staff and 
one for clients, that’s not enough. […] We have no ro m to sit and talk during 
breaks, have a cup of tea and relax.  
 
Hot-desking or, in management speak, “non-territorial offices” refers to an employee 
working from whatever desk is available. The practice offers employers a flexible 
landscape with a number of advantages: sites can be physically smaller with resultant 
savings in utilities costs, equipment needs are fewer and capital is in constant use. As 
the OSS had staff working on two shifts, it was uneconomic to lock up a desk for 
every employee. The managers believed that hot-desking not only permitted 
operational flexibility, but also facilitated employer’s control. It made it difficult for 
the staff to work consistently with the same group of people. However, the 
employees were preoccupied with the personal implications of not having an 
individualised workspace that they could personalise, particularly among female 
staff. 
 
As the employees changed desks constantly, it was impossible for them to decorate 
their workstations with personal items such as photographs thereby demonstrating 
“ownership” of a particular space. Implicit in comments about the lack of a staff 
common room was an attitude of hidden resistance to managerial control. The 
personnel perceived management to be attempting to make them work harder by 
removing all distractions or assuming that their work effort would decline if they 
were provided with a common room. “It’s a pity that we can’t meet informally within 
the office”, said one operator, who added that although she would not go there when 
she was busy, it would occasionally be nice to chat with colleagues in a relaxed 
environment.  
 
When commenting on the discontent at the OSS, another employee said:  
 
OSS has a nice modern building, it attracts people. As you start to work here, 
you realise that some of the gloss is just appearance.  
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This comment points to the potential of even a “nice, modern” environment to 
promote dissatisfaction. External appearances may give rise to the expectation that 
the work itself will be equally pleasant. Both case study organisations consist of 
large, open-plan rooms with desks arranged along the front-line. The separated 
spaces were offices for the management and administrative staff. The managers 
enjoyed the luxury of a private space, another indicator of power and authority. The 
open-plan layout of the offices was not designed with a view to assisting staff 
communication. As one of the managers put it: 
  
It’s a big area with a lot of people, but it’s not the sort of job where you can talk 
to the colleague beside you if you are serving a client.  
 
However, the staff managed to talk with each other while they were waiting for the 
next customer and during short breaks. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the 
consultants had more flexibility to talk as their performance was not timed and 
strictly monitored as the operators’ performance. The open-plan environment 
enabled the supervisors to see what the front-line employees were doing at all times: 
who was serving a customer, who was talking with a colleague. The open-planning 
removed the closed or private spaces in which staff could hide or talk privately. 
During lunch time the staff usually went to the nearest café where they enjoyed 
freedom of talk.  The supervisors were often too busy to see everything that went on, 
even if they wished to. Moreover, the supervisors could themselves be seen at all 
times. One supervisor remarked that all supervisors managed in slightly different 
ways. She went on to say that sometimes it was easier to gnore problems: 
 
I can tell the staff if something was wrong with serving a customer, but when it 
comes to communication among colleagues […] It’s hard to make a comment, 
we all want to talk. I suppose the staff are looking at me and thinking “What is 
she doing?”[…] everybody is watching everybody.  
 
In the OSS-2 separate offices were allocated to the sup rvisors so they could discuss 
some issues in private with staff and avoid constant observation and being observed. 
However, the supervisor had a view that their constant presence signalled that 
employees were being monitored, and that management was approachable. For 
example, if a client raised concerns about the corre tness of the application 
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registration, his/her complaint was immediately passed onto a supervisor. However, 
the supervisor’s comment that openness facilitated th  ability of staff to approach 
management should be assessed in the context of hersubsequent observation that “if 
you want to talk with someone about why they are lat  for work, you can just walk to 
the next desk and do it.” However, a supervisor’s visibility had two sides. The front-
line staff believed that supervisor’s presence in the open-plan office provided 
opportunities and legitimacy for them to query management decisions. Thus, there 
was a blurring between resistance and accommodation.  
 
A desire to inhibit collective organisation appeared to influence the layout of the 
OSS. There was no space for staff to meet privately. Research by others (for 
example, Hatch: 1997) has suggested that the lack of private workspace impedes the 
ability of workers to discuss common concerns and thereby hinders collective 
organisation. Lack of space and privacy may hinder collective organisation but may 
also generate solidarity. The staff could see their colleagues performing the same 
tasks under the same conditions, and were able to se when colleagues were upset. 
The interaction between the staff and the clients was to some extent common 
property: the employees could see and hear what was occurring and that gave rise to 
a strong sense of community. Some employees had known each other before 
recruitment at the OSS: they might have worked together in the same organisation. 
For example, one operator explained that she came to the OSS because her manager 
got a job here and invited her. In this instance, community ties had provided the 
precondition for workers to join together.  
 
This section explored perceptions of the managers and employees of the physical 
environment and its impact on the nature of interactions between managers, 
supervisors and staff as well as amongst employees. The evidence from the case 
study organisations suggests that, despite the modern and business-like physical 
environment created in the single-window centres, it was capable of promoting 
individual and collective resistance. Dissimilarities in the managerial staff and 
employees’ responses to the built environment in both sites were not always 
attributable to the physical differences. The diverse reactions to the built 
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environment indicated the importance to the front-li e staff of a sense of control over 
their environment, whether it was for reasons of comfort, health, fairness, equity, or 
personal space. It would seem that employees’ percetions of autonomy and dignity 
exerted a significant influence in shaping struggles over the built environment. The 
open-plan design of the OSS facilitated surveillance by removing private spaces in 
which resistance might develop. The managers saw in hot-desking a means not only 
of maximising return on investment but also of breaking down worker discontent. 
Although the lack of a common room and private workspace made it difficult for the 
staff to discuss common concerns and thereby hindered collective organisation, these 
factors served to generate solidarity because the employees could see that their 
discontentment was shared by their colleagues.  
 
Unlike customer service or statistical monitoring, which might call into question an 
individual’s abilities, the front-line employees were unlikely to be held accountable 
for the shortcomings of the physical environment in which they worked. While they 
might accommodate to indispensable elements of customer service work such as 
repetition and monotony, they were less likely to accept shortcomings in their 
physical surroundings. It was difficult for the managerial staff to rationalise away a 
desk or chair that was inconvenient. Struggles that focused on the built environment 
may be a reflection of broader, less tangible conflicts. The advantage of the physical 
environment as an arena for resistance lay in its visibility and measurability.           
 
6.3 SUMMARY  
 
This chapter considered several important issues. First, power dimensions within the 
OSS policy context were analysed by exploring the nature of the relationships among 
three groups of actors: 1) management staff from the MJ, OSS and stakeholder 
departments; 2) OSS managers and front-line employees; and 3) front-office and 
back-office personnel. In particular, this chapter analysed how the relationships 
between the traditional bureaucrats and customer-ori nted bureaucracy transformed 
from initial resistance towards cooperation on the design and delivery of joined-up 
services. Secondly, this chapter examined the control system and managerial 
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practices adopted within the single-window centres with particular emphasis on the 
use of technologies and physical environment as a me ns of control. It discussed the 
contradictory dilemma of quantitative and qualitative aspects of public services faced 
by the front-line personnel.  
 
The research findings suggest that the OSS followed th  pattern of hierarchy and 
centralised control by transferring the culture from the traditional bureaucracy into a 
new public sector organisation. Although formally the single-window centres 
received high-level political support, their own budgets, personnel and authorities to 
manage joined-up service provision, in practice they played the role of the ministerial 
branches following to the strict directives of the c ntral management. The OSS 
managers were not expected to initiate changes in service delivery or build 
partnerships with the new service providers unless the MJ provided agreement.    
 
Whilst the technology is increasingly “fit for purpose” at the single-window centres, 
the research evidence indicated that success or failure of the service integration 
policy was less a technological issue and more a people issue - in particular, the 
ability of the government to change traditional working practices and overcome 
bureaucracy. Both case study organisations represented highly routinised workflows 
where the front-line employees exercised very little control over key aspects of task 
performance. These workflows approximated very closely to the ideal characteristics 
of “quantity” outlined in Table 10. Targets, whether xplicit or normative, were 
applied, and sustained efforts were made to measure employees’ output and 
performance including managerial initiatives aimed at assessing the quality of 
customer service interaction. This last point is important as some writers assume that 
the management’s ability to measure service workers’ outputs is limited especially 
“insofar as service work encompasses aspects of quality in addition to productivity” 
(Frenkel et al., 1999: 139). In the case of OSS quantitative rather than qualitative 
criteria were employed in the evaluation of customer s rvice interactions. The 
majority of the employees expressed a general lack of control over key aspects of 
their job, perceiving task performance to be highly routinised. In other words, the 
degree of “customisation” was limited and highly constrained by the managerial 
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imperatives. In both case study organisations major initiatives from the central 
ministry to intensify monitoring and introduce tight targets were introduced. Rather 
than moving towards greater customisation, the OSS prioritised the imperative of 
cost minimisation and greater centralised control. The consequences involved the 
further growth of routinisation and intensification, although it was possible that a 
minority of the staff might enjoy higher levels of discretion and creative 
responsibility.  
 
The OSS were rooted in contradictory tensions and structural paradoxes, and 
confronted a number of trade-offs on that basis. These set a context for attitudes 
towards the organisation and could impose conflicting role requirements on the front-
line jobs. A core example was that of the pressure for quantity versus the aspiration 
for quality, the guiding logic of which was trying to get closer to the customer while 
routinising, centralising, reducing costs and prescribing standards. As an OSS 
manager put it:  
 
You can have all the quality and communication skill , but what good it is, if the 
customer from remote villages can’t get access to staff?  
 
This was a common issue for the OSS which by their v ry presence stimulated 
service volume. As the employees were measured on the number of clients and 
services provided, the pressure to push through services was passed down the 
system. As the customer queues built, the “service waiting time” indicators 
increased, and the personnel were aware that clients would be frustrated when they 
finally did get through, a factor that served to reduce service quality.  
 
The Kazakhstani system has a centralised nature and its control occurs on an 
administrative basis, where performance measures are regarded both as a threat and 
interference in administration as well as colliding with paternalistic and personalistic 
values. The selection and adoption of technologies lik  “Situational Centre” which 
enabled them to monitor statistical performance andrecord service interactions, 
behaviour and conversations of the managers and frot-line personnel illustrates an 
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example of how the bureaucratic machine managed to strengthen centralised control 
and impose a threat over the OSS staff across the regions.     
 
Concepts of clear targets, performance indicators and responsibility through 
performance mechanisms collide with a culture that is strongly influenced by legal 
control and the traditional administrative procedures. The OSS operated without 
clear performance measures or established targets. Thu , the link between resources 
and results, which is a central element of NPM reform, has limited impact in the 
Kazakhstani case. The OSS have not borrowed these features from NPM. The OSS 
managers were not “free to manage” within their own spheres of responsibilities, but 
under discretionary control from the senior officials of the MJ who could intervene in 
almost all areas of service management.  
 
Although customer service organisations have attracted considerable academic 
attention, one aspect has been largely ignored: the role of the physical environment 
both in enabling managerial control and its utilisation by employees to resist and 
accommodate that control. In the context of the Kazakhstani single-window centres 
the built environment was not a neutral space but, like working hours and wages, was 
“contested terrain”. The contest was not confined solely to the work processes that 
took place within the OSS, but extended to the physical attributes of the workspace 
itself. This research has examined how the design of the OSS not only facilitated 
managerial control but also generated employee resistance and accommodation. 
Although the employees might find the repetitive and stressful nature of service work 
of greater concern than the built environment, the angibility of the physical 
workspace made it a focus of resistance. Whereas the taff might be held responsible 
for work performance deficiencies, the managers could not blame them for 
deficiencies in the physical environment without also rendering themselves liable to 
criticism. Therefore, the front-line staff might displace dissatisfaction with working 
conditions into the built environment because it provided a safer, less contestable 
ground than resistance to other forms of control. This chapter has examined how the 
physical environment (the building, layout, furniture, equipment, design) and the 
ambient environment (lighting, temperature), while promoting managerial control, 
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also provoked resistance and accommodation in the workforce. It has suggested that 
the employees might deliberately exploit concerns about the environment as a tool to 
resist control. The following chapter presents an analysis of the personnel policies in 
the single-window centres with particular emphasis on selection, recruitment and 
training policies as well as gendered divisions among the staff. 
 
7. PERSONNEL POLICY: TENSIONS AND 
CONTRADICTIONS   
 
This chapter examines the development of the “communities of practice” (CoP) 
among the front-line employees for a better understanding of the challenges faced in 
the process of service integration. Organisational cu ture of the case study 
organisations is viewed in this work as based on two different categories, which are 
not necessarily integrative: managerial culture andworkplace culture (Raz, 2002). 
The first category, managerial culture, designates the perceptions of the OSS 
managers and its top-down messages, systems and norms. The second category, 
workplace culture, encompasses the everyday practices of organisational life as seen 
from the staff members’ points of view. The evidenc from case study organisations 
suggests that the workplace culture provides room fr the front-line employees’ 
subversion of managerial control. The development of CoPs is considered against the 
background of personnel management practices, cultural contradictions and 
emotional labour performed by the front-line staff. This chapter starts with analysis 
of personnel management policies: selection, recruitment and training. It then 
explores the role of gendered divisions among the saff in the formation of social 
competencies required for intensive customer servic.      
 
7.1 SKILLS REQUIRED FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE   
 
This section considers the recruitment policies within he single-window centres with 
particular focus on the processes of selection and recruitment of the front-line 
employees. The processes of selection and recruitment for managerial and front-line 
positions followed different approaches. As was mentioned in Chapters 4 and 6, most 
OSS managers had worked in the local departments of justice before, and had 
professional and personal connections with the politica  management of the MJ. In 
the corrupt culture of the Kazakhstani public sector the position of the OSS manager 
was attractive for many government officials given the opportunity it presented to get 
access to illegal payments from customers as well as career prospects. There was no 
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open advertising for managerial jobs: information on vacancies was passed through 
“word of mouth” among government officials. Candidate’s selection for a managerial 
post at the OSS depended on the authority and status of the person who 
recommended him or her and/or the amount of payment to get this position. There 
were a series of publications in local mass media about the resistance of the front-
line staff to the appointment of young university graduates to the managerial jobs at 
the OSS who lacked necessary knowledge, experience and professionalism 
(Akhmetova, 2007). Another example is a former manager of the OSS in Astana, a 
26 year old, who within three years had had rapid career development, from the role 
of postal courier to adviser to the General Secretary of the MJ, and then to the 
managerial position at the OSS, due to his close relations with the General Secretary. 
Under the pressure of critical mass media publications and an investigation by the 
Financial Police, which revealed his relation to the illegal transfer of funds to foreign 
banks, this manager was rotated to the position of the Head for Control and 
Monitoring Department within the MJ.  
 
The senior managers of the MJ were powerful figures since they could have access to 
the distribution of tangibles – jobs, contracts, tend rs – and, through development of 
these resources could build and maintain their personal clientele. In principle, the 
greater the resources controlled, the more powerful the patron (Cummings, 2005). In 
the OSS context the key patron was the former Minister of Justice, Mrs. Zagipa 
Baliyeva, who promoted staff members to the manageri l positions of the OSS, in 
some cases based on their qualification and experience, in other cases based on the 
family relations, nepotism and corruption. During this research project, I met several 
OSS managers with many years of experience in the public sector, excellent 
communication and management skills, who were enthusiastic about service quality 
initiatives. However, in order to become the OSS managers they had to get support 
from the political management of the MJ. Hence, reliance on informal power and 
relations through mutual obligation personalised the regime and placed patronage 
and nepotism at the centre of OSS recruitment policy for management positions. By 
contrast, the selection process for low-rank, front-line jobs was transparent and skill-
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based. The selection process for front-office positions consisted of the following 
stages:  
• job specification designed;  
• appropriate recruitment channel selected;  
• application forms collected;  
• interviews conducted, and, finally,  
• job offers made.  
 
The key focus of recruitment, from the view of the managers, was to find the “right 
fit” of employees for such a “high stress” environment. Advertising for front-line 
jobs was performed through daily newspapers, job fairs or unemployed people and 
university graduates. Geary’s (1994) notion of the young worker is a depiction of a 
typical front-line employee, who is in her or his early 20s and likely to be a graduate, 
some with postgraduate degrees. There was a disproportionate number of females, 
who constituted 80 percent of the total number of sta f. The front-office employees 
were considered to be “multi-skilled” as they were expected to provide a large 
number of services irrespective of the nature of servic : legal, land, tax or military 
registration. The OSS were the first public sector organisation in Kazakhstan which 
aimed at integrating services traditionally separated by professional and 
organisational boundaries. The diversity of policies and procedures that flowed from 
stakeholders meant that it was difficult to identify the existence of one clear set of 
policies. The development of service standards and regulations on each service was 
implemented through extensive negotiations and training sessions for front-office 
and back-office staff. The huge volumes of complex procedures, which led to 
contradictory interpretations of the policies by the service providers, were adapted 
into clear, user-friendly and transparent guidelines with information on application 
requirements, speed of service and service fees. Specially designed computer 
systems, which contained service standards and regulations, became available from 




The OSS managers believed that the front-line staff required a particular mix of 
skills. This was less based on technical abilities (such as computer skills), but more 
on social competencies that were more difficult to identify, yet crucial to customer 
service work. As Figure 9 illustrates, the recruitment process was designed to assess 
applicants in two areas: social and technical skills.  
 













Technical skills included basic computer knowledge, such as keyboard, navigational 
and computer literacy skills. Social skills were more difficult to define and contained 
diversity of necessary skills required for a front-li e worker in the view of the OSS 
managers such as communication skills, positive attitude, sense of humour, 
teamwork and ability to work under pressure and stres . Initially, the managers had a 
recruitment goal of attracting large number of applicants focusing entirely on 
technical skills. However, this approach proved to be ineffective, as the managers 
commented in the interviews.  
 
Initially we didn’t pay attention to the personality type of potential employees as 
long as they had education and were able to work on the computer. But that 
didn’t prove enough. […] One has to be morally strong to be able to constantly 
interact with so many people every day and able to work in a team with 
colleagues. […] New entrants may not have university degree, college education 
is enough for this type of job, but if they want to learn and have excellent 





Social skills  
(communication, positive 
attitude, sense of 
humour, teamwork, 
ability to deal with 
pressure and stress) 
Service provision   
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Many new recruits couldn’t cope with the constant psychological pressure to 
have customer interactions all day. […] Most clients are ok, but it is hard to 
provide service to difficult customers: some are aggressive, impolite and rude. 
You need to be morally strong to work in the OSS. […]   
  
The staff played a critical role in the management of customer relationships. As a 
consequence, the managers had gradually paid more attention to intangible qualities 
within the person, such as an applicant’s adaptability, teamwork skills, self-
confidence and degree of optimism to the existing organisational culture. There is a 
growing body of literature that recognises the “person centred” approach to finding 
the attitude to match the organisation, rather than the skills to match the tasks 
(Alvesson and Willmott, 2002; Callaghan and Thompson, 2002). The Kazakhstani 
OSS represented a middle ground. Finding a person with the attitude and values that 
matched the organisation’s culture was considered important. However, equally as 
important, was finding a person with a range of skill  required to perform adequately 
in the customer service environment. As Figure 9 shows, these skills included a 
combination of technical and social skills.   
 
There was no requirement for job applicants to have prior experience of direct 
customer-contact jobs. A law degree was preferable but not compulsory. The core 
criteria for a front-line employee selection were social skills, personality 
characteristics, and specific abilities, such as an ability to be part of a team. The 
managers were looking for certain personality traits, one of which was a “positive 
attitude”: 
 
It is important to have a positive attitude with peo le to work here. That means 
being patient and friendly towards customers, being supportive to colleagues. If 
someone generally dislikes to communicate with people, we openly say that this 
job is not for him or her. Either you have positive attitude or not, you can’t teach 
it.  
 
Honestly, I don’t pay too much attention to the computer skills of the potential 
applicant. This is what can be learnt during the work process, on training 
courses. […] What is difficult to change is someone’s attitudes, values. Front-
line employees should not be indifferent towards clients.  
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Social skills were given priority in the recruitment process. To the management good 
customer service required a positive attitude and, importantly, this could not be 
taught, it was a part of someone’s personality. In the first quote the manager did not 
see a “positive attitude” as a learned ability, “you can’t teach it”, while the second 
manager was less concerned with technical competenci s, where training could be 
provided, than with possessing the necessary attitude.  
 
Although the managers interviewed were very keen to point out that they did not 
discriminate when recruiting employees, it was generally acknowledged that women 
were more likely than men to hold the types of communication skills required in the 
customer service environment. Indeed, this perception was also shared by most of the 
staff. Women were seen as better able to handle the in eractive aspect of the job. 
They were generally perceived to be more “lively” and “chatty” with the customers, 
as well as more highly skilled at building rapport ver face-to-face interaction, as 
two managers explained:  
 
Girls are more lively and keen on talking and it definitely works in this job.  
 
Women by their nature are much more conversational, men are much more to the 
point, they just want to get the job done.  
 
In addition, women were perceived to be more comfortable with the ethics of 
customer service, and particularly skilled at listening and empathising with 
customers. They were also deemed to be more tolerant with the more difficult 
customers and less likely to react aggressively to difficult customers. It was 
frequently stated by the participants that these kinds of communication skills came 
“naturally” to women, as the following quotation byan operator illustrates: 
 
I think women seem to have a lot more patience, we are able to calm down our 
clients, male staff can also calm down difficult customers, but women seem to 
do it more and they are more natural at it.  
 
In summary, women were recruited by the managers in part because they were 
deemed to “naturally” possess the kinds of communication skills required. The 
managers expected women to perform “emotional labour” over face-to-face 
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interaction, and they actively used femininity in order to secure this advantage. The 
front-line employees were required to show observable facial and bodily displays, to 
empathise with their customers, manage the tone of their voice and control their 
emotions while servicing potentially difficult customers. Thus, the managers were 
obliged to find employees who could “micro-self manage” (Wray-Bliss, 2001: 42) a 
complex mix of skills and competencies including emotional labour. An important 
observation of this research project was that sustained contact with customers with 
few opportunities to vary the pace of work and the nature of the tasks often resulted 
in stress and emotional labour, especially among femal  workers who were expected 
to be more tolerant to the offensive behaviour of clients. One manager comments:  
 
The job is hard and some employees can be quite emotional in reacting to the 
customers’ criticisms. […] Sometimes girls cry […] especially at the start of 
their work here, then they get used to it and learn not to pay attention to all of 
this stuff. I understand them, it’s emotionally stre sful work.    
 
The other characteristic that emerged in the interviews with the participants was a 
sense of humour. The prospective applicants were not told that a sense of humour 
was one of the necessary attitudes; this aspect had arisen during discussions with 
managers who gave examples of how humour was used by the front-line staff: 
 
There are various types of customers and during work experience the staff learn 
how to behave and react in different life situations. For example, some 
customers make jokes and flirt with female workers, in such cases girls do not 
need to take it seriously. Customers are people and they bring their personalities 
into the conversations.  
 
This quote shows that not only was it advantageous f r employees to possess a sense 
of humour, it was equally important that they knew when to use this humour. They 
had to “read” the conversation and decide when it was appropriate to engage in them. 
Interviews with managers show that quality service was also dependent on the ability 
to act as a “team player”. This means fitting into the group and demonstrating a 
willingness to share knowledge and time in problem solving. Thus, the managers 




We are a small organisation so for us it is important hat new employees will be 
able to join our team, to share team spirit. Ability to work in the team includes 
willingness to support your colleagues, share your experiences and achieve 
success together with other members of staff.  
 
The managers relied on the commitment and motivation of their employees, and one 
way in which the OSS aimed to ensure that they achieved this was through the use of 
team working strategies. In the OSS context team working did not involve employees 
working collectively on a range of tasks and sharing decision-making with other 
group members. Rather, the front-line employees spent th  vast majority of their day 
working in isolation from their colleagues. However, they were grouped into teams 
on the shift basis, usually of around 15-20 people, and worked towards shared 
service targets. A strong emphasis was also placed on building a sense of collectivity 
amongst employees. Many of the employees interviewed commented on the strength 
of the “team spirit” and the informal culture in their organisations.  
 
When I came here the first thing I noticed was the atmosphere: staff are very 
supportive of each other which is different from what I’ve been used to in the 
civil service where people are in strong competition. 
 
Although the OSS were highly controlled working environments, as was described in 
Chapter 6, the front-line employees did find the time and space to talk to their 
colleagues both inside and outside of the workplace, s one supervisor explained: 
 
The staff members interact with each other and I suppose it’s partly because they 
are very young, most of them are 22-27 years old and active.  
 
The responsibility for developing and maintaining the sense of team spirit in the OSS 
environment was usually held by the supervisors. Indeed, the supervisors interviewed 
were keen to stress that the main part of their job involved motivating people, and the 
key way in which this was achieved was by ensuring that all front-line workers were 
“integrated into the team”. In order to do this they were expected to develop strong 
personal relations with their team members. It was generally agreed that it was a vital 
requirement that the supervisors as team leaders pos essed strong “team working 
skills”, particularly the ability to understand, communicate with, motivate, coach and 
provide support to others, in order to perform their jobs effectively. Only females 
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were represented in supervisor roles in both case study organisations. The managers 
and staff felt that women were more likely than men to possess the sort of “team 
working skills” required for supervisor roles. As the managers explained:  
 
Women have more understanding, more empathy towards people. These are the 
sorts of skills that you need in the OSS, like coaching and so on.  
 
It’s a natural instinct for women to look after and care for people. Men are more 
aggressive, individualistic, more likely to make peo le to do the task rather than 
encourage them.  
 
Gendered dimensions within the customer service enviro ment are discussed in more 
detail in the following section. Thus, the combinaton of positive attitude, humour, 
ability to work in a team and perform emotional labour were seen by the managers as 
being crucial to selection of applicants: 
 
I think that communication skills are the most important. […] The difference 
between what employees in the government bodies do an  what people at the 
front-line desk do is down to their personality, their communication skills. […] 
Why do customers choose to apply for service through OSS rather than directly 
through government bodies? It’s all about how the staff communicate with that 
customer. We have to have excellent communication skills.  
 
The priorities of recruitment emerge strongly from this quote. Personality and 
communication skills were the crucial differentiating qualities. In comparing 
managerial and employee perceptions, the most consiste t themes to emerge from 
the question, “what kind of skills do you think are n cessary to do this job?”, were 
patience, listening, flexibility and emotional self-management. Therefore, the 
interviews with the front-line staff revealed some continuity with management on 
perceptions of skill requirements. In particular, there was common ground that social 
rather than technical competencies and knowledge wer primary. But the emphasis 
was often different. The personnel were much more lik ly to associate job 
requirements with surviving stressful and repetitive work, rather than applying a 





You need to be very, very patient with the customer […] You may need to repeat 
what you have just explained for a second, or even third time. 
 
You must remember that the client is always right. You have to take a deep 
breath, when the customer irritates you. […] I have be n here for six months and 
it’s very stressful.  
 
However, the difference between management and employees might be less than it 
appeared. The managers were well aware of stressful nat re of front-line work and 
responded to that: 
 
There is little variety in the job: it’s one customer after another, all day long, 
sometimes clients with difficult personalities. […] The challenge is to treat each 
customer differently as clients are different. Here th  challenge comes. You have 
to have energy to last the six hour shift. You have to njoy communicating with 
clients and have a belief in customer service.     
 
There appears to be a double paradox about the OSS experience of selecting and 
shaping its labour force. Iles (1999: 20) says that“Work no longer comes in bite 
sized chunks”, yet, work in the OSS was precisely that. Despite the application of 
matching personality and job characteristics to identify social competencies, the OSS 
suffered from high levels of labour turnover and high levels of employee 
dissatisfaction. Both managers of the case organisations in Astana stated that the 
rates of annual personnel turnover were extremely high, up to 60-70 percent. It is 
well accepted that customer service employees leave in vast numbers, thus 
externalising their resistance (Callaghan and Thompson, 2002). It has also been 
recognised that service organisations often adopt a “sacrificial” policy, whereby they 
accept high levels of turnover in such high pressure environments (Wallace et al., 
2000). It is possible that particular techniques are inappropriate with the results that 
the wrong employees are being selected. It could be that in low discretion, 
standardised service interactions, the influence of personality traits on behaviour is 
likely to be weaker (Mount et al., 1998: 152-153). Regardless of the balance of such 
explanations, the widespread reporting of high turnover and low morale in the front-
line service industry (Callaghan and Thompson, 2002; Wallace et al., 2000), suggests 
that mis-matching is not the only thing going on.  
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The second paradox might be concerned with the extent to which social skills, on 
which the employers placed considerable emphasis when recruiting individuals, were 
being further developed and enhanced. The nature of work organisation in the OSS 
context acted to constrain skill development. One of the key aspects of the customer 
service, acknowledged by both managers and staff, was the predominance of 
standard, routinised tasks. In fact, the very purpose f establishing single-window 
centres in the first place was to create an environment in which work could be 
standardised to create relatively uniform and repetitious activities so as to achieve 
economies of scale and consistent quality of customer service. As was described in 
Chapter 6, technologies were adopted within the servic  integration context to 
achieve this goal. It has been well documented in the previous research on customer 
service organisations (see for example, Bain and Taylor, 2000) that in addition to 
intensifying the workflow, the technologies used in customer service organisations 
also allow for the extensive surveillance and monitoring of staff. There were 
remarkable similarities between responses by the employees regarding a narrow 
range of tasks. The staff talked about the lack of stimulation in their jobs and the 
“robot” nature of the work, and some identified similarities between the OSS 
environment and the factory production-line. The restrictive nature of the work was 
commented on by most employees. The interviewee quoted below, for example, 
emphasised the lack of opportunity available to demonstrate a broad range of skills 
due to the routinisation of the work process: “It’s hard to show all of your skills 
when you only have to accept documents.”  
 
Further, the employees were frustrated because they felt that they possessed the 
necessary social skills and could not fully use these competencies as the emphasis 
was placed upon quantitative targets: speed of service and number of applications 
processed. Giving good quality service and “helping with customers” emerged as key 
sources of job satisfaction for the personnel, but many felt that the system of work 
organisation used made it extremely difficult for them to do this. Further, some 
employees actually doubted whether their managers were in fact interested in 
delivering good quality services at all:  
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I think managers are more interested in the statistics. You can’t give good 
service looking only at time targets. This is not what clients want.  
 
However, the managers openly acknowledged that the recruitment and selection 
processes were not only designed in order to identify people with customer focus, but 
also to select people with the ability to deal with repetitive and highly pressurised 
work. The managers admitted that employees were sought for their ability to 
maintain a “positive attitude” with customers despite the pressures placed on them by 
the near constant flow of clients and repetitive nature of the work. Nevertheless, 
there was limited evidence of skill development amongst the staff despite the fact 
that each of the selected 11 OSS had put considerable investments into training (for 
more detailed discussion of staff training see section 7.3). Although many 
interviewees were positive about the transferability of these skills to other work 
contexts, they were doubtful about whether they hadactually developed any new 
skills whilst working in the OSS environment: 
 
I don’t really think that I’ve picked up many new skills. I just developed a lot on 
what I have like communication skills.   
 
Whilst the employees had some scope for skill development, the situation appeared 
to be less positive for managers. It is widely recognised that managers play a pivotal 
role in the organisation. Nevertheless, the OSS managers stated that no induction 
management training had been provided for them. This was in spite of the fact that 
the newly recruited managers lacked experience of managing single-window centres. 
The intensive nature of the OSS work left them little ime to further develop their 
“people skills” beyond those immediately necessary to carry out their day to day 
work.  
 
The third paradox might be tensions between how the OSS identified and then used 
social competencies. The managers appeared not to trus  their own judgements about 
individuals, in that new employees were continually trained to act, both in respect to 
conformity to service standards and regulations. This contradiction was perceived by 
staff:  
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They (managers) are always trying to control us, puhing and pushing. We are 
not robots, and I am planning to leave soon.  
   
Furthermore, while training emphasised on the quality of the service, once in the 
labour process the focus was on service quantity; as one employee said, “all they are 
worrying about is serving more customers”. In other words, the OSS not only 
recruited attitude, they shaped and dictated it. For the management an ideal front-line 
employee was someone who was perceived to be able to act as a person who had 
substantial resources of “personality” and could draw on and manage these emotions 
in a systematic way. The personnel were also aware of the need to provide emotional 
labour: 
 
I manage myself to divide into two personalities: one is for the public, another is 
for life outside the office. I have two children and I try to switch off the work 
one when I return home. 
 
I try to look at myself from customer’s point of view: how I behave, look, speak 
[...] It’s a kind of psychological training. 
                  
The research findings consistently revealed that the s aff were aware of the need to 
vary their face, but there was little evidence of deep acting, of employees actually 
changing themselves. Rather they acted as competent motion managers and made 
decisions about their degree of engagement and enthusiasm. Given the pressure of 
the labour process and the emphasis on service quantity, many employees delivered 
only surface acting:  
 
I am telling myself: I do this job from 9 in the morning till 3 in the afternoon and 
that’s it. It’s not a career, it’s a job. I thought that maybe only I have such 
feelings, but speaking to other people it’s the same. 
   
One part of your mind is doing repetitive work, all over again, another part is far 
away in your thoughts on life, future job, family. 
 
This “sacrificing” strategy is linked to the promine ce that has been shown that the 
staff place on patience and tolerance in discussion of skills necessary for the job, in 
contrast to the emphasis of managerial talk on ‘personality’. In low trust conditions, 
where emotional labour is prescribed and monitored, a response of surface acting can 
be seen as a defensive form of resistance (Sturdy, 1998: 32). However, a more active 
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form of contesting the emotional terrain arises when the employees decide to provide 
philanthropic emotional labour. This was a consistent f ature of interviews:  
 
It is ethically difficult to explain to the vulnerable customer that he or she has to 
come for a second time with a full package of documents. […] Some people, 
being in a difficult life situation, want to be listened to and in these cases, we are 
more psychologists than just consultants.   
 
It’s not easy to work with people, you know, they have different problems. […] I 
feel sorry for old people who come here alone withou  someone to help them. 
[…] I remember an old man who came to get a document about his ownership 
over a flat. Only once he was here did he know that his son sold his part of the 
flat without telling his father! That was a shock for all of us! 
 
The quality of public service appeared as a core value in the standards, regulations 
and policy legislation. The managers defined the goal of “better quality service” 
through three key components of service: ethics, speed and access. Ethics mainly 
concerned issues of politeness and ethical behaviour, i.e. not being corrupt. The new 
recruits learnt from their supervisors and managers that they should be polite and 
empathetic to the clients, and their role was to prvide good quality service to 
citizens. Ethical behaviour is given particular emphasis in the training sessions, staff 
meetings, legal regulations and informal conversations between the management and 
front-line employees. Speed of the service mainly concerned three types: length of 
time waiting in the queue before being invited to the operator; length of time taken to 
submit an application and length of time waiting to receive a document. The efficient 
front-line employees were defined by the management as those “providing services 
quickly and correctly”. The third component of the s rvice included different types 
of access: physical, language and cost. Physical access was defined as “equality to 
get access to the public services from cities and rural areas”, “easiness to reach the 
OSS office by public transport”, “convenience of opening times”, “convenience of 
conditions for disabled clients” etc. Language access was characterised as “clarity of 
procedures”, “service available both in Kazakh and Russian languages”. Cost access 
defined that “services should be affordable in financi l terms by population, 
including disadvantaged groups”.   
 
 199 
Implementation of these goals was explained by the management to staff through 
checklists of indicators like access (for service quality), number of clients served and 
number of documents accepted (for efficiency), as well as number of complaints and 
positive comments from clients (for ethics). The potential contradictions between 
these three goals, however, were not raised by the managers, neither in training nor 
in daily informal communication. The managers spoke about “professionalism” as an 
umbrella value that merged service quality, efficien y and ethics. A common 
message from the managers was that a professional front-line employee should be 
efficient, customer-orientated and work in conformity with the Code of Public 
Service Ethics. The definitions given to the term “professionalism” by the OSS 
managers combine three central aspects:  
1. knowledge competence in service standards and legal regulations 
(“knowledge of standards and awareness of changes to the legislation”); 
2. technical competence (“meeting the specific requirements of each service so 
that documents would be processed accurately by the stakeholder 
departments and customers would not have to visit OSS on the same 
matter”); 
3. ethics (“performing ethical behaviour”). 
 
The standard personnel practices involving on-the-job training, performance 
evaluation and appraisal can be seen as the backbone of the common occupational 
experience of the staff members.  Personnel with two years or more experience at the 
single-window centres were considered as “veterans”. A  a standard practice, the job 
contract included a commitment to work for 12 months with the opportunity to have 
this extended after the first year. However, the majority of staff did not remain at the 
OSS after the completion of the first year period, resulting in high turnover, which 
was characteristic of the front-line service work. 
      
As was described in Chapter 6, the staff members wee under strict, constant control 
and visual surveillance. Promotion was not a real pros ect for majority of the 
employees as there were few management posts. The legislation allowed the 
managers to distribute bonuses among the staff by saving on administrative 
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expenditures, for example, the cost of paper, phone calls, postage, transportation etc. 
Individual bonuses were paid on the basis of performance results, which reflected the 
number of customers served, late shift arrivals, number of complaints etc. Both 
supervisor and manager were responsible to inform every employee about these 
parameters. 
 
This section examined the selection and recruitment practices of the OSS staff with 
particular emphasis of the type of skills required for front-line positions. It was 
argued that social skills rather than technical skills were considered more important 
for good customer service both by the managers and employees. However, while 
performing emotional labour the staff had little scope for skill development given the 
routinised nature of tasks. This section also highlighted that there were gendered 
divisions amongst staff, as women were expected to be more flexible, 
communicative and empathetic to people compared to men. The following section 
explores gendered divisions in more detail in order to improve the understanding of 
the organisational culture within customer service environment.   
 
7.2 GENDERED DIVISIONS    
 
Gender played a significant role in organising the customer service environment in 
the OSS. As gender is embedded in workplace organisation, culture and practices, 
management relies heavily on both gendered assumptions and gendered divisions 
when restructuring work (Newsome, 2003). In gender terms managerial power at the 
OSS was male-dominated. There were about 30 percent of females among OSS 
managers and 80 percent of females among front-line employees. The OSS manager 
was typically a man suggesting the masculine character of technical knowledge and 
executive power. Reflecting this, the operational st ff such as supervisors and front-
line employees, were mostly women. Service work is itself gendered, based on an 
ethic of caring that is central to cultural ideas of femininity (Kittay, 2002). Williams 
(1995) suggested that it may be relatively unproblematic for women to embrace 
service work, while men may be inclined to approach it with some ambivalence.  
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Gender relations in the OSS need to be reviewed within Kazakhstani context. Despite 
gender equality declared in the Constitution of the Republic and Labour Law, the 
labour market in Kazakhstan is still segregated both vertically and horizontally in 
gender terms. Women are mainly employed in the low-paid service sectors like 
health, education, social care and occupy the lowest po itions of employment 
hierarchies. Furthermore, Kazakhstani women continue to carry the main load of 
domestic work and childcare, contributing to the so-called double burden which 
characterises the gender politics of communism. A number of features distinguish the 
experience of Kazakhstani women working in the front-line customer service 
organisations compared to their counterparts in developed countries. Firstly, all OSS 
employees work full-time without any opportunity to choose a part-time position. 
Secondly, women have constant pressure to fulfil work responsibilities and carry 
most of the domestic work. The balance of domestic lives is still conservative and 
patriarchal, even among young couples with higher education. For married women 
the burdens of the day job and their domestic commit ents effectively exclude the 
possibility to take a second job to increase their income.  
 
The research findings suggest that women’s resistance to stressful workplace  
conditions may entail blurring the boundaries betwen work and family. Female 
workers may “steal” time from work to handle family matters, use workplace 
resources for the benefit of the family, or even celebrate personal events like 
birthdays in the workplace as a way of humanising the environment. For instance, 
once at the end of the working day I was invited by the staff to celebrate an official 
holiday. The female workers brought home-made salad nd cakes, and male 
employees helped to organise tables and chairs, and bri g drinks. The management 
staff made toasts wishing good luck and success to the country and their 
organisation, and they thanked staff for their important contribution in service 
improvement. Everyone had a good laugh and the atmosphere was relaxed and 
positive. Similarly, the work of other researchers suggest that employees – male or 
female – who invest in ideals that conform with organisational ends may replace 
personal or family time with work-related activities and concerns (Hochschild, 
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1997). In the case of organisations focused on service delivery, there is a reason to 
anticipate that such employees will often be women. As one manager commented:  
         
Some girls work too hard, in my view. They could stay even after working hours 
doing what they have not finished during day. Usually, these girls are not 
married yet and lack a personal life.  
 
As was highlighted earlier in this chapter most managers and staff assumed that 
women were especially likely to have the kind of personality suited to the repetitive, 
yet highly pressurised work that characterises OSS work. A number of employees 
claimed, for example, that women were generally more able than men to handle the 
routine work, and “stick at the job” for longer. A supervisor commented in this 
regard: 
 
I find that the girls do the work better, they can serve more customers, whereas 
men have breaks more often and try to do other things. 
 
Some interviewees claimed that men did not tend to cope with the pressure involved 
in the work as women do. A manager commented: 
 
 I have been recruiting a very small percentage of males among employees. At the 
end of the day it is men who come and say that they want to leave.  
 
The managers held gendered assumptions about the abilities of women and men to 
perform highly controlled, repetitive and routine job tasks, tending to conform to a 
long-held view that women were more suited than men to working as machine 
“operators” (Cockburn, 1985). Clearly, the persistence of this perception raises 
doubts regarding the extent to which female operators c uld actually further develop 
and enhance their social skills in the workplace. As Woodfield (1998) and others 
have argued, female social skill contributions in the workplace have in the past been 
ignored and undervalued, and because they are viewed as natural feminine 
characteristics, viewed as neither recognisable nor remunerable. The research 
findings on the issue of skill recognition in the specific OSS context gives a 
somewhat mixed picture in this respect. While, on the one hand, there was a general 
perception that women “naturally” possess the social skills deemed essential for 
customer service delivery, at the same time women employees were keen to 
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emphasise that they had worked extremely hard at learning, developing and refining 
these skills. Further, it was frequently claimed that front-line jobs were difficult to 
perform well, and there was evidence of a widespread conviction that front-office 
jobs were indeed “skilled jobs”. These views were expr ssed not only by the 
employees themselves, but also by the managers and upervisors.  
 
Overall, there was little evidence that women’s social skills were undervalued within 
both case study organisations, despite the fact that these skills were understood by 
many to be naturally held. However, there was a widely held view that the expertise 
involved in the work was somewhat “invisible” to those outside the OSS setting, 
both within wider society and elsewhere within MJ and stakeholder departments. The 
managers spoke of the separation between the OSS and the rest of public sector 
organisations. The relatively low status of the single-window organisations was also 
reflected in wage levels. With the enactment of new l gislation, average salaries of 
the front-line workers have fallen well below average civil service pay. Despite the 
fact that women’s social skills were in demand and recognised as central in customer 
service work, they continued to be poorly rewarded in financial terms.  
 
A number of authors have observed that if women’s social skills are to become more 
visible, widely recognised and better compensated, they must be formally identified 
and recognised skills (Woodfield, 1998). My findings are more hopeful here as there 
is some evidence that the social competencies involved in the customer service work 
were recognised both by the managers and staff, and now being included in the job 
requirements for front-line positions. Clearly, formal qualifications may provide one 
way of recognising the competencies and skills involved in the OSS work, as well as 
providing employees with improved labour market opprtunities. However, although 
these developments are encouraging, the research findings indicate that awareness 
and take-up of these qualifications at present remains low. The following section 
examines training strategies adopted in the single-window centres and how the 
managers and front-line personnel learnt new knowledge and skills required for 
integrating service provision.    
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7.3 STAFF TRAINING: KNOWLEDGE GAPS      
 
Service integration is a new, challenging area for the Kazakhstani public sector, 
which requires a new set of knowledge and skills for joined-up service provision, and 
a cultural shift in thinking across professional and organisational boundaries. This 
section explores the utilisation and usefulness of training strategies adopted in the 
OSS; to what extent they met demands of the managers and front-line personnel, and 
how the managers and staff learnt new knowledge and skills to deliver multiple 
services through single-window arrangements.  
 
All manager participants from different regions agreed that training institutions could 
not meet their needs in terms of specific knowledge and skills required for improving 
the effectiveness of customer service. Cooperation w th local universities was usually 
limited to the short-term courses on improving Kazakh language and computer skills. 
The managers tended to differentiate themselves as “practitioners” and stressed 
demand in combination with practical and theoretical knowledge. The participants 
acknowledged that local universities were not able to provide valuable offers for the 
OSS. The Public Administration Academy under the Prsident of RK delivered some 
courses on quality standards. However, according to the OSS managers these courses 
did not meet their needs and expectations. Although some courses on quality 
management delivered by the business training centres could be beneficial for the 
single-window centres, public sector organisations could not afford them. The 
international projects such as EU Tacis and USAID/Pragma provided advisory 
support in organising a series of training workshops for the OSS managers. However, 
single, ad-hoc courses were not able to cover a large number of target group on a 
regular basis. Given the shortage of financial resources the single-window centres 
were not able to invite international or local business consultants to deliver advice on 
the establishment of single-window arrangements. The managers expressed concern 
about the lack of available literature in Russian and Kazakh languages for self-
education. The responses from the managers and front-line staff coincided in that 
they both said they particularly needed training in delivering complex services such 
as property, business and land registration (Janenova, 2008a).  
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In these conditions where local institutions lacked the capacity to provide adequate 
training to develop a pool of “universal” employees, the OSS developed an induction 
scheme for all new entrants. At the start of employment new recruits had to 
undertake a four-week induction programme during which newcomers were 
socialised into the culture and beliefs of the organis tion. Most of the time was spent 
sitting with a senior colleague observing the service process with informal and 
spontaneous storytelling about work, which framed norms, values and coping 
mechanisms. New recruits were taken through the full cycle of service provision 
from initial consultation to issuing a final document. Trainees were taught how to 
navigate through the computer system to be able to s arch for information on service 
standards and legislation. To keep updated with amend nts to legislation the staff 
were required to read legal documents and get information through management 
briefings and training. The second part of induction scheme took place in the 
stakeholder departments. By sitting near civil servants, observing the process of 
application review and asking questions, new recruits could examine service 
provision from different angles: both at the front-office and back-office. Induction in 
the government bodies usually lasted for a month with one week spent in each 
department. The employees were provided with informal advice from supervisors 
and managers in the area of social communication with customers. As a manager 
commented in this regard:  
 
We teach our staff to speak with clients politely, with a smile. We would like to 
invite professional trainers but it’s quite expensive for us. So we refer to our life 
experience in giving advice to young staff, for example, how to behave in 
conflict situations.  
  
Most OSS across regions engaged in “coaching”, where n w recruits had a mentor 
who supported them during the first month of working  the new environment. In 
the case study organisations coaching was also actively practiced to ensure on-the-
job qualification improvement. For example, one of the activities during coaching 
was providing feedback by the mentor to the new employees. The mentor observed 
interactions between clients and new recruits, made not s and gave feedback to the 
trainees in a form of dialogue, where both sides discussed strengths and weaknesses 
in the service provision and behaviour of new recruits. Other senior colleagues also 
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provided informal advice and tips based on their personal experience, which the new 
staff found extremely helpful.  
 
The front-line staff participated in the regular seminars organised with the support of 
the stakeholder departments, whose representatives came on a weekly basis to give a 
presentation. The government officials informed the front-line employees about new 
amendments to the legislation related to the servics, larified problematic issues on 
specific services within their scope of authorities. At the seminars the staff had 
opportunities to address questions directly to the colleagues from stakeholder 
departments, which enabled them to facilitate negotiati n between the front-office 
and back-office employees. The colleagues from the front-office and back-office 
discussed common reasons for frequent mistakes, developed suggestions for 
improvement and learnt to build trustful relationships. The results of the discussions 
were reflected in the protocol signed by the managers from OSS and government 
bodies, and circulated amongst the staff of both organisations. As a manager 
described this process:  
 
Legislation is constantly changing […] it is quite difficult for us to track all 
changes in different areas of service provision withou  the consultation of 
experts. In the beginning we had problems of misunderstanding. […] For 
example, when we worked according to the information received from civil 
servants orally during seminars, they could return unprocessed documents saying 
that documents were accepted incorrectly. Then to av id confusion the 
stakeholders and ourselves we sign protocols of the me tings when we find 
agreement on minor changes in service process.  
 
The problem of training in a diversity of services was related to the lack of clear 
guidelines of the procedures and the vagueness of strategic instructions, as was 
highlighted in Chapter 6. Learning on service provision in multiple areas was 
gradually accumulated through observations, acquiring technical and procedural 
knowledge by the front-office staff during their time working with back-office 
employees. New knowledge was communicated among the OSS personnel through 
oral communication and daily routine practices. As the manager of the MJ noted:  
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It would take half a year for new staff to understand what was going whereas 
during the short-term induction they can immediately see the work in practice 
both in the front-office and back-office and learn the process.   
 
While the managers were generally positive about the OSS values and norms, many 
employees were critical of them. When asked to reflect about value of formal 
training, including sessions conducted by the managers and government officials 
from stakeholder departments, and on-the-job training, responses from the OSS 
managers and employees differed to a great degree. The managers were positive 
about the value of formal training, with an emphasis on their important role in 
leading training sessions and keeping staff updated with new amendments to the 
legislation. As two managers commented:  
 
We train our staff on a regular basis: we conduct training ourselves and invite 
colleagues from the government bodies to clarify problematic issues on service 
provision within the scope of their authority. Then we assess staff knowledge 
with tests on standards and regulations, which we dev loped ourselves.  
 
If there are important amendments to the legislation related to our services, me 
or my deputy debrief staff for 15 minutes, normally between 2 p.m. and 3 p.m. 
when both shifts are at the workplace.        
 
However, the experienced employees were sceptical on the usefulness of sessions 
conducted by their managers, but were positive regarding training delivered by the 
managers from stakeholder departments.  
 
It is a good idea to invite practitioners from state bodies to explain procedures, 
and we then have the opportunity to ask direct questions on the problems we 
face in providing their services. But our managers would not tell us anything 
new, maybe except the legal amendments, which we can read ourselves. 
  
I don’t agree with the assessment system. […] You can know by heart all 
standards and regulations, but in practice fail to mplement them. So when you 
pass a test, you will get the best mark?! Or maybe you were lucky to tick the 
right box? During daily work we remember all these standards by referring to 
them every time we serve a client. So these tests are additional stress for us. 
 
In contrast to the staff members with experience of w rking at the OSS, many 
newcomers perceived formal training as contributing owards their professionalism 
and tended to pay more attention to them compared to their senior colleagues. Both 
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managers and staff had consensus on the value of th induction as practical, relevant 
and extremely useful. During the induction, the newcomers learnt the process steps 
of service delivery from the first customer contact to the delivery of the processed 
document. 
   
7.4 SUMMARY   
 
This chapter considered selection and recruitment as well as training policies adopted 
within OSS environment. In particular, it focused on gendered divisions amongst the 
staff, which played an important role in formation of social competencies in 
customer service work. It has raised related question  about the character and 
appropriateness of selection, recruitment and training policies in the single-window 
centres.  
 
The selection and recruitment process of the managers was based on a patronage 
system through personal relations, friendship and mutual obligation. The personnel 
management system for managerial jobs transferred the paternalistic system from the 
traditional bureaucracy. By contrast, selection andrecruitment for the front-line jobs 
followed a different approach aimed to identify theexistence of social competencies, 
which were significant for face-to-face, intensive customer service provision. 
Training was used to make those competencies appropriate to the particular 
workflows. The work demanded that the personnel had to be continually energetic 
and enthusiastic in exercising highly emotionally demanding and repetitive work, 
and the selection process aimed to identify “suitable workers”.  
 
In theory, the rise of the service economy could lead to the re-evaluation of those 
social skills traditionally associated with women’s work, disrupting the long 
established pattern in which women’s work has been undervalued, poorly recognised 
and rewarded. This chapter examined whether there wr  any indications that this 
was taking place in the particular case study organisations. The research findings 
showed that “feminine” social skills did play a central role in public service 
provision, and that as a consequence, women were demed to be particularly suited 
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to it. However, women were also recruited to the front-line positions because they 
were perceived to be more capable of dealing with the monotony of the work and the 
regimented work environment. The highly standardised and controlled nature of 
work organisation within OSS environment constrained the extent to which women’s 
social skills could be used and further enhanced. This created a situation in which 
thousands of women were being recruited to the OSS for their perceived social skills 
and competencies, and then only allowed to use them to a very limited extent. 
Furthermore, women were also most heavily concentrated in those areas of service 
delivery, particularly in customer service roles, that attracted the lowest financial 
rewards and lack of career prospects. These trends were found in both case study 
organisations as well as across the regions.  
 
However, this chapter also pointed to the emergence of a more optimistic picture on 
the issue of skill recognition rather than just the continuation of these well-
established trends in the sexual division of labour. Although women were often 
deemed to “naturally” possess the social competencies required for customer service, 
there was little indication in the interviews that this meant that these skills were 
ignored or undervalued within the OSS settings. Rather, it was repeatedly 
emphasised by the managers and staff that customer service was indeed “skilled 
work”. The front-line employees were particularly keen to talk about the social skills 
that they had developed, particularly in handling difficult customers, building rapport 
and controlling conversations. Indeed, the managers encouraged staff to recognise 
the skills involved in their work by providing training programmes specifically 
designed in order to raise personal awareness and self-confidence amongst young 
employees.  
 
In these intensified work environments, the personnel experienced considerable 
psychological stress. The research evidence suggested that the largest part of the 
stress was absorbed by the front-line employees. There was frequent evidence of 
resistance, disengagement, low motivation, and burnout. The question of how staff 
dealt with stress is very important, particularly in view of evidence that constant 
stress leads to high turnover. The average service length for the OSS was 18 months, 
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which coincides with the findings of Fernie (1998) in this regard. The fact that more 
and more services are added on a continuing basis to the list of OSS services is a 
substantial factor in producing stress. More immediate stressors include the ongoing 
service of customers.  
 
The mixed messages of recruitment, selection and training reflected the complex 
tensions and contradictions across goals and means in the OSS work operations. 
While recruits might not be “special” in the sense that the managers used the term, 
the rigour of selection and training might have something to do with identifying 
people with survival as well as communication skill; those who had strength to get 
through at least 30 customers a day while being constantly recorded and assessed 
through electronic means. What the research project observed is consistent with 
wider research. Summing up a variety of “empowerment” studies, largely in the 
service sector, Hales (1999: 7) notes that one of the key concomitants of 
empowerment is, “ex-ante control, in the form of careful employee recruitment and 
training to select “empowerable” employees and to inculcate the skills and attitudes 
conducive to exercising “responsible” choice.” 
 
Yet, the research findings showed that attempts to identify and utilise social 
competencies was a problematic and uneven process. The tight job specification and 
extensive surveillance over the front-line staff demonstrated this unambiguously. As 
a result, the tension in the labour process between th  mobilisation of employee 
attributes and the deliberate standardisation of social competencies was merely part 
of a wider tension between the “demands” of quantity and quality (Bain et al., 2002) 
as was described in Chapter 5. What was distinctive about this process in customer 
service work was the continual negotiation and re-negotiation over the 
transformation of emotional labour power into serviceable products.  
 
The common problems of low motivation, high turnover and the poor status of 
customer service organisations were recognised as important within single-window 
centres. The important observation was that the OSS reflected certain modern 
management tendencies: they spoke a language of teamwork, coaching and support, 
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but still the overriding message was about meeting statistical targets. This induced a 
culture of authoritarianism and institutionalised defensiveness, with each level of the 
organisation thus putting pressure on the level below. The quality tension meant that 
customer service rhetoric and quality customer carewere put against pressure to keep 
service short in order to maintain service levels and meet performance targets. 
Classically, the OSS relied on deskilled labour andlow wage rates. 
  
Collective watching and acting of the front-line staff in the work context, and 
exchange of ideas with the government officials can be identified as key to enabling 
factors for reflection on daily work practices. Development of ideas for service 
quality improvement did not necessarily depend on the emergence of contradictions. 
The combination of diverse experiences, backgrounds and work approaches of the 
front-office and back-office staff enabled them to create an environment for 
individual and organisational learning. Many participants referred to the change in 
their own views of traditional work practices. As one front-line worker who was a 
former civil servant put it:  
 
In the past I thought that only my organisation could provide professional 
consultation on business registration as this area is very complex and specific. 
But now I see that the single-window centre can deal b tter with clients in terms 
of consultation and providing informational services than government bodies as 
we learnt how to work with clients and deliver customer-oriented service, 
whereas state bodies have now more time and resources to concentrate on the 
review of the applications and legislation. 
 
Learning and information exchange were considered as important activities by the 
managers:  
 
We didn’t know what to start with: we were all from different sectors, with 
various expertise. We talked, listened, discussed, argued [...] Well, it was a 
painful process […] but we can see that as a result of our enormous work, 
service quality is improving, this is the main result. 
 
Both quotes illustrate that the relationships betwen the front-office and back-office 
staff has progressed in a positive direction over fou years of policy implementation. 
This chapter explored the how the relationship betwe n the OSS and stakeholder has 
changed. This has been from the open confrontation and antagonism of the 
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traditional bureaucracy to the new public organisations who have gradually learnt to 
negotiate with each other, find consensus, deliver joined-up services, and adopt 
technologies through mutual training and observations. Thus, the single-window 
centres have created a learning environment that encourages individuals and public 
sector organisations to work towards public service improvement. The following 
chapter explores organisational learning experiences of the managers and employees 
within the case study organisations and analyses what type of the “communities of 
practice” have emerged and developed among the front-line personnel.    
 
 
8. LEARNING WITHIN THE “COMMUNITIES OF 
PRACTICE” OF THE KAZAKH ONE STOP SHOPS    
 
Organisational culture in the case study organisations provided a context for studying 
professional socialisation of the front-line staff within specific settings. As 
demonstrated by examples in Chapters 6 and 7, informal workgroup communities 
within the single-window centres have developed not only consent but also resistance 
to the management directives (for example, towards constant visual surveillance, 
performance targets). As was demonstrated throughout t e thesis, the front-line staff 
were involved in a series of related conflicts since the single-window centres could 
be characterised by “treating people as machines while espousing that they are 
“valued”; wanting control while seeking contained initiative and flexibility; 
espousing an atmosphere of trust while utilising technologies of distrust” (Houlihan, 
2002: 80). 
 
The study of the front-line employees’ socialisation in the OSS enables us to 
highlight the social construction of organisational learning, since while the values of 
efficiency and quality are formally declared by management, their actual 
implementation and interpretation takes place within specific communities. Thus, 
this chapter aims to explore learning experiences of the managers and front-line 
employees using single and double loop learning theory (Argyris and Schon, 1978a), 
theories of the “communities of practice” (CoP) (Lave and Wenger, 1991) and 
“communities of coping” (Korczynski, 2002a). In particular, this chapter starts with 
focusing on the analysis of personal and social strtegies for coping utilised by the 
staff and exploring dimensions of the relations betwe n the managers and employees. 
It moves on to examine the nature of learning encouraged by the management staff 
and impact of the organisational learning on customer service performance.   
 
8.1 PERSONAL AND SOCIAL STRATEGIES FOR COPING       
 
It is evident from the field data that, while positive and negative outcomes prevailed, 
they were mediated by both personal modes of coping and organisational sustaining 
mechanisms. Survival as a front-line worker required commitment, determination, 
goodwill and flexibility. It was illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7 that the staff members 
were under constant pressure to achieve both quantitative and qualitative 
performance targets, and perform emotional labour while delivering customer 
service. The front-line job is mythologised as simple and routine, which is a surface 
fact beyond which there are many complex role and skill demands. Research by 
Sturdy (1998) identifies the fluctuating nature of attitudes and commitment to 
customer services work, with employees, in his terms, “smiling and sometimes 
meaning it”. Sturdy (1998) describes role embracement as temporary, limited and 
contradictory. The reasons for this have less to do with the task itself than with the 
background and context within which staff work.  
 
The employees at the single-window centres adopted a different range of cognitive 
strategies to make sense of their environments. Motivation was rooted in perceptions 
of fair play. The staff, while commenting on their relationship with their work 
demonstrated a mental storyline as to what they expected from their employer and 
most adjusted their expectations to minimise frustration. As one operator reflected: 
 
When we were invited to work at the OSS, we were promised competitive 
salaries, high status and excellent conditions of wrk, but they didn’t keep their 
promise... Well, now I am used to work with clients, though it’s not easy, and if 
we were better paid, I could have stayed here.   
 
It was when these expectations were frustrated, when t y perceived that they were 
being mistreated, or they perceived management as distancing itself from 
responsibility for system breakdowns, that morale and work effort deteriorated.         
 
A further mediating fact was the shaping role of supervisors at the OSS. As 
facilitators, advocates and support workers, the supervisors were a vital source of 
stress mediation. Team leaders play an important role in managing interpretation, 
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performance and meaning (Houlihan, 1999). Given the fact that most employees had 
little contact or access to the decisions being made about their work, “management at 
the MJ” was often an abstract, remote and faceless construct. Crucially, the 
management was represented for most staff by the immediate actions of their 
supervisors and managers, and the continuously changing nature of the systems 
within which they operated. The employees did not fully benefit from weekly staff 
meetings as they were concerned about raising their frustrations and problems. They 
preferred to talk about their work with colleagues and tell each other stories about 
customers during breaks. In all of these ways, implicit or explicit, clashes between 
organisation and personal interests were resolved quite unconsciously. However, this 
acted in neither the management’s nor staff’s long-term interests as issues persisted 
and became long-term problems.  
 
Development of resistance to the management directives was described as 
collectively shared and socially transmitted. Consequently, it can be seen as the 
predominant indication of the development of communities of practice among staff 
who channelled their growing frustration and criticism into acts of subversion, which 
were learnt and exercised through informal socialisation. Many employees said that 
they learnt from co-workers that when the client submitted documents, they sent him 
or her to the bank, which was located within the same office as the OSS, to pay the 
fee and wait, without calling for another customer, until that client returned with 
payment confirmation. This allowed employees to have bout 10 minutes break 
during which they could pretend to examine applications. The staff realised that this 
did not represent “best practice”. According to therespondents such behaviour was 
encouraged in informal socialisation that took place predominantly during the 
induction at the OSS, lunch times and after-work gatherings. During the induction 
period some experienced colleagues described themselves speaking with newcomers 
about “special arrangements” that “could make life in the OSS easier”. Such talk 
took place over breaks as well as in gatherings that took place in the evening when 
the personnel met together, for example, in the local pub. The senior employees said 
that they could reliably separate those newcomers who ere loyal to the system from 
those who were critical of the system:  
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You can ask them what they think about payment, bonuses and performance 
appraisal system, and immediately you know what the yp  of this person is.  
 
This is arguably the course of development of the communities that characterise the 
front-line staff in the case study organisations. The following section explores the 
nature of learning encouraged by the managerial staff amongst front-line employees 
and the impact of organisational learning on the ovrall customer service. 
 
8.2 SINGLE OR DOUBLE LOOP LEARNING? 
 
To begin to unfold individual learning processes and identify levels of learning, the 
participants were asked how often they received feeback on their performance. 
Responses from the front-line staff indicate that they receive mostly negative 
feedback, particularly if they make mistakes in their job, demonstrating therefore that 
they are not conforming to the performance targets. As the staff comment in this 
regard:  
 
I get feedback if I have done something wrong, for example, my documents have 
a mistake. It’s OK to make a mistake once, but you shouldn’t repeat mistakes.  
 
Some operators get criticized for their mistakes, but some do not, and I think it’s 
not fair. 
 
If you do your job well, it’s taken for granted, but if you do something wrong, 
you get immediate reaction.   
 
Argyris and Schon (1978a) suggest that lack of feedback creates isolation for the 
individual and fragmentation for the organisation, resulting in a lack of linkage 
between individual mental models and shared mental models and implies a “them 
and us” relationship between management and “others”. The managers of the OSS 
claim that they receive both positive and negative feedback from senior managers of 
the MJ. If Argyris and Schon’s (1978a) argument is followed, this implies that 
double loop learning is likely to take place so that individuals understand why their 
prior meaning-making systems had to change. An issue which emerges from the 
interviews with the managers is why, when they receive positive feedback, they fail 
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to engage in positive feedback with their direct subordinates – front-line staff. The 
root assumptions and guiding beliefs of the OSS industry are evidenced, though 
inexplicitly, in decisions about strategy, structure and management approach. It was 
highlighted throughout the thesis that managerial decisions are made according to 
strict hierarchy and heavily influenced by prevailing norms of traditional 
bureaucracy. The staff feel trapped in the cycle of following performance targets, but 
lacking positive, encouraging feedback.  
 
When I get a “thank you for your help, you explained verything to me, you 
helped me to fill in documents correctly”, it makes me feel that I’ve done 
something useful […] I’m not wasting my time. But, often there is rush, rush, 
rush, and I feel like a machine. Soon they will change the work process with the 
Internet, they are working on it now. I suppose it will be even more difficult to 
work here.  
 
For many employees, work at the OSS represents a transitional opportunity into a 
civil service career. Yet, routinisation and regulations enable the organisation to 
reduce its dependence on employees’ competency, to utilise a less expensive range of 
skills creating disciplined and “replicant” semi-professionals. This has the result that 
front-line jobs, being considered as semi-professional, i.e. not requiring a degree in 
the specific area and prior experience, have introduce  a loss of career, status and 
opportunity. The OSS are information handling organis tions. As currently 
characterised, the job of the front-line employee is to be the face of the organisation, 
interfacing with the client. As the research findings show throughout this thesis, the 
staff are largely constructed as “a mouth- and hand-piece” rather than as a “brain”, 
which is confirmed by the responses both from the managers and employees 
themselves.  
 
The research findings suggest that the front-line work is a complex blend of 
knowing, sensing and rule applying. The staff members use a complex, largely 
unacknowledged set of personal skills. They are expected to use their knowledge and 
skills to adapt to the mood and needs of the customer to achieve a particular 
outcome, such as the correct acceptance of application, which results in the timely 
and smooth service delivery. The evidence shows that the front-line workers are not 
required to think beyond a programmed level. Problems or non-routine solutions are 
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the matter of the supervisors and managers. The employee does not have official 
authority to deal with or learn from their experienc s or feed this learning back into 
the system.  
 
Information processing is a useful metaphor here as it conveys something of the 
limits of this system. Engestrom (1990) and others strongly voice the perspective that 
learning requires contextualisation of the concepts and skills to be learned. In the 
OSS learning takes place around service delivery processes. It does not attend to the 
business as a whole, or even the processes beyond the employee’s operations. An 
example of this assumption in action is the use of technology to measure length of 
interaction between the client and operator. This level of control betrays an 
assumption about the front-line employee as automatn nd the activity as simple 
and explicit. After all, it is easier to measure time than morale.  
 
As a way of exploring single and double loop learning levels, participants were asked 
if they challenged upwardly in relation to how things are done in the OSS. It was 
highlighted in Chapter 3 that single loop learning describes situations where 
individuals are comfortable performing within their sphere of competence and stick 
to the tried and tested (Argyris and Schon, 1978a), while double loop learning 
requires individuals questioning and challenging the successes of the organisation, 
leading to a deeper level of understanding and reassessment of values and 
assumptions. All participants among front-line staff suggest that difficult questions 
are not asked nor challenges made. The staff members discuss that they are regarded 
as trouble makers if they question established processes. When individuals are 
controlled and confined within their roles, they appear to exhibit the characteristics 
of single loop learning, in failing to question. This apparent lack of questioning 
enables management of the OSS to maintain control by rigid rules and the prescribed 
ways of doing things. As the employees highlight in their answers:  
 
Why should we question? We just have to work. 
 
I tend not to bother the manager, it’s not my positi n o question.   
         
I have some ideas for improvement, but nothing will change if I tell them. 
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The managers of the OSS reflected on whether their employees were able to question 
them and provided a number of honest insights: 
 
They can ask questions. But it won’t change anything as we have standards and 
regulations given from the Ministry and we have to follow these rules. 
 
As long as there is a good reason, I don’t mind questions.  
 
Some of my employees question me, but the agenda is set, and I can’t change 
anything. 
 
The research findings indicate that if the front-lie workers do attempt single loop 
learning and operate within taken for granted assumptions or attempt double loop 
learning and challenge fundamental assumptions in the organisation, then the 
managers may apply significant constraints, for insta ce, “it wont’ change anything”, 
“we have to follow these rules”, “the agenda is set”. These constraints may be 
enacted in ways which limit individuals to the double loop learning; the 
reinforcement of conformity and of the “thinker” (manager) and “doer” (employee) 
relationship. By constraining their staff to the single loop learning, the managers 
reinforce the prescribed rules. The procedural steps are learnt and repeated while any 
creative movements are unlikely due to apparent “handcuffs on learning” (Schein, 
1999).  
 
From the managers’ perspective when asked about their opportunities to question and 
challenge senior management at the MJ, their views differed. One OSS manager 
explained that they had some autonomy, but then he continued that autonomy was 
given as long as they kept their coordinators in the MJ informed about what was 
happening in the OSS. Some managers claimed that it w s difficult to question senior 
colleagues from the MJ as they often became defensiv  and therefore they tended not 
to. One manager offered an explanation for this defensive behaviour, suggesting that 
managers from the MJ were not used to communicating freely and working in a 






The managers at the ministry are used to give orders in top-down way. We are at 
the bottom level in relation to the ministry, so we are not supposed to ask 
uncomfortable questions that are difficult to explain, we are expected to perform 
what is required.  
 
This view tends to reflect the traditional management paradigm, in which there are 
few transfers across divisional lines and reinforces the views of Argyris and Schon 
(1978a), who suggest that there is a defensive tendency among organisational 
members to protect themselves from open confrontation and critique hence they do 
not engage in questioning or challenging. Argyris and Schon (1996b) explain this 
behaviour as managers attempting to avoid vulnerability, risk, embarrassment and 
the appearance of incompetence. The evidence from the observation of interactions 
between top-management of the MJ and OSS managers at the two official meetings, 
which are discussed below, provide description of the environment created by 
traditional bureaucracy, in which questioning is not the norm and there are limited 
opportunities to challenge.  
 
In October 2007, I was invited by the Deputy Chairmn of the Registry Committee, 
Mr. Bakhyt Shalkarov, to participate at the first round-table dedicated to the 
evaluation of OSS performance by international experts. All OSS managers at the 
regional level were expected to participate in thisimportant event. The round table 
took place in the large conference hall within the office of the MJ in Astana. Senior 
managers from the MJ, the Vice-Minister and two deputi s of the Chairman of the 
Registry Committee, were sitting at the top of the impressive desk in new black-
leathered armchairs and looking down at the audience. The managers of the OSS, 
around 50 people, were sitting in the modest chairs organised in the several rows like 
they were preparing to watch a theatre performance. Such distanced separation 
prevented any discussion in the role of equal partners. The atmosphere from the start 
of the event till the very end was characterised by official, top-down interaction 
between managers from the MJ and OSS, expressed in the form of critical comments, 
“naming and shaming” some of the OSS, and explaining the new directions in the 
strategy of policy development. Although the OSS managers had few opportunities 
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to ask questions or express their opinions regarding working issues, none of them 
used this opportunity.  
 
During the second round-table which took place in Ju e 2008 similar behaviour 
among the OSS managers was observed: they were reluctant to participate in an open 
discussion of the issues related to the performance of the single-window centres in 
the presence of the top-management of the MJ. The OSS managers might have felt 
concern about the potential consequences of their qu stions. They were silent during 
the entire meeting which passed in the form of monologue from senior management 
of the MJ on what managers of the OSS should and should not do, and what 
procedures would be taken in the case of poor organisational performance. Only after 
the Secretary-General of the MJ left the conference room at the middle of the 
meeting did the OSS managers start to give feedback sed on their experiences and 
give recommendations on how the communication channels between the single-
window centres and stakeholder departments could be improved, what kind of 
training was required for their staff, and what constraints they faced in terms of the 
lack of clear guidelines on the design of joined-up services. In both cases after the 
official meetings the OSS managers seemed relaxed and expressed a willingness to 
learn from experience of colleagues in other OSS: 
 
I wish we had more opportunities to meet with colleagues from other regions to 
exchange ideas and practices. It would be useful if, say, five employees of my 
OSS would go to Astana or Almaty OSS, which are the most advanced and learn 
how they work there, then bring new ideas back and help to improve our 
performance.             
 
If we had available resources, I would send ten of my staff to other regions for 
several weeks and invite staff from the single-window centres of neighbouring 
region to exchange experience, brainstorm ideas on how to improve customer 
service. […] My front-line employees need communication with their 
colleagues. Okay, we, managers meet regularly in Astana, but our staff never 
have a chance to meet. It is difficult to work on your own, you don’t know if you 
are doing it right or wrong. […] Really, everyone is stewed in one’s own juice.      
 
Thus, the narratives of participants and observations reveal that managers of the OSS 
and front-line staff are restricted to repetitive st ps and at best single loop learning. 
When referring to double loop learning, identified by Swieringa and Wierdsma 
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(1992) as more fundamentally questioning and challenging why things are done, the 
theory does not differentiate between this process as being upward or downward 
questioning and challenging in an organisational hierarchy. Therefore, the managers 
of the OSS were asked if they questioned and challenged their coordinating 
managers from the MJ. The overwhelming response was that OSS managers were 
instructed by the managers of MJ, implying at most a level of single loop learning in 
the sense of what they should be doing and what guidelines to follow. The managers 
of the OSS highlighted a definite “them” (management from the MJ) and “us” 
culture and relationships which reinforces the master- ervant relationship 
characteristics of the bureaucracy and the role of “d ers” and “thinkers”. It was also 
observed that managers from the MJ were status conscious. As the managers 
comment in this regard:  
 
They (managers from MJ) rarely ask our feedback and when they do, people are 
suspicious, as they are concerned for their jobs.  
 
The officials from the Ministry try to show their authority by giving different 
orders, for example, to help someone to get service fast r and or to give someone 
individual consultation. Some managers from the Ministry are Okay to work 
with, but some have low respect and put pressure on both us and our staff. 
 
These responses highlight evidence of the divide between organisational “thinkers” 
and “doers” in learning (Dixon, 1998). The OSS managers begin to get a feel for 
some freedom to learn but the managers from the MJ shut them down, forcing them 
to the tightly defined job role. These findings can be aligned with Field’s (1997) 
argument that when individuals learn, the manager may feel insecure, threatened and 
can tighten control by undermining the activities that facilitate learning. Field (1997) 
identifies with this “management jealousy” when describing manager’s reactions to 
individuals when they are empowered to learn. One of the managers described being 
involved in the strategic process of organisational importance and the reaction by his 
coordinator from the MJ to that:  
 
When I was involved in the Inter-governmental working group on developing a 
set of new standards for services, my coordinator complained that I was never in 
my office and he couldn’t reach me by phone. I know that he was jealous of my 
input into the steering group.   
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It has been argued that for learning to take place in an organisation, encouragement 
must be explicitly forthcoming and embedded in the context: the manager’s role is 
fundamental in achieving this. Emphasising the importance of the manager’s role in 
unlocking or inhibiting learning in organisations, manager participants were asked to 
describe what they perceived their role to be in supporting and encouraging learning 
and how they felt if their employees were learning: 
  
I should be giving my staff some autonomy to challenge, experiment, but I am 
not allowed to empower. 
 
I feel a great deal of satisfaction when I see that my people learn and develop. If 
people learn, quality of service is improved.   
 
To further explore levels of learning and experiences, and reflecting some impact of 
the investment in training and development, the OSS managers were asked how often 
they were encouraged to take risks. Argyris and Schon (1978a) associate double loop 
learning with radical change, suggesting that the rol of managers is fundamental at 
this level, to encourage risk taking. Not surprisingly in light of the previous findings, 
all participants, both OSS managers and front-line employees, claimed that they were 
not encouraged to take risks. The managers emphasised that some mistakes were 
inevitable in their jobs because they were learning by trial-and-error.   
 
What we do is new for Kazakhstan, and it’s a natural p ocess that all of us can 
make mistakes. The important thing is to learn from mistakes and improve 
customer service.  
 
The OSS managers accepted that making mistakes was a serious matter, but they 
believed that most mistakes were not so serious as to cost employees their jobs. 
However, one manager commented that he was concerned with regard to making 
mistakes as staff were “waiting for some reaction from him”. Argyris and Schon 
(1996b) may explain this experience when they comment that managers often blame 
others at the precise time when learning can occur in o ganisation.  
 
We are not allowed to take risks, we have very tightly defined jobs. 
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Since the staff members came to the OSS from a range of social, economic, cultural 
and educational backgrounds, and from organisations with different traditions, they 
brought a wide range of professional values to their workplace. General values of 
punctuality, discipline and so on were used implicitly in their workplace behaviours 
by the staff. However, the values that were mentioned explicitly, which contributed 
to the workers’ learning included: acting responsibly, providing good customer 
service. For example, value “serving for a citizen” is seen as an important way not 
only for knowing details of standards, procedures and legal documents, but also basic 
psychological aspects of communication. 
   
So you know the procedures, you get experience in working with customers, 
that’s when you understand what to do to make clients satisfied.  
 
Human curiosity is an important force underpinning behaviour in the workplace. 
Therefore, when workers encounter large or small problems, their instinct is to try to 
solve them (Gerber, 1998: 173). These attempts vary in their success in the OSS. The 
workers under coordination of the supervisor and manager discuss alternatives for 
solving problems and attempt the most obvious solution. If the solution of a problem 
requires the cooperation of stakeholder departments, their representatives are invited 
for discussions with staff members and managers at the OSS. The proposal to 
improve service quality, for instance, by simplifying the procedure is sent for review 
to the management at the MJ who takes the final decision. As the OSS manager 
indicated: 
 
Problem solving is a part of our job. We discuss problems with staff, look at 
options for solutions. I try to show my staff the whole picture of our work rather 
than just bits and pieces […] Finally, we need to co rdinate our actions with the 
Ministry and, if they agree, we take a step forward. 
 
Thus, the research findings suggest that learning at the OSS does occur through the 
interaction of front-line employees with managers and colleagues from stakeholder 
departments. Learning does occur when new recruits wa ch experienced colleagues 
performing tasks and then attempt to replicate their actions. This form of guided 
participation is both intended when the mentor demonstrates an activity to a new 
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recruit and unintended when the newcomer noticed something happening and 
observed the activity accidentally.  
 
8.3 SUMMARY  
 
The following themes have emerged from the analysis of the interviews with the 
OSS managers and staff discussed in this chapter. The control model is sadly 
reflecting the situation of single-window centres. It is rooted in standard 
measurement, monitoring, correction and short-term targeting. The personnel’s time 
is utilised to the maximum in the pursuit of the service coverage and achievement of 
shifting goals. When each action is prescribed, there is no ambiguity left, and little 
room for imagination and development. When all processes are formalised, there is 
no space in the system. Yet organisational slack is more than just space for escape, it 
can become a space for learning. Organisational learning is not a goal in itself, but a 
key factor in sustainability. The fundamental principle of learning is the ability to 
identify, build and retain organisational knowledge. For the front-line staff, learning 
is constructed at the level of the routine; learning ew routines, standards, 
technologies, unlearning the old and becoming accomplished in meeting the 
changing numerical targets.  
 
Hence, this research suggests that learning does take place within the OSS 
environment, but too often in an underdeveloped form. Reporting on every action of 
the organisation could be viewed as a demonstration of rganisational reflexivity, but 
the pressure for short-term targets makes the manner i  which they are used 
defensive rather than reflective. In this environmet, learning comes into conflict 
with short-term problems and intensifies the performance and push capability to the 
limit. This is adaptive, located, structure-based larning, which is situated in the 





However, again looking at the spaces in between the ideal and real, there is evidence 
of learning strategies at work. In the single-window centres though time for informal 
interaction is severely restricted, storytelling among colleagues persists. Stories 
provide a valuable counterpoint to the relatively structured and controlled nature of 
the job. More importantly, telling of stories is a means by which perspectives are 
shared and shaped throughout the organisation, and “communities of practice” are 
developed.  
 
The individuals are operating at the level of “not learning” as identified by the lack 
of questioning, lack of challenge, the reluctance to take risks, and managerial control 
mechanisms, both implicit and explicit, which prevents the development of learning 
levels, and which reinforces the routinised steps. The participants discussed their 
management-employee relationships as “them and us” interactions in which 
individuals felt constrained. The control and constraints placed on the front-line 
employees have been clearly highlighted, with all prticipants claiming that they are 
not encouraged to take risks. Significantly, the narratives revealed the crucial role 
that managers can play in inhibiting learning in organisation. By constraining their 
teams to the prescribed rules and procedures, the managers reinforce the routinised 
steps. Therefore, the personnel are trapped in single loop learning in order to perform 
their job roles. Any new actions as sources of creativity, improvisation or motivation 
and prerequisites of double loop learning are inhibited by the management approach.  
 
Given the small sample and case study methodology used here, it is not possible to 
make any firm generalisations as to whether this obervation is representative of 
other OSS. The study tried to expose the process by which CoPs developed among 
the staff and the social role they played, underlining the ways in which CoPs can 
inform resistance within service work. The CoPs that developed in the single-
window centres may have contributed to maintaining order but in so doing they made 
the social order less open to management intervention. The development of CoPs 
was represented in the interviews by three central themes: 
1. learning the contradictions; 
2. realising the organisational limits; and  
3. working the system.  
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Each theme represents a stage in an underlying sequence of informal socialisation. In 
the first stage, newcomers learned the contradictions inherent in managerial 
ideology. The resulting disenchantment was strengthened by the frustration of 
realising the practical limits of the organisation, when managers did not provide 
solutions, organisational technologies and conditions did not meet their goals and 
expectations. Many of the senior employees became critical of the organisational 
system in which they worked. Turning to their peer group and informal socialisation 
became a substitute for relying on managers and formal training. The CoP that 
developed was therefore, in the case of staff, a substit te for formal organisational 
roles and expectations. It resembles the “communities of coping” (Korczynski, 
2003b) that took shape in the backstage and combined consent to procedures with a 
subversion of goals. The following chapter presents a  overview of the public sector 
culture with particular emphasis on the illegal practices in service delivery in order to 
examine the extent of the impact of the traditional bureaucracy on the culture of the 
new single-window organisations.   
 
 
9. CORRUPTION AS A CULTURAL ASPECT AND THE 
VIEWS OF SERVICE USERS   
 
This chapter examines the nature of illegal practices within single-window centres 
and customers’ views on the quality of public services delivered through the OSS. 
Cases of illegal practices are presented to illustrate the scope of the corruption in the 
new public service organisations. Customer views add  new perspective on the 
service integration and perceptions of the single-window centres compared to the 
traditional government bodies. Section 9.1 starts wi h explanation of the meaning of 
“corruption” in the country context. It illustrates examples of the misuse of power 
and resources by the political management of the MJ and administrative management 
within the OSS. Section 9.2 explores customers’ perceptions of the single-window 
centres and quality of public services delivered through OSS. The final section 
summarises the arguments presented in this chapter.  
 
9.1 ILLEGAL PRACTICES IN THE OSS    
 
Corruption is considered to be a part of public sector culture in Kazakhstan 
(Cummings, 2005). Though regulations on combating the power abuse and bribery 
existed in the Criminal Code of the USSR, the term “corruption” was not accepted 
officially, and was not actually in use. Corruption i  the Soviet Union was 
concentrated in the spheres of distribution, lobbying for administrative decisions and 
the delivery of services to the population: awarding of flats and vouchers to 
recreation centres, bonuses, public allowances, the purchase of imported home 
appliances etc. (Jandosova et al., 2002). Petty, but mass corruption when getting 
references, documents, commodities in short supply, rooms in hotels, medical 





Transition from a centralised control system of theeconomy to state regulation in 
Kazakhstan has promoted the formation of a more professional civil service, 
formalisation of many administrative procedures, especially in the budgetary system 
and in the state procurement sector, the strengthening of transparency and the 
introduction of electronic document turnover. The Law of RK “On Combating 
Corruption” was adopted with the assistance of international organisations in 1998 as 
a demonstration of the obligations of the state. Anti-Corruption Action Plans are 
adopted every four years, and a wide public campaign on combating corruption has  
recently been launched by the President. The government believes that problems of 
corruption can be solved through the acceptance of the special laws against 
corruption and the tightening of punishments, which result in massive arrests of 
government officials at the political and administrative levels. Corruption is a system 
of attitudes and values which penetrates all structu es of the Kazakhstani public 
sector and society. However, as highlighted in the introductory chapter, anti-
corruption measures seem to fail to diminish corruption and this is demonstrated by 
the stable position of Kazakhstan among the most corrupt countries in the world 
according to different international ratings (Kaufman et al, 2009; Transparency 
International, 2009). 
 
The public sector in Kazakhstan is characterised by “oriental” corruption meaning 
that corruption in the country is deeply entrenched in the social system (Perlman and 
Gleason, 2007). The corruption system is closely connected with all other social 
relations – professional, corporate, family. Governme t policy is dominated by the 
private interests of those who are at the top of the power structure or near the power. 
Bribes, are regarded as additional revenue for the public employees for performing 
their functions and make up the main part of their income. Corrupt behavior is 
considered acceptable by the society and is not strngly opposed (Jandosova et al., 
2002).    
 
However, in the Kazakhstani context by virtue of the character and scale, corruption 
is not simply a separate phenomenon, it is a part of the everyday lives of 
Kazakhstanians. Corruption has flourished in the single-window centres, which are 
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located at the heart of the distribution of highly demanded services: legal, land and 
military registration. Two cases described below illustrate corruption at high-level 
involving the large-scale appropriation of the state resources by the political 
management of the coordinating body and OSS managers.  
 
“Palms for Mrs. Minister” 
 
The first example illustrates a corrupt case known among the public as “Palms for 
Mrs. Minister”, which was related to the misuse of power by the former Minister of 
Justice, Mrs. Zagipa Balieyva (Benditskyi, 2008b). The MJ planned for the allocation 
of large investments to establish single-window centres in terms of offices, 
technologies, furniture, and palm trees, which the Minister wished to use to decorate 
the OSS and make them look more user-friendly. The Financial Police discovered the 
disappearance of these palms from the OSS offices in A tana and found out that they 
were transported to the private apartment of the Minister. There were contradictory 
versions presented in explanation of this situation. O  the one hand, the government 
officials acknowledged that the front-line staff did not take care of the palms, and the 
Minister agreed to keep them at home on a temporary b sis. On the other hand, the 
officials stated that they took the palms to the Minister’s house without asking her 
permission as a present to the newly appointed political leader. According to the 
third version announced by the Minister, she purchased the same type of palms for 
herself, and there might have been some confusion wth their transportation. Later 
the Financial Police cancelled the examination of this case without providing any 
public statements. Another case involving the  Minister was in the misuse of state 
resources related to accusations of selling two corporate cars, one a “Toyota Land 
Cruiser” to her own husband (Benditskyi, 2006a). Despit  public resonance in mass 
media and online many cases were not raised for investigation by the responsible 
authorities. Both examples provide just a snapshot of he large-scale corruption 
flourishing within the single-window policy framework. The participants mentioned 
stories of the single-window centres, which were built according to the reports, but 
never existed in reality due to the misuse of allocted state funds by the management 
of the MJ and OSS. While these examples illustrated unethical behaviour of the 
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political management, the following cases examine illegal practices among the OSS 
managers who followed their leaders in exercising corruption.         
 
OSS as a “Family Business”  
 
The OSS of Karasay Rayon in Almaty region was at the centre of public scandal due 
to the behaviour of its manager, Mr. Nurushev. As journalists discovered, the 
building of the OSS was used as collateral on a loan from a commercial bank for half 
a million US dollars over a 20 year period. The OSS building was not owned by the 
coordinating body as it should be, but by the family of the OSS manager. During the 
massive campaign to establish single-window centres in 2005-2006, Mr. Nurushev 
worked as a senior manager at the local department of justice and later was appointed 
to the position of the OSS manager in Karasay rayon. His wife, Mrs. Nurusheva, 
rented the building and land for the OSS. At that time property construction and 
prices for land reached a peak, and high number of clients visited the OSS to register 
their documents. The clients brought significant profits for the Nurushev family both 
through paying illegal payments to accelerate the speed of public services as well as 
using the services of their businesses, which were located around the single-window 
centre such as a cafe, car washing and a hotel.  
 
The service users published a price list for illega services at the OSS in Karasay 
rayon online, for example, “to come to the operator without queuing” cost 10.000 
tenge (or 50 GBP); “to get a confirmation on absence of property” – 100 GBP; “to 
start-up a business company” – 200 GBP. One businessman left a comment that he 
paid 3.500 GBP to the “mediators” who helped him to re-register land in Karasay 
rayon within one day, and he was satisfied with fast service. According to the official 
statistics published by the local department of justice, over 75.000 cases of property 
registration were registered in Karasay rayon in 2007. Knowing the amount of the 
illegal fees and the number of services delivered through the OSS, one can easily 
imagine the scope and extent of corruption within this particular single-window 
centre. Importantly, the coordinating body did not make any attempts to investigate 
this case. It may be inferred that this lack of reaction means that the political elite are 
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well aware of such situations in the regions. Besid, one official from the MJ 
mentioned that the staff at the Ministry were not allowed to read the newspaper 
“Vremya”, which was actively investigating corrupt cases in the single-window 
centres.  
 
As the above cases illustrated, the single-window centres as new public service 
organisations were not immune to the corrupt culture of the traditional bureaucracy 
and adopted corruption in daily operations. The patronage, relations-based system 
played an important role in the distribution of powers and resources, and protecting 
network members. The following section explores the customers’ perceptions of the 
single-window centres and quality of public services d livered through OSS.    
 
9.2 ONE STOP SHOPS: CUSTOMER VIEWS     
 
The culture of the single-window centres needs to be considered within the overall 
public sector environment, which had significant impact on the customer-oriented 
bureaucracy. The rating of 34 public service providers in terms of administrative 
barriers was published by the Sange Research Centre in 2007 on the basis of a survey 
poll of 5.760 respondents across 14 regions and had wide resonance in mass media 
and government (Jandosova, et al., 2007). Table 11 presents the ratings of public 
service providers in terms of administrative barriers with position 1 as having the 












Table 11: Rating of Public Service Providers in terms of Administrative Barriers 
 




1 Land registration  11 Departments of justice  
State hospitals 
 
2 Architecture  12 Customs authorities  
State medical centres   
State Registration authorities   
Healthcare  
Education  
Military registration bodies 
 
3 Passport desks   13 Criminal justice bodies  
 
4 Employment and social protection 
bodies  
14 Railway service bodies  




6 Courts  16 Energy service  
 
7 Tax Inspection 
Traffic Administrative Police 
Migration Police 
17 Environmental protection  
Financial Police  
One Stop Shop  
Water supply bodies 
 
8 Sanitary-epidemic bodies  
Local municipalities 
 
18 Secondary schools  
9 Telecommunications   
 






Adopted from: Jandosova et al. (2007) Administrative Barriers as a Source for Corrupt Practice in 
Civil Service 
 
Table 11 shows that the single-window centres were positioned in 17th place along 
with environmental protection, financial police and water supply bodies. Only 
secondary schools and border security bodies were pceived as less bureaucratic 
than the single-window centres in terms of administrative barriers. The OSS 
stakeholders, such as land registration, passport desks, property centres are among 
the top five of the most bureaucratic public organis tions. Departments of justice 
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(11th position), state registration and military registration authorities (12th position) 
are also lagging behind the OSS. In terms of corruption the single-window centres 
were perceived as the least corrupt service provider compared to the other 34 public 
service providers (Jandosova et al., 2007: 41-42). 11 percent of respondents stated 
that services in the OSS were delivered on the basis of relationships, and 17 percent 
of respondents complained about impolite customer service (Jandosova et al., 2007). 
Overall, the OSS were considered by the customers as the least bureaucratic and 
corrupt service provider. 
  
The MJ managed to use this report as a proof of the successful progress of the 
service integration policy. In response to the journalistic question, what measures 
were taken by the MJ to reduce corruption in the OSS, the Minister of Justice, Mrs. 
Zagipa Baliyeva, responded that the citizens assessed the work of the OSS positively 
compared to many other government organisations (Benditskyi, 2008b). The 
Minister explained that problems with long queues and delays with documents at the 
initial stage of implementation were caused by the s ortage of offices. With the 
expansion of single-window centres across the country, the number of delays in 
service provision sharply decreased. As Mrs. Balieyva explained:  
 
For example, in 2007 0.4 % of documents were delayed in delivering 2 million 
services whereas in 2008 OSS delayed only 0.18 % of documents in the 
provision of 3 million services. It was planned to open 182 OSS in 2007, but we 
opened 214 OSS. Currently 260 OSS work in all regions and towns […] Last 
year the OSS at the rayon level delivered 4.510.749 public services. And we are 
going to increase the number of OSS offices up to 500 covering 100 priority 
public services. (2008)     
 
As highlighted in Chapter 6, the political management put emphasis on quantitative 
characteristics (such as number of services, number of clients), which were tangible 
and much easier to apply in performance evaluation c mpared to qualitative 
characteristics (such as nature of services, extent of customer satisfaction). The 
overall conclusion of the Minister’s speech is that progress of the service integration 
policy was successful and followed the best internatio l practice in Europe. Over 
time the customers have become used to the single-windo  centres and evaluated 
their performance in a much more positive way compared to the traditional 
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government bodies. This fact was not left ignored by the political managers, some of 
whom, for example, the Minister of Education and Scien e made official 
announcements that they disagreed with the survey results published by the Sange 
Research Centre providing statistical data on the performance of their organisations. 
However, none of them was able to provide the results of other customer satisfaction 
surveys.    
 
The following discussion explores the reasons for specific public service, such as 
property registration delivered through single-window arrangements being corrupt 
(Jandosova et al., 2007: 41-42). As mentioned in Chapter 5, the political party “Nur-
Otan” made public accusations against the MJ due to the poor performance and 
unethical behaviour of the single-window centres. “Nur-Otan” initiated an 
investigation of the service delivery process in the OSS in response to the customers’ 
complaints. According to the Law “On Property Registration” enacted in August 
2007, the waiting time for property registration has increased from 5 working days to 
15 working days. The members of the “Nur-Otan” party monitored the length of time 
required for property registration, which in fact took maximum two days including 
time for postal transportation between stakeholders and short breaks for the 
personnel, whereas the service itself took 75 minutes. They also reported that the 
mediators advertised in the local newspapers and this helped to accelerate the speed 
of services. It is worth highlighting that the political party decided to select the 
single-window centres, which were rated as the least corrupt by the customers as a 
case for public investigation rather than any other public service provider. As 
illustrated in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6, many politica  managers disliked the 
enthusiasm of the Minister of Justice in promoting service integration, which put at 
risk their power authorities over financial and human resources, especially if more 
services were to be delegated to the OSS. The ministers and management of the 
political party were part of the political network, and the actions of “Nur-Otan” 
towards the single-window centres suggested that some f them were concerned 
about the increasing power and popularity of the OSS among the public.  
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The significance of the property registration service for Kazakhstani citizens needs to 
be considered in the socio-economic context of the country. As described in Chapter 
4, property during 2003 - 2006 was the most profitable investment both for citizens 
and businessmen. Interest rates of deposits in the commercial banks varied from 
around 10 percent with an annual inflation rate of 18-20 percent, while the property 
prices increased twice or even three times every year. Most clients did not have the 
full amount to purchase property, so they took mortgage credits to buy property with 
the aim of re-selling it for a higher price. These clients found themselves trapped 
within short deadlines set up by the banks to submit documents from the single-
window centres. The MJ increased the length of procedures for property registration 
from 5 to 15 working days, which immediately resulted in high demand of clients to 
accelerate the speed of service for “extra” payment. The shadow operations around 
property registration reached a peak. If the legal fee for property registration cost 50 
GBP within 15 working days, the “extra” fee for accelerating speed of service within 
5 days cost around 900 GBP.  
 
The Financial Police initiated checks of mass media a vertisements which suggested 
illegal services. There was wide publicity of the results of investigation by the 
responsible authorities and several OSS managers were dismissed. In response to the 
government and public critique, which put at risk the implementation of the service 
integration policy and reputation ofthe Minister of Justice, legislation was amended 
in October 2008 which enabled clients to register property within the standard period 
of time (15 days) or, for additional legal fee, within shorter period of time (2 days). 
The key point of the policy was that the clients could pay legally to accelerate the 
speed of service compared to the earlier practice of illegal fees. The interesting 
observation is that the MJ made these amendments only after the end of the boom of 
the property market when demand for this type of servic  sharply declined as the 
global crisis hit Kazakhstan. In Astana the number of services for property 
registration in 2008 reduced 10 times compared to the same period in 2007. Another 
observation is that the amount of the legal fee to speed-up the process of registration, 
which is 500 GBP, turned out to be twice as much as the illega  fee, thus, making 
corrupt payment more beneficial for the clients compared to the official payment. 
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The clients’ comments expressed online about the amnd ents to the legislation 
regarding the new legal fees to accelerate the service are quite sceptical in this 
regard: 
 
100.000 tenge is too expensive when you can do it for 30.000 tenge. Then, who 
is going to pay legally? The Ministry will have even more people willing to pay.  
 
As always with our government: the right hand doesn’t know what the left hand 
does. This won’t change anything: those who takes bribes, will continue to do it, 
that’s all!  
 
Both quotes illustrate the clients’ mistrust of the government and scepticism about 
the capacity to implement the original intentions of the policy. The first customer 
makes a proposition that the state body has secured a source of illegal payments by 
making the legal fee three times more expensive than e amount of the bribe. Thus, 
although the new legislation and official declarations of the political managers might 
create an illusion of fighting corruption and reducing bureaucracy, in practice policy 
implementation often fails due to the culture of the raditional bureaucracy, which the 
new public service organisations seem not to be abl to overcome.    
 
Another example to illustrate the impact of the traditional bureaucracy on the 
customer-oriented bureaucracy is a new service of “application for state nursery 
care” launched in January 2009. As Table 11 illustrates, nurseries were positioned in 
10th place in the rating of public service providers in terms of administrative barriers. 
It is useful to give brief background information opublic nursery care during Soviet 
Union and post-Soviet period to understand the reasons for the corrupt nature of this 
service. During Soviet times child care and pre-school education was given special 
attention by the central government. Mothers could send their children from 6 
months old to 6 years to the public nurseries and pre-school child care, and work on a 
full-time basis. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the government of Kazakhstan 
could not afford the funding of public child care institutions and many of them were 
abolished. During the privatization campaign in the1990s many nursery buildings 
were privatized by entrepreneurs, who launched their businesses: restaurants, 
casinos, offices etc. Due to the shortage of places vailable in the public nurseries 
and the development of the market economy, high demand for child care led to the 
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opening of private nurseries, whose services could nly be afforded by a limited 
group of clients. For example, in Astana the monthly payment in the public nursery 
costs 10.000 tenge (or 50 GBP), the same service in the private sector varies from 
50.000 to 100.000 tenge (250-500 GBP), with the average monthly salary of a public 
sector employee of 200-250 GBP. Normally, parents registered their children for 
public nursery care at the pre-school education department within the local 
municipality. High demand for the service led to long queues and bribe-seeking 
behaviour by the government officials and managers of nurseries. Since January 
2009 the service of registration for public child care has been delegated from local 
municipalities to the single-window centres on a pilot basis.   
 
According to the new service arrangements clients write an application and choose a 
nursery from a list by area of residence. The application is processed within one day, 
and clients get a confirmation number of the child’s place on a waiting list. This 
service is provided free of charge. Overall, the process of application for public child 
care at the OSS followed the same administrative procedures as it was delivered at 
the local municipalities. Although the service was now provided in a more 
convenient physical environment, the service quality however, – application for 
public child care and getting a place in the public nursery – has remained the same. 
The clients have low expectations regarding service improvement as a result of the 
delegation of responsibilities from local municipalities to the single-window centres. 
Comments from the parents expressed online show their disappointment, mistrust 
and emotional stress caused by the poor quality of service and concerns for their 
children:  
 
This will be a chaos! I have been registering my flat or 6 months until I reached 
the manager of OSS and made a scandal! And now our child en will not be able 
to go to the kindergarten, only through personal rel tions.    
 
I have two children and we are 1.400 in the queue for child care. How many 
state-funded nurseries are there in the South-Eastern district? Two! With 3 
groups! The question is whether my children will go to the nursery before the 
school. The response is: NO!!!!!  It is just mathematics! 
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Many parents have been in the queue for child care fo  several years and are 
concerned that they might lose their position in the queue and have to start again. 
The clients believe that they would have to pay illegal fees in order to guarantee a 
place for their child in a public nursery.  
 
How will parents monitor the progress of queuing? Or will we continue to run 
for years and years with this piece of paper and search where to give a bribe?  
 
Nothing will change, but there will be even more headaches. As we gave 
payments, so we will continue and everyone accepts them, and everyone is 
happy, they even tell you “thank you”.  
 
Previous customers’ experience at the public servic organisations associated with 
ineffectiveness and lack of professionalism has had a negative impact on the image 
of the single-window centres. The clients believe that the real solution is to build 
more public nurseries. The negative attitude of citizens toward the government is 
well summarised in the following comment:  
 
This will not change anything. We have been staying for 2.5 years in the queue, 
in 42nd position, and we are still there. Local akimats will still keep control in 
their hands. The irresponsibility of the government in decision-making and lack 
of thinking on policy actions leads to mistrust, and I have not trusted it for a long 
time. 
 
Thus, the overall message from the service users is mistrust of the government to be 
able to improve the quality of service as a result of he re-distribution of functions 
between public service providers. 
 
This chapter explored the impact of the traditional bureaucracy on the culture of the 
customer-oriented bureaucracy by examining the illega  practices adopted within 
single-window centres and customer views on the quality of public services delivered 
through the OSS. The final section summarises the findings of this chapter in the 








Within a short period of time the single-window centr s received positive evaluations 
by the customers and were perceived as the least bureaucratic and corrupt public 
service provider. This fact was not positively accepted by the stakeholders who were 
concerned about their positions, power and access to resources. One of the research 
findings was that the implementation of service integration policy has led to 
unintended outcomes. The key aim of the policy was to reduce corruption by 
eliminating direct contact between service providers and customers. In practice, 
however, the corrupt circle has included a new player – a representative of the OSS – 
in the role of a mediator between government bodies and users. Frequent cases of 
corrupt offences by the political management of the MJ, managers of the OSS and 
front-line staff across regions, illustrated in this chapter, have strengthened the 
negative image of the government. The scale of corruption at the OSS undermines 
positive improvements achieved by the policy implementation. As a participant from 
the MJ commented in this regard:  
 
Every service has its own price. The most popular services are registration of 
property, land, business. Besides, the OSS managers have to pay regularly for 
their position as managers. The amount of illegal profit that flows from clients 
through the OSS to the Ministry is incredible!  
 
The above quote illustrates that the OSS managers we participants of the social 
corrupt network: they have to follow traditional practices otherwise they would have 
to leave the jobs despite their professional achievements and apply to other public 
organisations. The new public organisations adopted th  culture of the traditional 
bureaucracy and were not able to overcome the corrupt nature of public service 
delivery. The social network within the administrative system has put significant 
pressure on the OSS to follow the traditional patterns of work practices. The 
following final chapter presents the discussion of research questions and answers, 
and gives the conclusion of the thesis.   
 
 
10. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. CONCLUSION.   
 
This chapter present a discussion of the answers to the research questions outlined in 
Chapters 1 and 4. The service integration policy was an attempt of the Kazakhstani 
government to reduce red tape in the civil service and improve the quality of public 
services. An important point of departure for understanding the complexity of the 
implementation of the NPM reform in the Kazakhstani context is that it is rather 
complex in itself. NPM is a mixed bag of management a d organisational theories 
that are to some extent inconsistent with one another and do not always give much 
indication of how to actually organise public administration (Boston et al. 1996). In 
addition, the actual implementation of NPM varies considerably from one country to 
another (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). This variety and complexity are due partly to 
different national contexts, but also to cognitive problems among the executives in 
relating to the reform wave. This research, by focusing on the implementation of the 
managerial reform, such as integrated service delivery in the transitional context of 
Kazakhstan has added even more complexity to the academic debate.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the service int gration process in Kazakhstan, 
using the experiences of those involved in the policy implementation: the managers 
and front-line employees of the single-window centrs. A further aim was to consider 
the utility of concepts such as organisational learning and “communities of practice” 
in analysing service integration policy. The final aim was to analyse the conceptual 
and practical difficulties associated with the transfer of NPM ideas on customer 
orientation to a transitional context such as Kazakhstan. This concluding chapter 
summarises the key findings from the research, discusses the extent to which the data 
collected answers the original research questions, considers the research as a learning 
process (from methodological as well as theoretical and empirical perspectives), and 
sets out some issues for further research.         
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10.1 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS  
 
As indicated in Chapter 1 and in Chapter 4, the resarch was based on three research 
questions related to the experiences of those involved in the implementation of the 
single-window policy, the problems of service integration in a transitional context, 
and the usefulness of “organisational learning” and “communities of practice” 
concepts in analysing public service integration.   
 
1. What are the experiences of those involved in the implementation of public 
service integration through single-window arrangements in Kazakhstan? 
 
2. In what ways is service integration a problematic concept in a transitional 
context such as Kazakhstan? 
 
3. Are concepts such as “organisational learning” and “communities of 
practice” useful tools in analysing public service integration?  
 
This section discusses each question in turn, considering the material gathered in 
relation to each question, and then summarises, with an overall indication of how far 
the research answered the original research questions.       
 
Research question 1  
 
What are the experiences of those involved in the implementation of public service 
integration through single-window arrangements in Kazakhstan? 
 
This question was intended to bring an understanding of how public service 
integration was implemented and experienced at the local level. The single-window 
policy deals with multiple service providers and faces fundamental challenges in 
relation to a cultural shift from the traditional bureaucracy to the customer-orientated 
bureaucracy, the context of which is crucial in shaping the impact of the service 
integration experience. The single-window policy also affects those using public 
services through single-window arrangements. In respon e to this question there are 
a number of aspects of this analysis that it is important to restate here.       
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As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the research points t  strong centralised control 
over the single-window centres. Although the single-window centres have their own 
budgets, and staff and authorities to manage these r ources, they still rely on 
managerial directives from the central level. The ov rall approach in managing the 
OSS in Kazakhstan has followed the traditional pattern of managing the regional 
branches of the central government body by imposing total technological control 
over the performance of the OSS managers and front-line staff. The theme of strong 
centralised control emerges throughout the thesis. The control model of the single-
window centres is rooted in standard quantitative masurement, monitoring and 
short-term targeting. As described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the routines of public 
service delivery are specific and detailed, and the rol s of the managers and front-
line staff are restricted. The research found that, although some participants (the 
managers of the OSS and MJ) felt that good progress ha  been made in improving 
service delivery since the single-window policy was l unched, contradictions in 
policy implementation create frustration and resistance among the front-line 
personnel who deliver customer service, as they often have to deal with intensive 
emotional labour and a contradictory dilemma between quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the public services. There are also difficulties for different aspects of 
communication between the front-office and back-office, which have a negative 
impact on the public service delivery and overall performance of the single-window 
centres.  
 
Service integration policy in the Kazakhstani context is dynamic; there have been 
several changes in policy and procedures, such as delegation of service provision 
from the government departments to the single-window centres, the adoption of the 
single-access model of service delivery at the pilot stage, and its replacement with 
the alternative-access model and the return of the unctions to the service providers. 
These changes present significant challenges for the public service providers. As 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, legislative changes i  the procedures of public service 
provision, and the resistance of the political and dministrative civil servants to the 
new policy, have led to shift away from the original single-access model of service 
delivery, which was successfully piloted to the alternative-access model and which 
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does not threaten the positions of the stakeholders in terms of power, resources and 
access to the illegal practices unlike the original model. The OSS managers and 
front-line staff commented on a change of relationship with the stakeholders from 
initial resistance and confrontation towards mutual cooperation after the alternative-
access model was adopted and functions on service provision were returned back to 
the government departments. The new policy has resulted in providing an alternative 
for the Kazakhstani customers to get access to the public services by visiting 
different government departments or applying for several services at one location, 
which have a more user-friendly and customer-oriented approach. The service 
integration policy has changed the stereotype of the government officials that 
customer service can only be delivered by the professionals who have special degree. 
The new policy has had significant impact across regions and the entire public sector 
by stimulating partnerships, working across professional and organisational 
boundaries, among service providers. New technologies, standards and procedures 
have introduced new ways of service delivery through single-window arrangements 
and new ways of interacting among service providers, and between service providers 
and customers.  
 
This thesis argues that pubic service integration plicy has not been implemented to 
the full extent in the Kazakhstani context. The culture of the traditional bureaucracy 
has prevented the adoption of democratic, rule-based policies and procedures, in 
favour of relations-based habits of thought and practice. As discussed in Chapter 9, 
these paternalistic, relations-based cultural values ar  deeply rooted in Kazakhstani 
society, and the values of citizen-centred service, trust, teamwork and public 
accountability collided with the values of the government-centred and centralised 
system. In the current system, government officials are not motivated to implement 
service integration successfully as it puts at risk their positions, access to the 
resources and illegal practices, and exposes their performance under public scrutiny.      
 
These aspects highlight the complexities of service int gration policy and the 
difficulties it creates for all those involved. A number of problems with the policy 
were noted, such as the lack of trust and effective communication between service 
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providers, the dominating quantitative nature of performance measurement, the 
enforced strong centralised control over single-window centres and weak personnel 
policies. Some of these concerns are being addressed through changes, such as the 
establishment of inter-governmental working groups and the provision of on-the-job 
training by the stakeholders. However, concerns still remain over the role of the 
single-window centres among public service providers and the role of the service 
integration policy in the administrative reform. All of these policy-related factors 
shape the context and possibilities for public servic  integration.                
 
Research question 2 
 
In what ways is service integration a problematic con ept in a transitional context 
such as Kazakhstan? 
 
Service integration is difficult to achieve in practical terms, and problematic to 
understand conceptually. This question was intended to address the ways in which it 
has been defined and conceptualised, and how the process has been facilitated in 
Kazakhstan.  
 
As the literature review of the NPM theories in Chapter 2 suggests, it is important to 
understand the country context in which the manageri l reforms are implemented. A 
strategic planning tool called SWOT-analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, 
and Threats) was used to provide a framework for structuring my answer to research 
question 2 in the following discussion (see Table 12). SWOT-analysis groups key 
pieces of information into two main categories: 1) internal factors - strengths and 
weaknesses internal to the organisation (for example, personnel, finance, 
technologies); and 2) external factors - opportunities and threats presented by the 
external environment (macroeconomic matters, technological change, legislation, 













1. Policy was initiated by the President  Lack of follow-up political support to drive 
the policy. 
 
Lack of clear and realistic vision of service 
integration reform. 
 
2. Public service standards were 
introduced. 
   
Service standards were not able to make 
in-depth changes of existing working 
practices. 
  
3. Rapidly improving technological 
infrastructure and computer literacy 
of the population. 
 
Increasing digital divide between urban 
and rural areas.   
 
4. Good human resource capital  
(adult literacy rate 98%) 
  
Reducing level of human capital with a 
dehumanising routine environment.  
Lack of training, inadequate payment. 
 
5. Development of partnerships between 
different government bodies and 
professions.  
    
Resistance of the political management to 
promote service integration.  
 
6. Time and cost savings for both 
service providers and users 
 
Lack of customer views for evaluation  
7. Use of technologies to improve 
access to the public services and 
information. 
Technologies are adopted as a means of 






1. Political ambitions to engage in anti-
corruption and service modernisation 
reform.   
Corrupt use of allocated public funds for 
service integration.  
 
Domination of group and individual  
interests over public service tasks.  
 
2. Emergence of new customers’ needs 
(e.g. rising unemployment, migration 
from rural regions to cities) 
 
Policy implementation could be at risk of 
continuation in the case of political 
changes 
3. Involvement of new stakeholders 
among government bodies   
Increasing social gap: emergence of 





Table 12 illustrates that each of the factors has strengths and weaknesses, and the 
success or failure of the service integration initiative depends on the government’s 
choice to overcome barriers and move away from a command-control system or 
follow traditional paternalistic and corrupt system. Service integration is conceptually 
difficult due to the lack of a clear and general definition. Nonetheless there are some 
commonalities in conceptualisations of service integration; particularly that service 
integration involves partnerships, shared strategies, teamwork, and negotiating new 
identities. It is challenging in a practical sense given the size and scope of the OSS 
policy. Unlike many service integration initiatives that were more narrowly focused 
(for example, e-tax services), the single-window policy was taking a broad “whole of 
government” and multi-channel approach that presentd larger and more complex 
challenges. The constraints faced by those involved in public service integration can 
be divided into four types: political, operational, technological and cultural. Each of 




Promoting public service integration within a hierarchical, centralised context such 
as Kazakhstan is both beneficial and extremely challenging. It is beneficial as it helps 
to begin the service integration process in order to educe bureaucracy and deliver 
better quality public services.  Furthermore, it contributes to developing trust and 
effective communication between service providers. However, not all service 
providers are willing to participate in and support service integration, as successful 
service integration would put their performance under public scrutiny. These 
difficulties were discussed in more depth in Chapters 5 and 6. The single-window 
policy encouraged government-wide service integration, while the political system in 
Kazakhstan emphasised hierarchy and strong centralisation. The Kazakhstani 
politicians were resistant to join inter-departmental, intergovernmental and inter-
sectoral initiatives over which they had less contrl in regard to decision-making and 
allocation of resources. Lack of strong political support pulled back service 
integration, which resulted in the delivery of only 25 services (including 16 services 
of the coordinating authority) during four years ofimplementation. Like the 
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politicians, administrative government officials were also concerned about losing 
power, status and their source of illegal payments if ervice integration was 
successfully implemented. Political battles between the management of the MJ as the 
coordinator of the OSS policy and other service providers with respect to the transfer 
of functions, services and resources persisted along the entire process of policy 
implementation. Several steps were taken to improve government accountability and 
transparency: service standards were introduced in the OSS and made more easily 
accessible to the customers; electronic performance management systems enabled the 
monitoring of the statistical data of service provision; a new grievance system 
allowed customers to send their complaints to the OSS managers and get feedback. 
However, as highlighted in Table 12, recent political hanges in the MJ put at risk 
further the OSS policy implementation by delegating the coordination functions to 
the local municipalities, which lack experience in building partnerships and 
delivering joined-up services, and the capacity to manage and promote the service 




There are challenges of how far and in what ways public service integration can be 
measured, as there is no compulsory obligation for the government departments to 
integrate services through single-window arrangements. While some service 
providers provide public services directly to the customers and through single-
window centres on an alternative basis, the majority of government departments 
continue to enjoy their monopolisation of information and services.  
 
The single-window policy adopted a new multi-channel approach for Kazakhstan. 
Integrated channel delivery in Kazakhstan involved bringing together face-to-face, 
telephone and postal channels (with e-government in a short-term vision) to provide 
citizens with good quality services through a combination of channels. Among the 
benefits of this approach were improved access to the services, particularly for 
clients from far remote regions, better management of the public service 
infrastructure on a government-wide basis rather than institutions-based. The 
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integrated channel management strategy of the single-window policy recognised that 
the drive for cost efficiency must be balanced against the need for fairness and equity 
in access to services. For this reason, involvement of the postal offices as customer 
contact points enabled better access to remote rural communities, which were 
previously under-served by the government. Given the poor technological 
infrastructure and low level of computer literacy in the country, it was important that 
the single-window centres provided a face-to-face channel for the service users who 
were unable or unwilling to use other channels. Designing of joined-up services was 
complicated by differences among the stakeholders in their policies, laws, 
experiences and methods of working. Fostering servic  integration required 
information sharing across professions and organisations, and building new 
capacities for front-line customer service, which was problematic in a culture of 
mistrust, lack of tradition to work in partnerships, and lack of customer-orientation.  
 
Service integration is also problematic in the Kazakhstani context due to the lack of 
adequate training and professional development for the front-line personnel. The 
participants commented on the gaps in the knowledge and skills required for 
delivering the multiple services of different stakeholders at one location. A number 
of different practical approaches have taken place in the case study organisations in 
Astana as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. These have included the development of on-
the-job training and induction schemes, as well as coaching methods to facilitate 
knowledge exchange between the front-office and back-office staff, senior 
colleagues and new recruits, to develop a mix of skills required for customer service. 
The important role of the “communities of practice” in providing support to the staff 
members was discussed in Chapter 8. It was noted that this on-the-job training can 
often be multi-functional. For example, inductions ot only improve the new 
recruits’ understanding about service delivery processes, but also have a social 
function to facilitate their introduction to the organisational culture, norms and 
values of the single-window centres, as well as to help them meet staff from the 
back-offices of the stakeholder departments. Yet each method of training also has 
limitations resulting from the pressures of deliverng an increasing number of public 
services, the constraints of funding, the contradictions in legislation and the 
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difficulties of intensive customer service. It has been emphasised throughout that 
service integration is a multifaceted process with a number of levels including the 
macro level of policy and the micro level of personal experiences. While examples of 
both levels have been considered, it should also be not d that there are also a range 
of other integration strategies in addition to those which have been discussed in this 
thesis, for example, providing services through an e-government online portal, which 
is currently under construction.    
 
Technological barriers   
 
Technological factors closely relate to the operational factors adding complexity to 
the overall situation. A number of researchers highlight the full and perfect power of 
electronic monitoring, which makes any other form of c ntrol unnecessary (Fernie, 
1998). This work illustrated the imperfections of technological devices by arguing 
that customer service relations cannot adopt this simplistic model of “total control” 
(Bain and Taylor, 2000). As discussed in Chapter 6 and in Chapter 8, control over 
staff performance was conducted through the use of t chnological devices, however, 
the use of technologies was limited when it came to capturing qualitative aspects of 
customer service. This thesis found that even low-skilled employees, such as the 
front-line staff at the single-window centres, were difficult to manage. Their control 
was a complex task, and the core of this complexity relied on the fact that the nature 
of their work involved intensive customer interaction, and the use of technologies in 
such cases could at best only be partial. The front-line personnel were challenged 
with two fundamentally contradictory logics: a need to be cost-efficient and a desire 
to be customer-orientated. The electronic monitoring system created a myth of 
“perfect information” and total control. However, the reality was far from accurate, 
reliable or complete. An important part was missing, such as the tacit skills and 
interpretative knowledge of the front-line staff, as well as service quality perceived 
by the customers. It was demonstrated in Chapter 6 that the new technologies seemed 
to be an excellent tool for exercising and extending centralisation over the OSS 
managers and front-line staff.  
 
 251 
Cultural barriers   
 
Service integration was implemented in Kazakhstan to a limited extent due to the 
prevailing culture of the traditional bureaucracy, which favours paternalistic, 
relations-based habits of thought and practice. The Kazakhstani culture rejected the 
minimalist conception of the state, its role as a service provider, and the individual’s 
role within society. The Kazakhstani culture conceives government as constituting, 
in the first instance, personal obligation and duty, with relationships depending upon 
networks and mutual obligations. The emphasis on the vertical dimension of the 
government constrained the development of shared values, which are required for a 
blending of organisational cultures across departmen al and jurisdictional boundaries. 
Not only did government officials tend to look vertically rather than horizontally, 
they were also inclined to support departmental, rather than inter-departmental and 
inter-governmental, initiatives. International practice suggests that creating a 
common organisational culture is a lengthy process r quiring both the removal of 
structural and managerial barriers and the development of shared commitment to 
such overriding values as teamwork and citizen-centred service. These 
considerations partially applied to the single-window policy efforts to create a new 
organisational culture and develop a new profession of front-line employees, who 
came from different organisations and professions in order to provide a range of 
public services. The aim was to develop and embed a service excellence culture 
within the single-window centres. This was facilitated by, extensive on-the-job 
training, induction schemes, and negotiations with the stakeholders. However, the 
single-window centres were not able to resist a government-wide culture 
characterised by patronage and corrupt nature of service provision. As Chapter 9 
discussed, this research found a strong link between th  government-wide culture 
and the culture in the single-window centres, which adopted the traditional pattern. 
Hence, the culture of the traditional bureaucracy was a significant barrier to 
successful service integration as it prevented the cultivation of a shared commitment 
to the values of citizen-centred service, trust, teamwork and public accountability, all 
the elements of which collided with the relations-based values of the government-
centred system. 
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The OSS policy did not challenge the prevailing traditional structure that exists in 
Kazakhstani administration, nor did it create a connecting network among the public 
service providers. The new organisations did not shift t e locus of budgetary 
authority and managerial responsibility from the centr  to a point close to the 
delivered service. The single-window centres remain hierarchically dependent on the 
MJ, and report directly to the authority to which tey originally belonged. The 
relationships between the MJ and the OSS are formal, and many managers of the 
single-window centres have adopted hierarchical managerial styles towards their 
staff, who are severely constrained by constant supervision. This is far from the 
normal NPM trend, in which a key point about the autonomy granted, is that it seeks 
to decentralise budgets and to take authority away from the centre.  
 
The accountability process follows the traditional p ttern. Evaluation of the front-line 
staff’s work is made through quantitative measures, whereas qualitative targets such 
as the level of citizens’ satisfaction remains ignored. Enhancement of services 
follows the top-down traditional process where the central government determines 
what is needed for users. As the participants commented in their interviews, the 
services of the OSS were selected and decided centrally by the government without 
any consultation with customers. In NPM theory evaluation of customer satisfaction 
is one of the techniques to yield important data and improve quality. While the 
Kazakhstani government declares a customer-orientato  principle as a slogan for 
public modernisation reform, the citizens remain outside of the policy-making 
process.  
     
These research findings showed that public service integration in Kazakhstan was 
driven both by the global trends for managerial reforms and country-specific 
political, organisational, technological and cultural factors. This research found that 
the global drivers for integrated service provision in Kazakhstan were diverse. These 
included globalisation, pressure from the international community, public 
dissatisfaction with the government, and the opportunities offered by the 
technologies for shifts in service delivery. A combination of these factors influenced 
the government’s intention to turn to the opportunities presented for joined-up 
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working. The Kazakhstani OSS inherited many elements of the traditional public 
service system, such as hierarchical and centralised control, a lack of customer-
orientation and the corrupt nature of the public servic s. In many ways the single-
window centres became victims of the political ambitions to solve public service 
failures and eliminate corruption. The pressure to match political promises trapped 
the single-window centres in a cycle of short-term results thinking. The concepts of 
clear targets, performance indicators and transparency collided with a culture that 
was strongly influenced by legal control, a patronage system, and bureaucratic 
administrative procedures. The new technologies did improve access to the public 
services and performance monitoring, however, they b came an excellent tool for 
exercising and extending centralised control. The OSS did not reduce corruption, on 
the contrary, the policy implementation resulted in new forms of corrupt schemes 
involving the front-line employees as the “mediators” between the service providers 
and service users.    
 
The difficulties of service integration have been a theme throughout this thesis, but 
the progress which has been made in Kazakhstan and Astana in particular, has also 
been noted. The difficulties arise from understanding what public service integration 
means, and how it can be put into practice. Practice-related issues related to service 
integration were discussed throughout Chapters 5 – 8 and a number of responses 
were found in Kazakhstan, but it remains a complex and debated topic.             
 
Research question 3:            
 
Are concepts such as “organisational learning” and “communities of practice” 
useful tools in analysing public service integration?     
 
The prominence of organisational learning and “communities of practice” in the 
literature on service integration makes critical analysis important. In order to answer 
this question a critical review of the relevant areas of the organisational learning 
literature was carried out, which formed the basis for the analysis of the nature of 
organisational learning and “communities of practice” within the single-window 
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centres in Chapter 8. The perceptions of learning i the interviews with the 
participants related to their experiences in servic integration were also analysed.  
 
The prominence of organisational learning in the servic  integration literature is 
reflected in the processes of the design and delivery of joined-up multiple services 
described by the participants. The “communities of practice” developed among the 
front-line personnel are intended to facilitate learning and knowledge exchange by 
passing information and skills from senior colleagues to the new recruits. There was 
an emphasis in some interviews on the importance of the CoP to support the learning 
processes through participation in daily work practices and observation of customer 
service. For the front-line staff learning is construc ed at the level of the routine; 
learning new standards, technologies, unlearning the old and becoming accomplished 
in meeting the changing numerical targets. The managers and staff of the OSS are 
operating at the level of single loop learning as identified by the lack of questioning, 
lack of challenge, the reluctance to take risks and strong managerial control, which 
prevents the development of learning levels and which reinforces the routinised 
steps. As organisational learning is used both directly and indirectly as a frame of 
reference, it is clearly relevant to service integration. This research focused on 
learning at different levels: individual, organisaton and government. Even with the 
type of flexible approach that has been taken in this research project, however, there 
are some difficulties with the concept of organisational learning. The processes of 
learning are not always clear, and even where they can be distinguished, using one 
level of learning as a basis for another, for example, learning of the front-line staff as 
a foundation for organisational learning of the single-window centre, is not 
unproblematic. Chapter 8 also highlighted the fact that issues such as learning and 
negotiating new identities are not straightforward. Therefore, while organisational 
learning and “communities of practice” are useful con epts there is a risk that their 
usage may mask issues of the lack of critical reflection, although this is an area on 
which further research is needed.  
 
The findings of this research are consistent with research findings on customer 
service organisations in the developed countries where front-line employees 
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performed high emotional labour, faced contradictions between quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions of public service delivery and were trapped within single-loop 
learning while being discouraged to challenge the existing practices. The experiences 
of different groups, OSS managers and front-line personnel, government officials in 
coordinating authorities, stakeholders, and customers, highlight the difficulties that 
are encountered with the public service integration process. The information on 
implementation of the single-window arrangements in practice and the tensions 
between the traditional bureaucracy and customer-ori ntated bureaucracy allowed a 
number of issues to be brought out in evaluating the policy. Constraints and 
problems relating to public service integration in the transitional context have been 
noted and a range of responses to these have been discussed, considering also how 
these have developed over time. Organisational learning and “communities of 
practice” were difficult to operationalise through the methods employed in this study, 
and the third question has perhaps the least detailed nswer, but the advantages and 
disadvantages were considered and its usefulness as a discourse have been noted.  
 
The literature on the applicability and appropriateness of managerial reforms in 
developing and transitional countries proved to be us ful for analysis of public 
service integration in Kazakhstan. Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004) model of 
explanatory public management reform variables (interaction between: 
socioeconomic forces, political system, elite decision-making, and administrative 
system) could be particularly useful for analysis of managerial reforms in 
Kazakhstan as a transitional country. Policy transfer literature takes a focus on policy 
goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; 
institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons. 
 
Institutionalist theory might be helpful to understand public management reform in 
transitional countries (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Ferlie et al., 1996). From an 
institutionalist perspective, if there is to be transition in organisations then three 
elements such as the formal structure, systems of decision-making, and underlying 
interpretive schemas, which include core values, beliefs and ideology, must change 
simultaneously, but such archetypical transition is unusual. Another theory, 
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complexity theory (Haynes, 2003; Mitleton-Kelly, 2003), could offer useful account 
of the implementation of managerial reforms. Teisman and van Buuren (2007) argue 
that the shape of managerial reforms is not only context specific but also process 
specific, reflecting the dynamics of the implementation process. They claim that the 
implementation of public management reforms is a co-ev lutionary rather than a 
linear process and “out of this co-evolutionary process, trajectory between different 
parts of the system (organisation, process, chain) and its environment, the concrete 
shape of the new public management reform emerges” (Teisman and van Buuren, 
2007: 183). This theoretical interpretation is offered in the context of managerial 
reforms in Western Europe and remains unexplored in eveloping and transitional 
countries.      
 
Overall, the research has provided breadth and depth in relation to these questions, 
but the answers raise new questions, which are discussed further below after a brief 
consideration of the research as a learning process.   
 
10.2 RESEARCH AS A LEARNING PROCESS 
 
The findings of the research in relation to the three research questions were 
summarised above, yet the research can be considered as a learning process not only 
in relation to answering research questions, but also learning about the process of 
research and the choices made. This section looks again t what was learnt from the 
research, this time in terms of what has been learnt empirically, theoretically, in 
relation to service integration policy and practice, and in terms of research design 
and methods. On this basis the significance and limitations of the research are then 
commented upon.  
 
The theoretical and empirical findings have already been summarised, and are 
therefore noted here briefly. The empirical findings consist of a range of experiences 
of the service integration process, and the impacts of policy, understandings of what 
service integration is and how it can be facilitated and constrained, changes that have 
occurred since the policy was launched, and challenges which remain or which have 
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arisen. The single-window policy has contributed to a shift away from a specific 
focus on service improvement, to the broader issues of applicability of managerial 
ideas in a transitional context. This brings challeng s not only in terms of resources 
and technologies, but, more importantly, in facilitating cultural change of the 
government apparatus from traditional bureaucracy to customer-orientated 
bureaucracy. In theoretical terms the research looked at existing concepts for service 
integration and how these might apply in a context of transitional country. The 
relevance of organisational learning and “communities of practice” within service 
integration context were also noted, again taking account of the issues of the current 
situation and a number of advantages and disadvantages were discussed. The 
difficulties in promoting double loop learning and critical reflection on the existing 
practices were discussed. 
 
Research as a learning process can also be considered from the perspective of what 
others can learn from the research. A number of implications have been noted in 
terms of policy and practice, as discussed in Section 10.1. These issues relate to the 
understanding of the service integration processes and changes in policy. The 
distinction between service integration as a process and an outcome also has 
implications, as there are challenges in promoting and facilitating the service 
integration, and after designing joined-up services n w issues have to be dealt with. 
Changes in policy such as the introduction of single-window arrangements have 
changed the context for public service delivery. These changes may lead to a need 
for a refocusing of resources and technologies, ongoing work on continuing 
adjustment of services. The main findings are restat d gain in the final summary.             
 
It is also important to reflect on what has been learnt about research design and 
practice from the process of carrying out the research, as discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 4. Doing pilot study was found extremely helpful in terms of getting access 
to the participants, testing research methods and choosing qualitative methods, in 
future I would include pilot study as a necessary component of the research. For 
future research I would begin access efforts earlier in the research process, I would 
also try to be wary of assumptions about the ways in which the different stages of the 
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research might facilitate each other, as changing roles from participant observer to 
interviewer within case study organisations proved difficult. That is not to say that 
different aspects of the research were not mutually beneficial as regards access, but 
not always as anticipated.       
 
On the basis of the findings outlined above and in relation to the research questions, 
and comments above, and having acknowledged limitatons, what can be said about 
the significance of this research? It looks at public service integration within a 
Kazakhstani context, and takes into account of views and experiences from new and 
traditional service providers, policy coordinators and service users. The single-
window policy usefully illustrates intergovernmental ensions that can arise when 
policies promoting public accountability, transparency and partnership working 
within transitional context. There is analysis of the complex nature of service 
integration, the ways in which it can be defined an promoted, and the difficulties 
related to implementing managerial ideas of decentralising management and 
customer-orientation. The contradictory dilemma betwe n the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of public services is used to identify and address some of the 
paradoxes of service integration in the Kazakhstani co text. The usefulness of the 
organisational learning and “communities of practice” is also analysed. In such a 
fast-moving policy environment, such research can only offer a snapshot of a 
particular point in a process which may have since moved on. The limitations of a 
small-scale study must also be acknowledged, and the difficulties of accessing a 
hard-to-reach and diverse group of participants limit the possibilities of 
generalisation. Nonetheless, the research makes both an empirical and theoretical 
contribution. Empirically, it builds on the knowledge and experiences of those 
involved in service integration, considering how its effects are shaped by 
implementation within a transitional context. In theoretical terms, it adds to the 
conceptual debates on applicability of NPM ideas in transitional countries by 
examining extent of implementation of decentralising management and customer-
orientation in the Kazakhstani context, and the implications of service integration as 




10.3 FINAL SUMMARY    
 
Using participant observation of the daily work practices within the customer service 
environment, analysis of policy documents and observation notes, interviews with 
the managers of the OSS and the coordinating body, and virtual ethnography of the 
customers’ views, this thesis has examined the impacts of the policy, the responses to 
the challenges of service integration and the uses of an organisational learning 
framework. In relation to these analytic themes, as outlined above, the main findings 
are: the tensions and the changing relationships between the traditional bureaucracy 
and customer-orientated bureaucracy; the complex nature of public service 
integration; the limited extent of organisational learning, and the challenges and 
constraints of service integration within a transitional context. While service 
integration creates particular difficulties, for example, related to connecting 
databases of different stakeholders, often the problems encountered in the design and 
delivery of joined-up services are existing issues of public service provision that are 
exacerbated within the context of the single-window policy. These issues relate to the 
lack of trust and effective communication between srvice providers, nepotism, and 
corruption flourishing in the public sector, centralised control discouraging critical 
reflection, and the separation by professional and organisational boundaries. Overall, 
the responses to the single-window policy in Kazakhstan have highlighted the 
importance of a multi-level, partnership-based, flexible approach as service 
integration presents challenges for individuals, servic  providers, service users, 
policy makers and the government apparatus as a whole. A significant amount of 
progress has been made since the single-window policy was launched, but policies, 
procedures and power dimensions continue to change, changing the context for 
service integration and bringing new challenges.  
 
This research presents a snapshot not only of the OSS policy implementation but of 
the overall political and administrative situation i  the country. This research 
revealed striking similarities in Kazakhstan with ot er transitional countries in terms 
of facing both institutional and socio-cultural constraints during implementation of 
managerial reforms as described in Chapter 2. While lacking knowledge and state 
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capacity, the Kazakhstani government anxiously embraced NPM principles as a 
panacea for public service failures, ineffectiveness and corruption. The literature 
outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that the applicability of NPM is dependent upon the 
nature of relations between the state and civil society. Public pressure and people’s 
expectations of better service played a large role in the successful implementation of 
administrative reforms in developed countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). In 
liberal democracies citizens are increasingly expecting quality and value for money 
from their public services. In considering the application of the NPM model to the 
Kazakhstani context as a transitional country, several important points need to be 
highlighted. First, the extent to which the demands of the society have put pressure 
on the government and, second, how far the government institutions have given way 
to pressures for the implementation of managerial-type reforms. The Kazakhstani 
government has not faced the same sorts of pressures from civil society that are faced 
in advanced Western democracies. The nature of the relationship between the state 
and civil society within Kazakhstan suppresses demands upon government. The first 
element of the relationship is a weak civil society which has not organised as interest 
groups to influence government’s decisions and actions. The second is a deep-seated 
respect and fear for authority and the state which results in a lack of demand for 
accountability. On the other hand, Walsh (1995: 71) argues, that the “more unified 
and centralised the system of political control and power, the easier it is to introduce 
new approaches to the management of public services.”  This research showed that 
Kazakhstan is a country where government bodies can be put under authoritarian 
pressure to implement managerial reforms. There is an autocratic imperative to 
improve quality of public services and reduce corruption with evidence of significant 
progress and failure in certain areas. Major administrative reforms have taken place 
to introduce customer-orientation service and decentralizing management, downsize 
the government apparatus, implement public service standards for all government 
bodies and technologies for improving access to the service users.            
 
The lack of state capacity is considered to be a significant constraint to the 
implementation of managerial reforms, as highlighted in literature review in Chapter 
2. Kazakhstan is a highly centralised state with a lot of power in the hands of the 
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central government. As a consequence, Kazakhstan should have the capacity to 
implement such reforms, if the government were to be committed to them. However, 
the Kazakhstani political system also contains other factors that operate against NPM 
reform. An important factor that severely limited the introduction of managerial 
reforms was clientism, nepotism and corruption which are fundamental 
characteristics of the local political system (Cummings, 2007; Perlman and Gleason, 
2007; Schatz, 2005). Managerial reforms which promote public accountability, 
transparency in policy-making and social inclusion have posed a threat to the elite 
control over state resources. NPM incorporates the importation of private sector 
management systems and techniques into the public services. Flexibility, innovation, 
the right to manage and delegation are promoted as valued behaviours by NPM. Such 
principles require administrators to become managers. However, as this research 
shows, in Kazakhstan the main administrative values ar  authoritative interpersonal 
relations and avoidance of initiative and responsibility. The major influential factors 
for these values are socio-cultural. Submissive andpaternalistic tendencies, the 
avoidance of initiation and innovation are inherited within patriarchal, authoritarian, 
and relations-based system. This clearly presents a fundamental cultural difference 
from the principles underlying NPM. The prevailing administrative practices and 
procedures clash with democratic principles. The centralised decision-making 
structure, political loyalty-based recruitment, promotion and reward, as well as law-
oriented administration hamper the introduction of delegated authority, customer-
oriented service and merit-based personnel practices promoted by the NPM ideology.  
 
As public service integration is a topical political issue, there are a number of 
potential audiences for this research including servic  providers, policy makers and 
academic researchers. What can the research offer fr these different audiences? For 
service providers the research provides an assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the single-window policy, the challenges faced and the way these 
challenges have been addressed. For academics and policy makers the research 
makes a valuable contribution to the scholarship on the applicability and 
appropriateness of managerial reforms in transitional countries, and highlights issues 
of  ongoing importance, such as limited extent of public service improvement in the 
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corrupt and relations-based system, need for cultural shift from the traditional 
bureaucracy to the customer-orientated bureaucracy, new challenges and problematic 
aspects arising from re-contextualization of Western managerial reforms in 
transitional countries. Also in academic terms the research adds to debates around 
service integration concept analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of using 
organisational learning framework.  
 
The overall conclusion from this research is that managerial reforms are not 
universally applicable and might lead to unexpected outcomes in transitional 
countries. Though the Kazakhstani government attempt d to introduce NPM 
principles through major legislative changes, this ha  not necessarily made it more 
customer-orientated, accountable to the public, transp rent and less corrupt. Since the 
situation in the Kazakhstani political system is rather similar to the situation in other 
post-Soviet countries, except the Baltic states, the findings of this research might be 
of particular interest for academics and practitioners who are interested in NPM 
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MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN 
45, Pobedy Street, Astana, 010000, tel. (3172) 39-12-13, fax (3172) 32-54-44 
 
No. 11-3-3/12397 dated 26.12.2006  
 
 
To: Civil Service Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
 
In response to the letter dated 
23.11.2006 # 03-01-11/1148u 
 
 
The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan supports your initiative to 
conduct analytical research on the One Stop Shop in Kazakhstan with participation 
of foreign experts and expresses willingness for cooperation to improve quality of 
public services.  
 
 









• To gather reflections of the OSS managers on the experience of service 
integration  
• To determine benefits and barriers faced by the OSSmanagers  
• To understand needs of the OSS to improve service integration  
 
Introduction  
• Introduce purpose of research; timing; consent 
 
1. Present circumstances  
• Age/gender 
• Summary of current activity (work, education) 
• Current residence  
 
2. Concepts  
What do they understand by “one stop shop” concept? What are its components? 
 
3. What do they see as the drivers for service integra ion? (prompts: global, 
Kazakhstan: central and regional level) 
a) Why services of registration were largely chosen? (prompts: what about social 
services) 
 
4. What do they see as the benefits of service integra ion (both expected and 
emerging)? (prompts: for government, their organisation, stakeholders, public sector 
as a whole, customers, businesses)  
 
5. What do they see as the barriers to service integration? (prompts: political, 
cultural, technological) 
 
6. In looking particularly at the pilot projects of One Stop Shops: 
a) what did they have in place at the beginning of the project? 
b) what did they do? what happened (details of the process)? what support 
(infrastructure, consultation, training) were provided for their organisation? 
c) were there any unintended outcomes? 
d) if they had to do the pilot again, what would they change? 
e) when regions are to undertake a similar projects, what would they need to have in 
place to have a successful outcome?  
 
7. Has service integration met their expectations? (prompts: why, why not, what 
needs to be done)  What has changed in terms of quality of service delivery, relations 
among managers, staff, stakeholders and customers?    
 
Ending: give contact details  
 
